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INTRODUCTORY 
OF late the interest of the British public has been 
centred on the internd problems of the Indian 
Empire, and chiefly those connected with the 
Hindu portion of the population. As a result 
of the alarming wave of sedition that swept over 
Bengal, accompanied by Brahmanical revivals in 
the two Presidencies, the affairs of the North- 
West Frontier, together with the problems con- 
nected with the Mahommedan subjects of the 
Icing-Emperor, have gradually been relegated to 
a hazardous obscurity, and have not received the 
attention they deserved. The crisis on the frontier 
in the autumn of 1910, as a direct result of the 
suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf, 
has had the effect of switching the limelight once 
again on to this most interesting quarter. People 
are a t  last beginning to realize that if the arming 
of the Pathan belt continues, a fiontier rising in 
the future will be an affair of infinitely more gravity 
than heretofore. But in spite of this the opera- 
tions of the blockadiilg squadroil in the Persian 
Gulf are not sufficieiltly recognized as ail integral 
part of frontier policy, r~11Ci have attracted atten- 
xi 
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tion more from the hazardous nature of the under- 
taking than from any bearing that the ultimate 
suppression of the traffic may have on the tran- 
cpillity of the frontier. It is with this object, 
namely, of emphasizing the connection betweell 
the operations of the blockading squadron and 
the preservation of peace on the Pathan border, 
that I have ventured on the publication of this 
book. Though it in no sense aims at bringing 
the history of the frontier up to date, yet so 
little has been written on this subject since the 
publication of Mr. Chirol's " Middle Eastern 
Question " and Mr. Angus Hamilton's cc Afghan- 
istan" (to both of which I am indebted as well for 
the interest I have felt in the subject as for the 
information therein contained) that I have thought 
it worth while to devote a chapter to a prdcis of 
the Zakka Khel and Mohmand Expeditions. 
But it is not only against the independent tribes 
that anxiety is felt. For a long while now the 
attitude of the Amir has given cause for anxious 
speculation as to the real motives that have 
actuated his policy. Authorities on the frontier 
would be puzzled to give a dogmatic answer to the 
question, " What is the true policy of the  Amir ?" 
Many would say that he was bonestly anxious 
to fulfil his treaty obligations with the British, but 
that he was dcbarred from doing so in an open 
manner through fear of the loss of influence with 
his subjects which would result from the main- 
tenance of too close relations with the Govern - 
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seeing policy which aims at  the complete inde- 
pei~deilce of tlie Afghan kingdom of both Great 
Britain and Russia. Many circumstances point to 1 
the idea that the Amir is contemplating a coup 
of some sort in the near future. Not; least among , I 
these is the feverish activity which characterizes 
I 
the training of the Afghan army. A t  the review 
4 
a t  Agra during his visit to  India in January, 1907, 
the Ainir is said to  have reviled his Sirdars for j 
having led him to believe in the efficiency of his I t l  
army as a fighting machine. Turkish officers are 
now engaged in training the Afghan sepoys; 
modern guns and ammunition are manufactured 
in Kabul; great attention is paid to the mobility 
of the force as a whole, and to the clothing 
(especially boots) and comfort of the individual 
soldier. Armed with modern iifles, the Afghan I 
army would no doubt prove a formidable fighting I 
machine in war. But the danger lies in the fact I 
that when the Amir takes it into his head that 
1 
I 
he is in a position to throw off our control he will 
probably make the attempt, and though we may 
be sure of the issue in the end, we shall not escape 
a lengthy campaign and a vast expenditure of 
treasure, coupled with the anxiety of seditious 
risings in India at  any moment. 
The account of the operations of the Mekran 
Field Force may have a certain interest, seeing that 
this cdrner of the Persian domillions has beell so 
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rarely visited by Europeans. But the narrative 
must necessarily be rather bare of incident, for 
the cogent reason that (' a inan armed" is not so 
likely to be admitted illto the family circle of those 
against whom he is marching, or to see '( the little 
savages at play," as a traveller of more peaceable 
intentions. On the march to  Bint hardly a soul 
was seen, and what few villages we passed were 
deserted. I t  was the same story in Biyaban, 
though here we had the good-fortune to fall 
in with the gun-runners, my account of which I 
liope will compare with the account they gave of 
themselves. 
I am indebted to the Times for permission to 
make use of articles of mine contributed from the 
scene of the operations, as well as for the one con- 
tained in the second half of the chapter on the 
Autumn Crisis on the Frontier. Much of the 
subject-matter has been rearranged to suit the 
lapse of time which has occurred. I am also 
indebted to t l ~ e  proprietors of the Or~looker for 
peri~ission to reproduce photographs of the expedi- 
tion, taken by myself, which appeared in that paper. 
ARNOLD KEPPEL. 
QUIDENDHAM, NORFOLK. 
October 7, 19 1 1 .  
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GUN-RUNNING AND THE 
INDIAN NORTH-WEST FRONTIER 
CHAPTER I 
PESHAWAR AND T H E  KHAIBAR PASS 
when the spring-time flushes the desert grass, 
Our Kafilas wind through the Khyber Pass. 
Lean are the camels, but fat the frails ; 
Light are the purses, but heavy the bales, 
As the  snow-bouncl trade of the North comes down 
To the market square of Peshawar Town." 
Bn~rack-Room Ballnds. 
THE rapidity with which, on the North-West 
Frontier of India, events develop into a crisis, and 
the latitude that must in consequence be allowed 
in dealing with them to the Political Officer in 
charge on the spot, led to  the formation, by Lord 
Curzon in 1901 of the North-West Frontier 
Province, out of the trans-Indus districts of the 
Punjab, under a Chief Colnmissioner directly in 
touch with the Government of India in the Foreign 
Department. A similar scheme had already been 
formulated and approved by Lord Lytton in 1877, 
1 
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which would have placed the political control of 
the frontier under the Foreign Department, the 
internal administration remaining, as before, under 
the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The 
outbreak of the second Afghan War, however, 
prevented this scheme being carried into effect, 
and it was not till after the close of the Tirah 
Campaign that it was again revived under the 
viceroyalty of Lord Elgin. It remained, never- 
theless, to Lord Curzon to point out the weak 
spot, and to insist on the transfer of both political 
and administrative departments to the Govern- 
ment of India as the only practical means of 
insuring a successful grappling with the frontier 
problem. By this masterstroke of constructive I 
statesmanship Lord Curzon succeeded at one 
stroke in giving to the affairs of the frontier their 
proper place and true significance in the foreign 
policy of the Indian Empire. It was inevitable in 
a huge district like the Punjab, one of the richest 
in the whole of India, that the affairs of a few 
small hill-tribes should receive inadequate if con- 
scientious attention, and that their petitions should 
be shelved and their legitimate aspirations mis- 
understood. The Lieutenant-Governor of the 
Punjab had more than enough to do in super- 
intending the economic development of the district 
under his care, in staving off the insistent claims of 
famine, disease, and pestilence ; and questions which, 
owing to the pressure of ordinary administrative 
routine work, had to be held over to await their 
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turn were found on examination to have assumed 
such dimensions and to wear such a tl~seateniiig 
aspect as t o  leave nothing to  be done but to  
entrust the matter to the tender mercies of the 
Punjnb Frontier Force. Moreover, the Lieutenant- 
Governor of the Punjab might be an Indian civilian, 
wit11 Indian civilian modes of thought, and the 
politics of the frontier might be to him the merest 
Greek. The task of coping with the innumerable 
little pitfalls of Pathan or Afghan statecraft requires 
a more than usually firm grasp of the working of 
the Pathan or Afghan mind, and more than a 
nodding acquaintance with the broad lines of 
frontier policy. Never did the personal equation 
enter more into the successful management of the 
people of India than it does with the wild and 
lawless tribes of the Afghan marches-wild and 
lawless through sheer wanton savagery, but capable 
of being schooled and led little by little and 
step by step into the paths of righteousness by 
a firm hand, and by the knowledge that their 
~et i t ions  are read and considered by someone who 
is interested in their welfare, just in his deal- 
ings, and, above all, who is in constant personal 
touch with the headmen, or c6malilrs,J' of their 
tribe. 
A mere glance at  the map is totally inadequate 
to  coilvey t o  the reader the tribal dispositions, the 
natural divisions, the artificial frontiers, and the 
character of the country of wliich the North-West 
Frontier is made up. In its extraordinary coln- 
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plexity, both politically and geographically, the  
serrated sharb's -tooth line which bisects t he  
province, forming what is known as the "Inde- 
pendent Border," cannot be better understood 
than by clasping the two hands together and 
interlacing the fingers, so that those of the right 
harid may represent the roads running up through 
independent territory to the British outposts or  
political agencies a t  their heads, and the fingers 
of the left hand the long spurs of mountainous 
independent territory that run down into the rich 
level plains of Peshawar and the Derajat. The  
knuckles of the right hand will then represent the 
five district centres of Hazara, Peshawar, ICohat, 
I Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. I n  each of these 
districts settled government exists, and the ad- 
ministration does not differ in essentials fiom that  
of other provinces. I n  independent territo~y, how- 
ever, we do not attempt any administration i n  
the ordinary acceptation of the word. No taxes 
are collected, and justice is meted out, not accord- 
ing to the Indian penal code, but by the "jirga," 
or assembly of the elders of the tribe. A mass 
meeting of the elders of the whole of the Afridi 
tribe, for instance, would correspond very much 
to the old '' Shiremote" of the Saxon heptarchy ;, 
and, indeed, there is more in the simile than one 
would expect a t  the first glaace, for the democratic 
spirit that is so characteristic a feature in the  
gradual growth of English customs finds its 
counterpart in the spirit of liberty and right of free 
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CHARACTER OF THE PATHAN 5 
action that is one of the most cherished preroga- 
tives of the Pathan tribesman, be he never so 
humble. This spirit finds its chief expression in 
the manly bearing, open countenance, and almost 
indefinable dignity of this hardy race of hillmen, 
whose life is one long struggle for the barest 
existence on the outskirts of a "promised land" 
of unsurpassed richness, and is one of the qualities 
that most inevitably endears him to the English- 
man who has spent his life among them, and has, 
in consequence, acquired an almost native love for 
the wild and forbidding highland glens and theis 
lawless denizens. 
The Pathan has been dubbed cruel, treacherous, 
miserly, and, in fact, every epithet of an oppro- 
brious nature has been showered on his devoted 
head at  one time or another by men who were 
either incapable of seeing things from the Pathan 
point of view, and of making allowances for his 
shortcomings, or who were so hidebound by the 
humanity-mongering sentimentality which passes 
to-day for the hall-mark of a liberal mind that 
they shudderingly dismissed the Pathan from their 
thoughts (presumably with pious ejaculations) as 
an  unreclaimable savage. And yet the same man, 
in all probability, would reserve a corner in his 
heart for Cesar Borgia, Louis XI., or King John, 
and even find an excuse for the atrocities of " Jack 
the Ripper" under the plea of crime passio~znel. 
Here i t  may be as well to point out that the vast 
majority of murders committed on the North- 
R 
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West Frontier, for which the unlucky perpetrator 
would in all probability receive a sentence of death 
from the horrified Pharisee, are actuated by 
jealousy; that the vast majority of raids into 
British territory are committed out of sheer 
hunger and desperation; and that nearly every 
attack on British officers or civilians has been 
carefully planned by bigoted and fanatical priests, 
who hold out to their ignorant and only too willing 
tools the prospect of paradise and salvation as the 
reward for the killing of a hated '( unbeliever." 
As to his miserliness, i t  is the miserliness of him 
from whom bas been taken even that which he 
had; and though the Pathan is undoubtedly 
acquisitive, yet he lacks the cunning to turn this 
trait to good account, and the moneylenders of 
Peshawar and Kabul, who grow fat on the duller 
wits of the Semitic Afghan and Pathan, are the 
Hindu c c  bannias," who are tolerated in the midst 
of the Mahommedan community on account of 
their business capacity, but who are, however, 
compelled to wear a distinctive headgear on 
account of their religion, consisting either of a 
red or yellow puggaree or a small skullcap. 
These are the colours of the Hindu religion, and 
for this reason the Mahommedan dons with 
the greatest reluctance the scarlet livery of the 
But if the Pathan is unable to turn to advantage 
his miserly propensities, he knows full well how 
to dip his hook into the flesh-pots of the wealthy 
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Hindu bannias of Peshawar. Raids on Pesh- 
awar City itself in the old days were by no means 
an uncommon event, the last recorded being that 
which occurred early in 1908, when a band of from 
sixty to eighty Zalcka Ichel Afridis looted the 
Hindu quarter, always the first point to be made 
for, killing two policemen, wounding a score of 
men, and carrying off booty to the value of at 
least one lakh of rupees. It was this raid that 
heralded the despatch of an expedition against the 
Zakka Khel into the Bazar Valley. Since then 
the probability of successfully carrying out a raid 
on Peshawar has been materially reduced by the 
careful patrolling of the Peshawar border, and the 
immediate notification to all fortified posts, from 
Michni to Bara Fort, of the presence of any band 
of marauding tribes-people that may justly be 
suspected of being on the war-path. The oppor- 
tunity of wrecking the Hindu quarter does, 
however, occur at certain intervals, when the 
coincidence of a Hindu and a Mahommedan 
festival causes racial feeling, and a riot ensues. 
Such a scene took place in March, 1910, when 
the Hindu festival of rejoicing (the " Holli ") fell on 
the same day as the Mahommedan feast of mourn- 
ing (((Barawafat "), when the mourners went about 
the streets, only to be pelted with bricks from the 
upper windows. The demise of one Mahommedan, 
who had been hit by one of the missiles, was the 
signal for a general rush to the Hindu quarter, 
which was incontinently stripped bare, the carpet- 
8 PESHAWAR AND THE KHAIBAR PASS 
dealers losing practically the whole of their store 
of carpets, which had just arrived from Penjdeh. 
A t  such a time Peshawar is full of Musalmans 
from every part of Central Asia-l'athans, Ghilzais, 
Hazaras, Bokharans, Turcomans, ICabulis, and 
Heratis-and presents a curiously cosmopolitan 
aspect, so that it is truly said that when you have 
crossed the Indus you are no longer in India, but 
in Central Asia. 
Situated as i t  is at the very mouth of the 
~ h a i b a r  Pass, and forming as it does the connect- 
ing link between Central Asia and Hindustan, it is 
natural that Peshawar should constitute the chief 
entrepSt for Central Asian trade, and therefore the 
political centre for frontier intrigue. Dera Ismail 
Khan, in the south of the province, fills the same 1 position with regard to Waziristan and Southern -
Afghanistan, since it constitutes the point on which 
the pass-roads through the Suleirnan Range con- 
verge. I n  a minor degree Icohat fulfils the same 
office for the Rurram and Tochi Valleys. But 
it is in Peshawar itself that the trained hand may 
keep its finger on the pulse of trans-border feeling, 
and in its bazaars that the first throb of unrest gives 
vague presage of trouble. 
The city of Peshawar lies in a semicircular 
valley surrounded on all sides by mountains, low a t  
first to the  eastward, where the Kabul River and its 
muddy tributaries make their way to the Indus, 
but rising gradually as they sweep round to the 
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culminate due west in the massive peak of Lalcka, 
the  highest point in the Tartarra or Ilhaibar Range, 
which stands sentinel over the most historic pass in 
the  history of the world. From tlie Gorlcatri, the 
palace of the Governor of the old Silrh province, 
situated in the centre of the town, a magnificent 
view can be obtained towards sunset of the en- 
circling panorama, and on a clear day to the north- 
west may be descried the mountains of Bajaur, and 
in  winter, perhaps, a glimpse of the snows on 
the  summit of the far-away Lowari Pass, which 
for four solid months divides the little garrison of 
Chitrd from the outside world. It was in this 
palace that the terrible Sikh Governor, General 
Avitiibile, an Italian by birth, lmown to his subjects 
and to posterity as Abu Tabela, seated on a suinp- 
tuous divan, and attired in a flowing garment of 
red silk, dispensed a summary and somewhat 
primitive justice to the turbulent populace of 
Peshawar. It was his boast -that he lrept Pesha- 
war in order by the simple expedient of hanging 
every week four of the most promineilt citizens. 
Round the foot of this palace, and extending some 
way to  the southward, lie the intricate and tortuous 
alleys, the mud hovels of the poor, the briclc houses 
of the well-to-do, the bazaars of the coppersmiths 
and silversmiths, the leather-workers, the carpet- 
sellers, the silk - merchants, the tea - merchants, 
and a host of others, and in this labyrinth of 
filth and evil odours dwell 100,000 mystel-ious 
Orientals, here to-day and gone to-morrow, the 
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places of those who leave for the passes always 
being filled by the constant stream of those that 
arrive. To stand at  the western gate of the city 
and to watch the long files of camels as they 
dawdle past on their way to the " kafila-serai," gur- 
gling and bellowing under their loads, is a liberal 
education in itself. Here a confused mass of long- 
haired, two-humped Bactrian camels, supporting 
enormous bales of carpets, block the way, and 
behind them comes a long string of the one-humped 
Arabian variety, with a contribution of old rags and 
malodorous asafetida, to the general discomfiture 
of a mixed flock of " dumba," or fat-tailed Afghan 
sheep, long-eared goats, and small brown cattle. 
These are goaded on by lanky youths armed with 
stout sticks, and ancient white puggarees wound 
round their heads. Presently will come a buffalo 
moving stolidly forward under a t  least a ton of 
sugar-cane, while an Afghan, with pointed a culla," 
henna-dyed beard, a drab-coloured Poshtin coat 
embroidered with yellow silk, baggy white trousers 
caught in at the ankle, and curly-toed Peshauri 
shoon, all complete, jogs by on a mouse-coloured 
trotting donkey. All this vision of the teeming life 
of the fkontier town is seen through a dense veil of 
dust, from out of wllich issues the raucous voice 
of invisible Jehus, bidding the unwary "Batchka ! 
garhiwallah !" " Batchka ! Apridiah !" (0 Afridi), 
each in turn being apostrophized with unerring 
accuracy, according to the calling or the tribe to 
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while in the neigl~bouring caravanserai the long- 
suffering camel subsides like a collapsing suspension 
bridge, to the muttered exhortation of the camel- 
man, 6' Ush 1 Ush ! be imana I" (Kneel 1 kneel l 0 
dishonourable one I) 
The Ichaibar Pass itself is, of course, one of the 
principal places of pilgrimage for the traveller in 
India, attracting him from down-country wander- 
ings with an almost hypnotic influence. I, too, was 
no stranger to  these feelings, as in response to an 
invitation from Major Bickford, Commandant of 
the  Ichaibar Rifles, I hired a bazaar tum-tum " 
(two-wheeled cart) and drove out through the long 
avenue of Peshawar Cantonment to spend a couple 
of days at Landi Kotal. Passing the lines of 
the  Munsters and the 51st Sikhs, and the Guard 
House surrounded with barbed-wire entanglements 
as a precaution against rifle-stealers, we debouch 
upon the broad military road that leads straight as 
an arrow to the old Sikh fort of Jamrud. Parallel 
to us and on our left runs the single line of the 
Peshawar-Jamrud Railway, along which daily the 
Flying Afridi " clanks and groans. Presently we 
reach Icacha Garhi, railway-station and fortified 
post, where the Kabul River Railway branches off 
northwards t o  its unknown terminus among the 
Mullagori Hills. Here I pick up my host, and we 
drive on to tiffin at Jamrud. On the way he 
points out to  me the different landmarks in the 
surrounding country. To  the north and north- 
west among those hills is the country of the Moh- 
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mands ; to  the west-south-west, behind a high ridge, 
the Bazar Valley ; to the south lies Tirah and the 
Bara Valley, and a little farther to  the eastward the 
low neck of the Icohat Pass. Among those low 
foothills on our left dwell two septs of the Icuki 
IChel Afridi, at deadly feud with one another. 
Their fortified villages may just be descried in a fold 
of the hills. This feud is carried on by means 
of artillery. Each village has an old muzzle- 
loading cannon, but between them they can only 
muster thirteen or fourteen cannon-balls, the re- 
mainder being presumably embedded in the mud 
walls of the strongholds. These cannon-balls are 
solemnly fied backwards and forwards whenever 
the feud breaks out. The " game," of course, is to 
make a " corner " in cannon-balls, when terms may 
be dictated for the time being by the successful 
collector. But, like blackmail, the power which 
the possession of the cannon-balls gives is only 
efficacious as long as they remain unexpended. 
This never lasts for long, as the childish folk 
cannot long resist the intense pleasure of firing 
the cannon. From time to time we pass evil- 
looking scoundrels, who eye us with fierce and 
lowering brow, or perhaps their faces light up in 
answer to  the cheery Pushtu salutation, "May you 
never be tired!" to which the invariable reply 
is, " May you never be poor !" The fact remains 
that the Afridi is poor--abjectly poor, though he is 
never tired. 
The entrance to the Khaibar lies some two and 



























:hind a high ridge, 
ies Tirah and the 
r t he  eastward the 
kmollg those low 
iepts of the l h k i  
rith one another, 
: descried in a fold 
ied on by means 
a n  old mnuzzle- 
Ern they can only 
uilon-balls, the re- 
:dded in the  mud 
e cannon-baUs are 
'orwards whenever 
le," of course, is t o  
;, when terins may 
by the successful 
the power which 
~a l l s  gives is only 
main unexpended. 
t h e  childish folk 
pleasure of firing 
,ime we pass evil- 
s with fierce and 
r faces light up in 
.utation, " May you 
~e invariable reply 
T h e  fact remains 
I poor, though he is  
lies some two and 
ALI MASJID 13 
a half miles beyond Jamrud,and the change from the 
perfectly flat plain to the rocky, mountainous defile 
is very abrupt. Up and up leads the road in ser- 
pentine convolutions, doubling, twisting, writhing, 
until the Chargai IZota1 is reached, with the Chalxai 
Post perched on the top of an unscalable rock lilre 
a pinnacle of the temple. Here a gradual descent 
begins, and a little farther on the road up to the 
Chura Pass into the Bazar Valley is passed. I t  
was close here that Sir Havelock Allan lost his life, 
shot by Afridis. And now the gorge begins t o  
narrow, and the road sweeps down to Ali Masjid, 
situated at the narrowest and most forbidding 
portion of the pass. The ancient Sikh fortress, 
surmounted by the British fort, towers above, 
completely dominating the defile. Formerly the 
road lay along the bed of the streamlet, and one 
can well imagine the difficulties of its passage 
during the first Afghan War, and the awful rep- 
utation which it then gained. But since 1851 
it runs along the northern scarp, though even now 
one can hardly repress a shudder at its dark and 
sombre aspect, so pregnant with disaster. 
Between Ali Masjid and the first Zakka IChel 
village that announces the end of the pass, we had 
the misfortune to pass one of the longest kafilas 
that I saw, either here in subsequent visits 
to the Khaibar, or in the Icurram, or crossing 
the bed of the Indus at Dera Ismail Khan. There 
must have been fully 800 camels, peacefully 
plodding along on their way to Kabul, with what 
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peak of Sikaram above Parachinar in Kurram, full 
15,000 feet high. 
Up  here it was quite chilly, the month being 
December, and we returned to the warm fire in the 
mess-room of the Khaibar Rifles in the fort, zfter 
paying a visit to the men's quarters and watching 
them prepare their evening meal of chupatties, 
curried dal, and rice. Chupatties are merely 
unleavened pancakes made of flour, water, and ghee 
(clarified butter), baked on ail iron girdle. Dal 
is a kind of lentil. W e  also entered the hospital 
in the fort, in which at the time there were no 
sepoys. There were, however, a few sick tribesinen 
from tlie surrounding villages, suffering from bron- 
chitis, cataract, and o t h e ~  diseases, and a Laghmal~ 
Afghan, who bad sustained a severe wound in 
some trans-border affray. H e  was being nursed by 
his own father, who had brought him in. The 
surest way to  the heart of an Afghan or a Pathan 
is the ability to heal him, and this certainly ac- 
counts for the personal immunity with which the 
famous " dalctar-sahib " of Bannu, the Rev. Mr. 
Pennell, can move about in independent tribal 
territory, ail ccunbeliever" in a Muslim country, 
and for tlie respect in which he is held by the 
usually so fanatical mullas. 
On the following day, in company with Major 
Biclrford and Captain Galbraith, 55th Colce's 
Rifles, P.F.F., I walked down to the Afghan 
frontier at Torkham, past the enormous mud- 
walled kafila-serai just outside Landi ICotal, and 
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past the block-house at Michni IZandao, which was thi 
attacked by an Afghan " lashkar " during the aln 
Mohmand rising of 1903. Beyond this is the tiv 
first Afghan post of Paindi Icakh. The boundary wa 
here has never been properly delimited, and the strl 
Afghans in consequence lay claim to the water- k a ~  
supply a t  Landi IChana, between Tor Kham and Ka 
Michni Kandao, with the object of gaining control in 
over the stream which rises here and drains into the Ka 
Kabul River below Dalcka Fort. The question of me 
water-supply is always a very important one in a as 
country where practically every crop depends on of 
Ka 
The inhabitants of the villages round Landi disc 
Kotal live chiefly by carrying firewood into rou 
Peshawar, and this also is the principal occupation Toi 
of the poorer cave-dwelling Afridis, whose caves far 
we had passed on our way up the Ichaibar. To me hlai 
it is a mystery where the wood comes from, as I 1 
never saw a tree of any kind, or even a, sh~sub Riv 
capable of producing firewood, except the sorry of 
scrub that occasionally crops up in barren and un- a lz 
expected places. As a second string to his bow, ing 
when firewood fails, the resourceful Afridi can to s 
always support life by raiding. is e, 
To the north of L a i d  ICotal lies the little- by 
known territory of the Shilmanis and Mullagoris, this 
dwelling on the right bank of the Kabul River. bod 
These two tribes inhabit the natural cul-de-sac Waf 
formed by the great northerly bend that the Y 
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this country runs the Mullagori Road and the 
almost legendary Icabul River Railway, as altenla- 
tive strategic routes from Peshawar. From the 
walls of Landi Rota1 one may see the road 
stretching away to the north-east as far as the 
kandao which forrns the southern barrier of the 
ICam Shilman Valley. What lies beyond is veiled 
in mystery. Torkamr-the point to which the 
Kabul River Railway was sanctioned by Parlia- 
ment-is a mere geographical expression as far 
as the outside world is concerned. The difficulty 
of railway constl*uction in the ilarrow gorge of the 
Kabul E v e r  may be apprehended from the heated 
discussions that took place over the selection of the 
route. We know that the railway never reached 
Torkamr, although the " flying Afridi " runs as 
far as Warsak,* the last station in the Peshawar 
plain. 
The reasons for the construction of the Kabul 
River nailway are to be found in the inadequacy 
of the IChaibar roads for the rapid despatch of 
a large army into Afghanistan, and for provision- 
ing it when there. Supposing we ever had occasion 
to  send an army into Afghanistan, this one avenge 
is easily interrupted, flanked as it is on both sides 
by presumably hostile Afridi tribes. In any case 
this road would never be sufficient for supplying a 
body of, say, froin 60,000 to 100,000 men, and so it 
was thought advisable to have alternative lLoutes. In  
* This Warsak must not be confused with the Warsalr in the 
h e  Shilman Valley. 
3 
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pursuance of this line of policy the Mullagori Road 
was constructed, and the Loe Shilman or Kabul 
River Railway sanctioned as far as Torkamr. I n  
1 a later chapter we shall see what trouble arose out 
of its construction. Beyond Torkamr a discussion 
arose as to the best route to  be followed to the 
Afghan frontier. Lord ICitchener, then Com- 
mander-in-Chief, advocated a direct route west- 
ward up the Loe Shilman Valley, thence tlwough a 
tunnel to the west of Warsak to the village of 
Smatsai, below Dakka Fort. But, principally on 
account of the expense that the construction of this 
tunnel would have entailed, it was eventually 
decided to follow the course of the Kabul River 
upstream along the big northerly bend past Palosi, 
a route which presented fewer engineering diffi- 
culties. Ultimately further construction was post- 
poned. It is to be hoped that this decision was 
dictated by consideration of real policy, and not by 
the wave of economy which from time to  time 
seems to  sweep over the India Office, like a plague 
of locusts, blighting every progressive or expedient 
measure it may happen to encounter. 
Though by no means so frequented by former in- 
vaders of India as the Khaibar Pass, this route was 
undoubtedly known to the ancients, and would, in- 
deed, be a more rational route to follow than the 
narrow and tortuous Khsibar, inhabited by the 
warlike Aparytz (Afridi), as Herodotus calls them. 
Though a portion of Alexander's troops made the 
passage of the Khaibar, the majority are supposed 
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t o  have gone by the more northerly route. The 
old camel-road of ihe Buddhist pilgrims exists 
also, which was, and, I believe, still is, used on 
occasion by the Amir's "dak-runners" as an 
alternative to the Khaibar. 
CHAPTER I1 
'I'HE ZAKKA KHEL AND hiO1lMAND EXPEDITIONS 
'Tis N'ar, red War, I'll give you then, 
War till my sinews fail ; 
For a wrong you have dorie to a Chief of Men, 
And a Tliief of the Zokka Kheyl." 
KIPLIXG : Lament o f f h e  Borila 
Catlle TlrieJ: 
1 Srsc~: the fi~ial quelling of the revolt of 1897 in 
'Sir:il~, t l ~ c  rlfridi border had rernni~ied comparatively 
I~e:'odul, but for the spasmodic raiding of various 
barids of outlnws, ~zxltil iri 1004 i t  again began to 
rosporid to tlie secret n-iachin:~tions of the fanatical 
R~iglopliobe party in Ilabul. I n  that year large 
~luliibers of Afridis visited the Afghan metropolis, 
being well received by tlie Amir, and sent away 
with prcsents of money, after liaving purchased 
co~isiclcrl~ble quantities of arms and ammunition. 
Friendly relatiorls with Kabul were still further 
cemented wit11 the assistance of one I<l~awwas 
IClian, a ~ l  ex-malik of the Zakka Khel and a former 
citizen of Peshawar, through whose instrumentality 
the Afiidi clans were enabled more and more to  
cou~lt on the support of a powerful faction among 
the counsellors of the  Arnir. In fact, to such a 
dqret.  did this nltfagP zt:*s. 
n;;ndoft'ttie .+iruir tl; 2 %  t i , r ~  
l ~ h e n  tlic tirlne ~l;r%ta-r;-: s.? 
~hic'1) the ,ifritlir wt+ ", ?.-. 
Ing  en the supptrb w'.; ,  
pcd ca~tw firr :i?xtc ; i 
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h2.d csmc ~-t-Ilc~l tf  t t b  kc+! zli 
o ~ e r  tlfe 1 rldlls lry :% ce $11 
paldent tribes, iat %% ! :L lt  
p1.y 110 incr~n,pictrtbt:-. ~ : - L c  
1905 raid-, wcrc tker l~ i  :a"_ i 
were stopp~i1 Ibr : a  ri:t-, 
v..;lutasy etGc+t o z l  tI:. iai 
%:ikka Khel ciarltintic $ 3  : a &  
~ ~ i d i n g ,  :rnrf wIitbr1 t l i ~  : t i 1  
rer~rlvctl, the %;~k$i:i Ki;j;~4 
nu1rlhE.r. The deti:ari: ;tzir% 
of the Xakkrr 1Cltt.J tr 
starit nssura-rrrccs of k t,;aw 
riofhinp to ft7:lr. :t\ ~ c b l  
%:ikka Khel are tht. qq4w+rr 
dl the Afridi cIaa14. xnc 
contact u-i-ith British rd~? .  
the fkrthest point of 'L'ira 
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n fact, to such a 
degree did this inan gain an ascendancy over the 
mind of the A~n i r  that the latter was wholly unable, 
when the time came, to prevent the insurrection 
which the Afridis were emboldened to make, rely- 
ing on the support which his actions had given 
good cause for anticipating. Through Ilhawwas 
IChan and his myrmidons it was that the Afridis 
and the Mohmands, and even the Shinwaris, were 
gradually worked up to the belief that the time 
had come when the English should be driven back 
over the Indils by a general uprising of the inde- 
pendent tribes, in which Afghan lashkars would 
play no inconspicuous part. All through the year 
1904 raids were frequent, and the Afridi allowances 
were stopped for a time. But though this had a 
salutary effect on the majority of the clans, the 
Zaklca IChel continued to be the ringleaders in the 
raiding, and when the allowances were once more 
mnewed, the Zakka Khel were excluded from the 
number. The defiant and uncompromising attitude 
of the Zakka IC11el was no doubt due to the con- 
stant assurances of Khawwas Khan that they had 
nothing to fear, as well as to the fact that the 
Zakka Khel are the poorest and most " jungly " of 
all the Afridi clans, and have come least into 
contact with British rule. Situated as they are at 
the  farthest point of Tirah from British territory, 
and the nearest to Afghanistan, they would be 
more susceptible to Afghan influences, and less 
likely to appreciate the probable consequences of 
their temerity. Their territory would also afford 
4 
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to  the outlaws the surest sanctuary, and having 
already forfeited their allowances, they would as 
soon be hung for a sheep as for a lamb. Among 
the chief of the outlaws may be mentioned Dadai, 
Usman, and Multan, all of whom were notorious 
for the number of their crimes and the daring with 
which they were carried out. These three went 
constantly to Kabul, where they listened eagerly to 
the rash and malignant scheming of Khawwas 
Khan, returning to Tirah only to confirm the 
Zakka IChel more surely in their folly. The 
Shinwari mullas were also untiring in their efforts 
to bring about a crisis in Tirah and among the 
Mohmands, who were also at this time showing 
signs of disaffection on account of the coilstruction 
of the Loe Shilman or Kabul River Railway, which 
they regarded as a prelude to the taking over of 
their country. I n  this connection, Alam Gul, the 
cc  Sufi Sahib " of Batikot, was the most indefatigable, 
dividing l i s  attention equally between Tirah and 
the Mohmands. This gentleman, like the " Gud 
Mulla" (or Lame Mulla) of Inzari, was a disciple 
of the well-known Hadda XSulla, a native of the 
Jellalabad district, who in 1897, with a follow- 
ing of Afghans, had raided Shankargarh on the 
Blohmand border, and attacked the fort of Shab- 
kadr. His anti-British propaganda had begun 
some years before, when in 1902 a new allowance 
had been granted to  the Musa Khel Baezai 
3/Iohmands, which afforded him an excellent oppor- 
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wit11 the result that the Musa Ichel and other 
Mohmand clans did not come in to receive their 
due. 
Another principal cause for the suspicion and 
mistrust with which we were regarded at this time 
by the Mohmands was the proposed Mohmand 
Boundary Commission, which was intended to 
do away with the facility with which Afghan 
Mohmands could raid into what, strictly speaking, 
had been laid down as British territory by the 
Durand Agreement. Major (now Sir George) 
Roos-Keppel was deputed as the British Repre- 
sentative, and it was arranged that he should meet 
the Afghan Commissioners at  the Nawa Kotal in 
Mohmand territory on February 1, 1903, and 
mark out the boundary, as far as the crest of the 
Sofaid Koh a t  the Peiwar Kotal in the ICurram, to 
the south of the Khaibar. But owing to the 
obstructive measures of the Amir, the Boundary 
Commission never started. If it had, i t  is quite 
possible that the British members of it would never 
have returned. During the construction of the 
Loe Shilman Railway the Tarakzai and Halimzai 
Mohmands, as well as the Mullagoris on the 
southern bank, who had undertalcen to protect the 
line from attack, were repeatedly subjected to 
annoyances from the Afghan Mohmands. The 
Sarhang of Dakka especially showed a particular 
desire to  pick a quarrel at  any price and on any 
pretext, with the object of impeding the progress of 
the work. A dispute arose as to the ownership of 
24 ZAK13A RHEL AND MOHMAND EXPEDITIONS 
logs and driftwood which the inhabitants of Smatsai, 
a small village on the right bank of the Kabul 
River a little below Dakka, had been accustomed 
to collect for fuel. The Sarhang attacked the 
village, and, on a remonstrance from the British 
Government, claimed Smatsai as lying in Afghan 
territory. Whatever the justice of this claim, and 
it appears that the words of the Durand Agree- 
ment admit of a considerable elasticity of interpre- 
tation, we, a t  any rate, were perfectly justified in 
not recognizing the claim, seeing that it was through 
the obstructionist attitude of the 'Amir that the 
boundary had remained undemarcated. Thus in 
1905 for the second time the question of demarca- 
tion was raised, only to come again to the same j infructuous end. Meanwhile attacks on the Kabul 
River Railway, under the instigation of Sahib Haq, 
Akhundzada, son of the Mulla IChalil, occurred as 
before, and numerous raids were committed by such 
notorious outlaws as Mahazil, Khoda Khel Baezai, 
and Hakim Khan,'%n the unprotected villages of 
the Mohmand border. The reinforcement of the 
frontier posts at this point led, however, t o  a 
temporary cessation of these annoyances. 
During 1907 the Zakka Khel, in spite of the 
genuine efforts of the maliks of the remaining 
Afkidi clans t o  restrain them, adopted a yet more 
* The notorious outlaw Hakim Khan, with a following of 
twenty-nine, was taken near tlie village of Char Sadda on 
February 28, 1911. Hakim and twenty of his accomplices 
were killed, and the rest were captured and suffered death by 
hanging. 
D EXPEDITIONS 
.tants of Smatsai, 
k of the Kabul 
3een accustoined 
~g attacked the 
%om the British 
lying in Afghan 
bf this claim, and 
Durznd Agree- 
,icity of interpre- 
ectly justified in 
at it was through 
: Amir that the 
cated. Thus in 
tion of demarca- 
;ain to the same 
2ks on the Kabul 
on of' Sahib Haq, 
hail, occurred as 
lmmitted by such 
~ d a  I<hel Bnezai, 
;ected villages of 
Forcement of the 
, however, t o  a 
yances. 
, in spite of the 
f the remaining 
rpted a yet more 
with a following of 
: of Char Sadda on 
y of his accomplices 
md suffered death by 
'( JEFIAD " 25 
defiant attitude towards the British Government, 
and an Afiidi jirga met at Landi Rota1 in that 
year to deliberate on what steps should be taken 
to abate the nuisance. During this meeting and 
while the Afridi maliks were urging on the 
Government the advisability of occupying the 
Bazar Valley, a Zakka IChel jirga made its appear- 
ance, professing itself willing to come to terms. 
Not content with offering an unconditional sur- 
render, the Zakka I<hel in their turn made such 
preposterous and absurd demands, conditions, and 
stipulations, that the insincerity of their professions 
was made only too apparent, aiid they were iinme- 
diately dismissed. 
All this time the progress of the unrest was being 
watched with jealous care in Kabul, and secret 
agents continued to send in their quota of informa- 
tion to the leaders of the Anglophobe party. It is 
probable that a t  this time the Amir began to realize 
the nature of the whirlwind that was about to be 
reaped from the insignificant wind that had been 
sown by the presence of Khawwas Khan in Kabul.* 
Early in 1907 the Sufi Sahib, accompanied by Abdul 
ICarim, a Shinwari of Deh Sarak, was preaching a 
"jehad" in Tirah, while Lala Pir, a secret agent 
from Kabul, was engaged in stirring up the tribes 
in I<liost and Waziristan, and holding communica- 
tion with the Mulla Powindah and the Hamzullah 
* The Pioneer had repeatedly urged on the Government of 
India the advisability of obtaining the dismissal of Khawwas 
Khan from Kabul. 
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Mulla, with the intent to incite the Wazirs and 
Mahsuds to revolt. Unsuccessful in Waziristan, 
he turned his attention to Hhost, where, on the 
outbreak of hostilities, he raised a lashkar, which 
was to have co-operated with a Ghilzai lashkar 
from the Ghazni district in an attack on the 
Kurram Valley. Among the Mohmands and Ning- 
raharis the Hazrat Sahib " of Chaharbagh, Pidai 
Masun Jan, succeeded, with the help of the Sufi 
Sahib and the Gud Mulla, in raising a lashkar, 
principally composed of Afghan Mohmands and 
S hinwaris. 
The Afridi maliks having proved themselves 
utterly incapable of exercising any influence over 
the Zakka IChel, the Government, after clutching 
at every straw that seemed to hold out a possibility 
of a settlement, suddeilly sanctioned an expedition, 
as the result of a determined raid on Peshawar City 
undertaken by Multan and other outlaws on the 
night of January 28, 1908. This raid occurred 
in spite of the fact that the whole of the Jamrud, 
Bara, and Kohat Pass roads were being patrolled 
at the time. Three constables were wounded, two 
of wbom died, and the raiding-party escaped over 
the city wall before any reinforcements could be 
brought up. 
As soon as the intelligence was received by the 
Zakka Ichels that punitive operations had been 
sanctioned against them, they began moving their 
families and flocks and herds through the passes 
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Dadai, and Usman also repaired, returning, however, 
to take p a ~ t  in the fighting. The Chief Commis- 
sioner of the North-West Frontier Province, 
colonel Deane, summoned the Afridi malilts to a 
jirga in Peshawar, where he made it plain to them 
that the object of the expedition was merely to 
punish the Zakka IChel, and that no annexation of 
territory was in any way contemplated. This very 
timely declaration of our intentions had the veTy 
beneficial effect of securing to us the co-operation of 
the Afridi inaliks throughout the campaign, in 
spite of the untiring efforts of Mulla Saiyid Akbar, 
Aka IChel, one of the ringleaders in 1897, to raise 
them. They were, in fact, induced to maintain a, 
blockade of the passes from the Bazar Valley into 
Tirah, so that the passes into Afghanistan were the 
only avenues of supply for the leaguered Zaltka 
IChel. It was proposed to take up two brigades 
into Bazar, and to hold one brigade in readiness at 
Nowshera. Major-General Sir James Willcocks 
was given full military and ~olitical control of the 
expedition, and Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Iceppel 
acted as Political Officer. The value to the Zakka 
Ichel of one, at  least, of the passes into Ninpahar 
was largely discounted by the rapidity with which 
this latter officer led a flying column into Bazar by 
way of the Bazar Pass, which opens out of the 
IChaibar a little short of Ali Masjid. By sending 
part of his baggage animals back from Ali Masjid 
to Jamrud, the Zakka Khel were led to believe that 
no entry was intended by way of the Bazar Pass ; 
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consequently the column was enabled to make the 
passage unopposed, and thus get between the Zakka 
Khel and their bolt-holes into Afghanistan, at the 
same time gaining possession of the village of China, 
commanding these exits. The second brigade 
entered the valley by the Chura Pass through 
Malikdin Ighel country, and advanced to Walai, 
while the first brigade occupied Chura. 
Mountain warfare, as carried on on the North- 
West Frontier, does not lend itself to impassioned 
descriptions of bloody fields of battle, of cavalry 
charges and heroic actions done in the limelight 
before the astounded gaze of two armies. The 
Afridi does not rush down into the open to certain 
( death, but retires gracefully before a stronger force 
sent against him, slculking along the sky-line, and 
ready to take advantage of the smallest mistake on 
the part of his opponents, or to cut off any straggler. 
H e  has been described as the finest natural skir- 
misher in the world. It is when the retirement of 
the British troops begins that he is at his best, and 
then i t  is that those deeds of heroism are committed 
by our British and Indian troops alike, when there 
is none to mark how those battery mules were got 
safely across that open nulla-bed, swept as it was, 
by a hail of bullets, or how So-and-so held on to an 
almost isolated position, at the risk of being cut off, 
for three minutes more than was necessary, in order 
to enable a wounded comrade or two to get a good 
start down the hill. At night, too, worn out and 
dog-tired by the constant hill-climbing, the soldier 
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must cool< and eat his food in the dark, as no lights 
are allowed, for fear of attracting the fire of the 
snipers. Then he must dig himself into a narrow 
trench ill the ground, and hope for sleep, wl~ile from 
the hills around an incessant firing is kept up till 
daylight. Those who by repeated experience of 
this kind of warfare may be considered competent 
judges declare that nothing is more nerve-mcking 
or more demoraliziilg to troops than to have to 
undergo night after night this constant sniping, 
coupled with the apprehension of a night attack at 
any moment. Tlle first indication of a night attack 
is like the rustling of the wind through autuinn 
leaves, as the " chaplis " of the silent-footed foe 
slitl.er over the rocky ground ; the11 follows the 
confused, half-audible jingle of accoutrements, steel 
upon steel, and jangling neck ornaments, and the 
final rush and the blood-curdling pandemonium 
that is let loose as the wave of savagery breaks on 
the bristling perimeter of the camp. Occasionally 
one of those little incidents occurs which serve to 
relieve the tension and raise a smile aH round, even 
though it be but a false alarm in the middle of the 
night, caused by an inconsiderate sepoy falling 
asleep with his shoulder against the firing-button 
of a machine-gun. 
A t  the beginning of the operations the Amir had 
issued a declaration to his subjects forbidding them 
to join in the hostilities, but in spite of this and of 
his presence so close to the scene as Jelldabad, 
large numbers of Sangu IChel Shinwaris, Afghan 
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Mol~mands and Wingraharis of every description, 
entered the Bazar Valley by the Tsatsobi Pass, 
where they openly sold ammunition to the rebels, 
aided them in fighting, and proved particularly 
obnoxious by militating in every possible manner 
against the resumption of peaceful relations with 
the Zakka IChel. With fanatical zeal, they ex- 
horted them not to conclude peace with us at any 
price, with the consequence that negotiations were 
conducted with the greatest difficulty, and our 
occupation of the valley was much longer than it 
need have been. A t  their instigation, too, the 
Zaklra IChel sent messages to the Mohmands 
urging them to rise, and the Hazrat Sahib and the 
Sufi Sahib did everything that could be done to 
bring about a combined insurrection. But at 
length the Zaklra IChel, having exhausted ammuni- 
tion, supplies, and means alilre, and having seen 
their fortified villages disappear skywards in a cloud 
of dust, were brought to their knees, and terms 
were at length agreed to through the mediation 
of the Afridi jirga. These latter undertoolr to 
punish the outlaws, to guarantee each a section 
of the Zdclra Khel, and to deposit so many rifles 
until the Political  office^ should consider that the 
Zakka Khel had sufficiently expiated their folly. 
The outlaw Dadai died of the wounds he had 
sustained, cursing IChawwas Khan and his own 
folly in bringing desolation on his clan. 
The difficulties attending the satisfactory terrnina- 
tion of the Zakka Khel rising were enhanced by 
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the necessity of keeping a watchful eye simul- 
taneously on other parts of the frontier. Hardly a 
month elapsed before it again became necessary to 
send a punitive force into independent territory- 
this time against the Rfohmands. All throuigh 
February and the first fortnight in April, raiding 
had been increasing on the Abazai border, and the 
Shinwari lashlrar that had collected in Ningrahar 
at the close of the Zaklra IZhel Expedition crossed 
the Kabul River at Lalpura and went off to throw 
in their lot with the Mohmands. The constant 
influx from the Afghan side led to reinforcements 
being early sent to the forts of Michni and Shankar- 
garh. After telegraphic coinmunications had been 
twice interrupted, villages raided, and posts fired 
on, it was at  length decided to mobilize :L seconcl 
expedition under the command of General Twill- 
cocks. Brigadier-General Anderson, Major-General 
Barrett, and Major-General Ramsay, had command 
of Brigades, the Third Brigade being held in reserve. 
011 April 24 two columns attacked the enemy's 
position west of Shanka~garh, and the enemy were 
driven back with heavy loss. This defeat greatly 
discouraged the mullas, who were trying to raise 
Dir and Swat. A t  the same time every effort 
made to gain the co-operation of the Zakka Khel 
and the Loargai Shinwaris proved unsuccessful, 
and many mullas retired in consequence into 
Afghanistan. The Mohmands' supplies were now 1 I 
running short, and many combatants availed them- 
selves of the dead or wounded among their relations 
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to accompany them back into Ningrahar, whence 
they were careful not to return. The Hazrat Sahib, 
however, doggedly remained in Mohmand country, I bound 
though with a greatly reduced following, gradually I As 
1 
retiring into the more remote valleys of that i. reverst 
district. I n  Tirah the malilrs had been successful 
I 
I the H 
in counteracting the efforts of Mullah Saiyid Akbar 
to raise the Afridis, in spite of the latter's invitation 
to the Sufi Sahib to join him in the Lower Bara 
Valley, whilst in the Bazar Valley what Zakka forth j 
Khels yet remained-the majority having gone up I His n/l 
into Maidan for the summer-intimated that they I this ti1 
would oppose the Sufi's lashlrar, if necessary, wit11 the ra] 
force. The Mollmand trouble appeared to be I border: 
dying a natural death, and the Government of India himsel 
I 
had already intimated to General Willcocks that treaty 
no advance should be made into Mohmand country * 
I UP 
if it coyld possibly be avoided, when a diversion of 1 clans- 
l a dangerous nature suddenly arose in the Khaibar. [ Mollm 
On April 29 the Mian Sahib of Tsappar arrived at ? remain 
Peshbolak in Ningrahar with a Khugiani lashlrar exampl 
some 6,000 strong. A junction with the force ment ( 
already assembled under the Sufi Sahib and other territor 
mullas brought the total of the combined lashkars the ren 
up to nearly 20,000. fixed a! 
This formidable gathering, which was composed take pl 
entirely of Afghans, moved up to  Landi Iqhana, part section 
of it, under the Sufi Sahib, entering Bazar. The * The 
fortified post of Michni Icandao, just below Landi mnnis ar 
Kotal, was attacked on the nights of May 2 and 3, Icabul R 
and General Willcocks moved up to  Landi Kotal campaig~ 
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with reinforcements, with which on the followiiig 
day he drove the Sufi's lashkar across the Afghan 
boundary. 
As  a result of this sudden and unexpectcd 
reverse to the Afghan supporters of the &Iohmands, 
the Hazrat Sahib's following suffered a further 
decrease in numbers, and the voice of thc Ainir, 
which had been raised in half-audible protestations 
to which nobody paid any attention, now thundered 
forth in an authoritative recall of all subjects of 
His Majesty from independent territory. But by 
this time no such coin~nand was needed to insure 
the rapid exodus of Afghans from the Mohmand 
borders, though, no doubt, the Amir congratulated 
biinself on his (somewhat tardy) loyalty to his 
treaty engagements with the English. 
U p  till this time only two of the Moliinxnd 
clans-namely, the I-Ialiinzai and the Pandi:~li 
Mohmands-had ventured to  come in. The 
remainder had been deterred from following this 
example, probably by the fear that the Govern- 
ment contemplated an annexation of Mohmand 
territory." These two clans undertook to induce 
the remaining sections to come in, and May 9 was 
fixed as the date by which their submission should 
take place. Wi th  the exception of the Musa Ichel 
section of the Baezai, the Baezai and Khwaezai 
+ The EIJirnzni and ~ a r d i ~ d  Mohmands, as well as the Sl~il- 
manis and Mullagoris who live on the southern bnlllc of the 
Kabul River, remained loyal to the  Government throughont the 
campaign. 
5 
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are considered as Afghan subjects. The remain- 
ing Mohmand clans consisted of the Utmanzai, 
Dawezai, Isa Ichel, Burhan Hhel, and the Musa 
IZhel Baezai. Nothing having occurred by May 9, 
the First and Second Brigades advanced into Moh- 
mand territory. On May 15 the column arrived 
a t  the IZharappa and Nahaki li'asses, in the Gundab 
Valley, without opposition. The enemy were, 
however, found in considerable force in the IChapak 
Pass, having been joined by Baezai and IZhwaezai 
Afghan Mohmands. The efforts of the First Brigade 
were directed against the Handahari Sufis, while 
the Second Brigade ascended the valley of the Bohai 
Dag towards ICargha and Mulla Killai, in Utrnan 
IZhel territory. By May 27 all the clans, with the 
exception of the Musa Khel Baezai, had tendered 
their submission, and, the latter having been 
punished on the following day, the troops began 
to  evacuate Mohmand territory, which was effected 
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ce i r l  the ~~~~d~~ THE POLICY OF THE AMIR 
:ri : L X ~  Iqll\d8ezai 
t 11 c P'irst Q .gde FOR close on half a century the nightmare of n 
1.1 Russian invasion of India througll the passes of r Gt1fiB, ,411ile 
the Hindu Hush, or by way of Herat and the Para- 
illcy of tl\, pomisus, has held the mind of the Biitish public, 
~ i i l l r r i ,  i~ Utflan clogging our foreign policy and forcing the hand of 
le CP;LXIS ~ i $ l >  our diplomacy. I n  spite of the fact that since 
i..i~i, hild t e n d e r e d  1873 British statesmen have from time to time 
-CP Il:tv-in been B attempted to  reassure the nation on this point, in 
-1tC3 troops began no field of politics have alarmists and scayeinongers 
7 1  lit h W:L~ efibcted obtained such a ready hearing as in this one of the 
Russian advance in Central Asin. 
It is not necessary at  this distance of time, and 
in view of our present relations with Russia, to 
rake up old scores, too higllly coloured for the 
inost part with the hues of national animus, but 
i t  may not be irrelevant to the subject to recall 
a few of the less liasty views of those British 
statesmen who, in the midst of the alinost 
universal panic, still kept their heads. 
I n  1873 the Tsar had already intimated to the 
British Government, through Prince G~~tchakoff, 
that he considered Afghanistan as lying altogetller 
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outside the Eussian sphere of influence, an assur- 
ance which Lord Granville saw no reason for not 
accepting. But in 1868 the capture of Samarliand 
had caused such an ebullition of feeling in England 
that Lord Clarendon felt constrained to inform 
Baron Brunnow that "although Her Majesty's 
Government feel neither suspicion nor alarm at 
these movements, yet something must be done 
to allay the uneasiness of the British and Indian 
public." A scheme was then discussed for the 
establishment of a neutral zone in Central Asia, 
resembling somewhat the present so-called neutral 
zone in Persia : a scheme which was afterwards 
abandoned when the object for which it had been 
broached-namely, the pacification of the English 
public-had been for the time being attained." 
When in 1878, after the Treaty of San Stefano, 
we sent Indian t.roops to the Mediterranean, 
Skobeleff's plan, in the event of war breaking out 
between England and. Russia, and provided he 
could gain the support of Shere Ali, was to make 
an invasion of India through the passes of the 
Hindu Icush. But it may be reasonably doubted 
that he would ever have contemplated such a 
step had he not fully believed that the whole 
of India was ready, at the mere approach of the 
Russians, to break out into a blaze of insurrection 
resembling the Mutiny of 1857. 
It is a noticeable fact that, with one exception, 
* Wheeler's "Life of Abd~irral~man," practically the only 
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fiiction between Russia and England in Central 
Asia had n1w:zys been preceded by strained rela- 
tions between tlie two countries in Europe. This 
one exception was the c'Penjdeh Incidenl;" of 1885, 
when Gladstone's Parliament voted :£11,000,000 
for war preparations, The incident might easily 
have been avoided had we shown a little more 
firinness at the outset, and it is not at  all clear 
that tlie Russians were prepared to  back their 
views by resorting to extreme measures. Sir Wrest 
Ridgeway, who succeeded Sir Peter Lumsdeil in 
command of the Boundary Commission, was of 
opinion that the Russians could not possibly have 
risked a war in view of the disturbed condition of 
the Mahommedan population under Russian rule 
at that time.* 
To look for a moment at  the Russian side of 
the questiou, a ;Fact too often overlooked by the 
partisan historians of this period is that from 
1868-1873 we, too, had caused the Russians con- 
siderable anxiety by our attempts, culininating in 
the Forsyth Mission, to  establish commercial 
relations with Y8koub Beg of Icashgar. W e  had, 
in fact, ourselves been setting the example in what 
we afterwards .complained so much of in Russia. 
But to return to the question of the Russian 
invasion. Sir Donald Wallace, in his book 
G c  Russia," sums up the whole question in one 
pithy sentence : 
+ Wheeler's " Life of Abdurrahman," practical.1 y the only 
really impartial review of the Russian question. 
6 
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"What  had been seriously entertained, not only 
in the official world, but by the (Russian) Govem- 
inent itself, is the idea, strongly advocated by 
General Skobeleff, that Russia should as quickly 
as possible get within striking distance of our 
Indian possessions, so that she may always be able 
to  bring strong diplomatic pressure to bear on the 
British Government, and, in the event of a con- 
flict, immobilize a large part of the British army." 
This places the whole matter in a much more 
reasonable and probable light, and is a strong 
argument against the notion that Russia ever 
harboured designs pe?- se for the invasion of India. 
Lastly, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, a t  a 
banquet given for hitn on the eve of his departure 
for India by the county of Kent, said in reference 
to  this question : " I have grave doubts as to 
whetbey such projects were ever seriously con- 
templated in those days by the Russians." 
The elimination of the Russian question for the 
present from the sphere of practical politics on the 
North-West Frontier of India, if it cannot be said 
to have simplified the problems with which we are 
called upon to deal, a t  any rate must have the 
effect of modifying our policy in many of its 
hitherto most important aspects. 
The situation now resolves itself into the three- 
cornered problem of- 
I. Our relations with the Amir. 
2. Our relations with the independent tribes. 
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For the first t in~e since the Vienna Congress of 
1815, England is found acting in harinony with 
Russia, and the immediate consequence of this is 
that Afghanistan finds herself coinpletely isolated. 
Hitherto the Amir's chief weapon has been his 
power to hold the bdance between the two 
countries, and to play off England against Russia. 
H e  can now no longer count 011 the moral support 
of Russia in any situation where the interests of 
Great Britain and Afghanistan clash. We are, 
of course, still bound by our defensive treaty of 
alliance in the event of a foreign invasion of 
Afghanistan ; and Russia, within the last t w o  
years or so, has renewed her assurances to us tliat 
she considers Afghanistan as lying altogether 
outside the sphere in which she may be called 
upon to act. At the same time, as long as the 
Amir observes the treaty negotiated in ICabul 
in 1905 by Sir Louis Dane, in which Habibullah 
undertook to be bouiid by the engagements that 
his father made with the Goverilment of India, 
we are also bound to fulfil our side of the bargain, 
and to respect the independence of Afghanistan 
as a kingdom. By one of the Articles of the 
Durand Agreement of 1893 the Amir undertook 
no-t to exercise ally interference ill the independent 
territories on our side of the Durand line; but so 
often have risings among the border tribes been 
directly traceable to Afghan machinatioiis as to lay 
Habibullah open to the charge of having violated, by 
corninission or omission, this clause of his agreement. 
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What  conceivable circumstances can be urged 
in defence of the following, or in what way can 
Hsbibullah seek to justify them? The reception 
of tribal jirgas in Icabul, either by the Amir or 
by Nasrullah, and their dismissal with gifts of 
money and arms ; the presence of the proscribed 
ex-malik, IChawwas Khan, in ICabul, who attained 
such influence in the Amir's councils as ultimately 
to bring about a rising in the Bazar Valley; the 
open sale of rifles and ammunition to the Zalrka 
Khel during the ensuing expedition, in direct 
defiance of the Amir's orders, and in spite of his 
presence not twenty miles away, at  Jellalabad; 
finally, that a nest of outlaws should be permitted 
to exist in IChost, upon our very borders, and that 
no measures should be taken to put a stop to their 
depredations, until the capture of a native officer 
of a frontier militia rendered unpleasant complica- 
tions with the Government of India an immediate 
possibility. 
Whether personally guilty or not guiltyo it is 
with Habibullah, as ruler of Afghanistan, that re- 
sponsibility must ultimately rest. That such things 
should be possible calls for measures that shall 
arrest, once and for all, this gradual stultification 
of the Durand Agreement. The time has, in fact, 
come when we should intimate to him in no 
equivocal manner tlmt relations of ally political 
nature, either directly or indirectly, cannot longer 
be tolerated in independent territory. For, in the 
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Anglophobe party, the maliks have shown them- 
4 $
selves, on the whole, capable of loolcing after the i 
tribes under their charge, and inclined to discourage 
close relations with Afglmnistail. 
The exact attitude of the Amir towards us is n 
subject on which considerable difference of opinion 
exists. Whilst full of protestations of good-will f I 
towards us, he is sometimes so backward in giving i 
practical effect to them as to furnish legitimate 1 
cause for doubting his sincerity. No doubt he is I 
saddled with a difficult task in properly fulfilling I 
his treaty obligations, and at the same time pre- 1 
I 
serving his character among the Afghans as an 
uncompromisiilg upholder of Afgl~an integrity and 
independence. To this and to the fact that his 
brother, Nczsrullah I<han, has ever evinced the most 
thoroughgoing antagonism to everything British, 
may be attributed his waning popularity. It may 
even be doubted whether his popularity at any time 
since his visit to Hindustan would have been suffi- 
cient t o  keep him upon the throne but for the 
loyalty of his brother, who exercises by far the 
greater iilfluence of the two, and who would prob- 
ably be received with the greatest acclamation by 
the people did he choose to proclaim himself. How- 
ever, at his accessioi~ he at  least had the foresight to 
will over the soldiery by the sirrlple expedient of 
increasing its pay, an operation which he has re- 
peated at  intervals since, although compelled to 
disband the inferior portioil of his troops in order 
t o  defray tllc increasing cost of upkeep. But since 
I 
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Nasrullah is Commander-in-Chief, it seems im- 
probable that Habibullah could count on the un- 
divided loyalty, except against an external foe, of 
any but the Kabul garrison. 
Habibullah has been described as too easy-going 
to  attempt any curtailmelit of Nasrullah's influence, 
relying, no doubt, on the Government of India to 
see him through any family crisis ; and though 
Nasrullah has a great affection for his brother, he is 
said to have been much displeased at the nomina- 
tion of Inayatullah, the Amir's son, as successor 
to the throne. It is also rumoured that Nasrullah 
is physically afraid of the Amir, and that when 
circumstances of a sufficiently peremptory nature 
have decided the latter on a definite course, the 
remonstrances of the Commander-in-Chief are swept 
away as chaff before the storm. 
As Commander-in-Chief of the army, and at the 
same time spiritual head of the community and chief 
prop of the State, Nasrullah is to  all outward appear- 
ances a dictator. Like the warrior-bishop of the 
Middle Ages, he is keenly alive to the advantages of 
combining the spiritual with the temporal power, 
and it is to  the acquisition of supreme spiritual 
power that all his stealthy energies have been 
directed. Well he knows that in a countiy like 
Afghanistan, where the fanatical zeal and warlike 
propensities of the population are shrewdly turned 
to  account by the mullas, whose only principles 
are subordinated to motives of political expediency 
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acquisition of such power is the passport to ulti~~late 
supremacy. In  this he 112s been aided by circum- 
stances. According to A4usalmnn l:nv anyoile 
who, having prayed after the " chief' imam" or 
preacher in tlie mosque, afterwards acts contrary 
t o  his commands, is counted an infidel, and ceases 
to belong to the company of the faithful. Most 
Afghans at one time or another have pl~lyed after 
Nasrullali in his capacity of chief imam in the large 
open-air Masjid-i-pul-i-Pukhtu in Icabul, a mosquc 
capable of' accommodating several thousand people. 
Among these are sure to have been inany tribcs- 
people from our side the border, and hence it is 
not too inuch to say that it is only necessary for 
Nasrullah to despatch a body of mullas to pre:icll 
a holy war against the Britisli to cause in yesponse 
a movement of unrest along the whole length of 
the frontier. 
The first instinct of an Oriental monarch on 
ascending the throne is to get rid of all superfluous 
members of his family who lnay be suspected of 
any leanings towards the purple. 'I'his is effected 
by banishment or by harsher methods. At his 
death in 1823 Timur Shah left twenty-three sons, 
dl of whom, during tlie disputed successiorl wlzich 
followed, gradually disappeared, until only Shah 
Shujah and Dost Mahommed were left. Forty 
years later, on the death of the Dost, there was 
another disputed succession, many of the actors in 
which are still living in exile in either Russia or 
British India, On his accession Habibullah was 
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spared the inconvenience of asserting his right to 
the throne, owing to the thoroughness with which 
his father, the lamented Abdurrahman, had pre- 
viously cleared the country of all possible claimants. 
Yakoub Khan and Ayoub Khan, the sons of Shere 
dli, who fled from Afghanistan in 1879, are now at 
Lahore, and, though both are over sixty years of 
age, probably still have some adherents among 
the Afghan Mohmands, their mother having been 
a lady of that tribe, a sister of Sa'adat Khan of 
Lalpura. . A  still more ancient link wit11 the past 
survives in the person of Is'hak IChan, now over 
seventy years of age, if, indeed, he still lives, and an 
exile in Samarkand, Habibullah's birthplace. In 
fact, with the exception of his brother Nasrullah 
and of his half-brother, Mohammed Umar, a grand- 
son of Shere Ali, a quarrelsome and irascible youth 
from all accounts, there has been no one who could 
show any pretence to the throne. For some years 
Bibi Halima, the mother of Mohammed Umar, was 
the cause of considerable friction at Kabul, but 
since Mohammed Umar (who never participated in 
,the . ambitious schemes his mother entertained for 
his future) slew the Amir's Master of Horse in a 
fit of passion, and on another occasion wounded 
Nasrullah in a quarrel, he has been allowed to go 
his own way, which does not differ in essentials 
from that of other ne'er-do-weels. H e  is no longer 
to be reckoned with as a possible claimant at 
Inayatullah's accession. p n e  other there is who, if 
any credence may be given to  the tales of ICabuli 
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merchants in Peshawar, is causing T-Iabibullal~ a suc- 
cession of nzaz~vais quarts d'l~ezsre. The Shahgassi 
Mulki, Sirdar Yahya Khan, the brothcr of the first 
Queen, who was driven from Afghanistan by 
Abdurral~inan, has now been bad< in Afghanistan 
for about four years. Saving Nasrullah's priestly 
following, he commands the sympathy, so 'tis said, 
of all the tribes to  the south and east of Kabul. 
The Ghilzais, moreover, are known to have pro- 
cured many rifles during the recent gun-running, 
and, inspired by the Icnowledge that they are well 
armed, have been showing signs of restlessness ; 
whilst only the other day the Amir despatched 
the Hazrat Sahib Charbagh (one of the disciples of 
the well-known Hadda Mulla) to  pacify the Sangu 
Bhel, a Shinwari clan in the vicinity of Jellalabad, 
which had become intractable. 
So long as Nasiullah retains his position at the 
head of the mullas he has nothing to  fear. As a 
Durani, he evidently prefers to pull together with 
Habibullah than to risk the loss to his fainily of 
the legacy of subject tribes - Hazaras, Hafirs, 
Ghilzais, Usbegs, and Turcomans-that Abdur- 
rnhman bequeathed to the present Arnir a; the 
independent kingdom of Afghanistan, a kingdoin 
that requires a firm hand if the unruly elements of 
which it is composed are to be held together. 
Vexed by internal movements and hampered by 
the Anglophobe party in his dealings with us, the 
position of the Amir is certainly not an enviable 
one, nor is the administration of the country all 
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that can be desired. What government there is 
in Afghanistan is conducted in the most haphazard 
fashion-at least, in the outlying districts, which for 
the most part are farmed out to governors or 
" hakims." The collection of the revenue is 
usually deferred to some two years after the expiry 
of their terms of office, when the hakims receive a 
summons to ICabul, and the major portion of their 
property is unceremoniously confiscated to supply 
the deficits in the exchequer. Corruption is rife. 
Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered 
at that the affairs of remote districts do not always 
come to the notice of the central Government as 
promptly as might be desired, in spite of the fact 
that in 1906 telephonic communication was estab- 
lished between ICabul and the principal provincial 
capitals. I n  many instances the first intimation of 
disorderly conduct on the part of his subjects 
reaches the Amir though the Government of India. 
In  this way Habibullah has made out a very 
plausible case for himself, and the sympathetic 
British lion has been within an ace of being caught 
napping. To all outward appearances, the Amir 
is merely an Oriental monarch, bound to Great 
Britain by certain treaty obligations, which he is' 
honestly trying to fulfil, even at the risk of the 
allegiance of his subjects. H e  hears with regret 
(from the Government of India) that raids into 
British territory are being made from his side the 
Durand line. H e  replies that he has not yet 
been informed of the matter by his ow11 officials, 
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but that he will do d l  in his power to put an end 
to the raiding. He  receives jirgas in Kabul, and, 
true to his engagements, he counsels them against 
any unfi-iendly attitude towards the British. They 
are then handed over to the chief imam. . . . H e  
forbids the sale of rifles and ammunition to the 
independent tribes, but not the sinallest attention 
is paid to this injunction. H e  pays a fiiendly 
visit to the Viceroy in India, wliere we are careful 
to inform him that we oilly wish to consolidate his 
position in his own kingdom, and to see Afgl~anis- 
tan able to defend herself. H e  accepts our assur- 
ances of friendship, and the howitzers presented to  
him by Lord Curzon, some of which, metaphorically, 
he mounts pointing towards Russia, some towards 
India. H e  spends the "allowance" granted to  
him on the defences of the Khurd Kabul Pass, and 
as soon as we propose building, as an earnest of 
our defensive treaty of alliance, a railway that shall 
facilitate the throwing of troops into Afghanistan 
in the event of a foreign invasion, he bares his 
teeth. Even while Sir Louis Dane was yet in 
Kabul, it was known in India that the Mission of 
I905 was a complete fiasco. The proposals we had 
to  make, according to the Times of January 26, 
1905-the linking up of Peshawar and Jellalabad 
by rail and telegraph, the training of Afghan ' 
troops by British officers, the purchase of war 
material from England alone-Habibullah refused 
t o  discuss, substituting in their place Nasrullah's 
pet scheme, advocated as far back as 1897, 
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during the latter's visit to England, for a legation 
in London wllicll should transact business with the 
India Office over the head of the Viceroy, and an 
even more impossible request for a strip of land to 
the Baluch coast fos the purpose of founding an 
Afghan seaport. Other instances could be cited 
for illustrating the insincerity of the Amir's 
professions, notably his obstructive policy with 
regard to the Mohmand Boundary Commission. 
As to the clauses agecting Afgllanistan in the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, the Ainir has 
not yet signified his assent to them. 
Utilizing every excuse that ctLn be urged in 
extenuation of the Arnir's attitude towards us, i t  
can hardly be claimed that we have succeeded in 
malung Afghanistan either a strong or a friendly 
kingdom. The very fact of our requiring a friendly 
attitude on the part of the Amir only contributes 
to his unpopularity among his subjects, and is one 
of the causes of his weak government. 
Realizing all this, as he must, it is only natural 
that he should do something to reinstate himself 
in the eyes of his people. H e  is no longer content 
to remain merely the huger State between. Great 
Britain and Russia, and, with the intention of 
making himself altogether independent of Great 
Britain, it is not likely that he should despise the 
weapon that lies readiest to his hand in 1;lle shape 
of the impressionable independent border tribes, 
who are only too ready to follow his lead as long 
as we refrain from making our power felt. 
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CI-IAPTER I V  
THE AUTUMN CRISIS, 1910 
BEFORE proceeding to an account of the crisis of 
September and October, 1910, on the frontier, it 
will be necessary to trace briefly the rise of the 
arms traffic in the Persian Gulf. 
Up till the year 1897-that is to say, the year 
of the great revolt in Tirah-the trade in arms 
through Muscat and Bushire had been chiefly 
confined to Persia and the countries at the head 
of the Gulf and on its southern shores. As 
" guardians of the Gulf" we had done what lay hi 
our power to put a stop to this traffic. In  1891 
we had been instrumental in inducing the Sultan 
of Muscat to prohibit the importation of arms 
into Gwadar and its dependencies, over which he 
lays a claim of suzerainty. I11 1892 we were 
successful in obtaining a similar undertaking from 
the 1;rucial chiefs of the Pirate Coast. For inany 
years, however, Bushire continued to absorb the 
greater part of the trade, and the arming of the 
Bakhtiari tribesmen in the mountainous south- 
western corner of Persia went on apace. A t  the 
same time we may be sure that large quantities 
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of rifles found their way into the possession of the 
semi-independent nomad tribes of the Arabian 
interior, especially among those chiefs who feared 
the aggressive designs of their powerful neighbour, 
Turlcey. 
After the Afridi revolt of 1897, the course of 
trade in arms veered round to the North-West 
Frontier, and large numbers of rifles began gradu- 
ally to  filter in, replacing the obsolete and home- 
made " jezail" with which the Afiidis had hitherto 
for the most part been armed. It was at  about this 
time that the Sultan of Muscat issued a proclama- 
tion granting to British and Persian men-of-war the 
power to search in Muscat waters vessels flying the 
flags of the three countries. The first-fruits of this 
agreement was the capture by H.M.S. Lapwing 
of 220 cases of arms and ammunition, destined for 
Bushire, on board the Anglo-Persian Steam Navi- 
gation Company's S.S. Bc~luchista?z. The shippers 
afterwards hailed the Sultan and British Govern- 
ment into court, but on appeal to the House of 
Lords the principle on which the captain of the 
L a p i n g  had acted was upheld, and a verdict was 
returned in favour of the defendants. But in spite 
of this blow to the arms traffic, at  least as far as 
it concerned Persia, by 1902 the trade through 
Persian and British Baluchistan had assumed such 
proportions that the Political Agent, Icalat, felt it 
his duty to come to some arrangement with the 
Governor-General of Icerman with a view to 
putting some check upon the traffic, which was 
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already threatening the preservation of law and 
order on the Berso-Baluch frontier. It had, in 
fact, been found necessary in 1901 to send an 
expedition into Melaan to dislodge certain out- 
laws under Mahinud Khan, a noted ringleader, 
who for some time past had been committing raids 
into British territory from the security of several 
Baluch forts in the districts of Sarhad and Saravan. 
I n  a conversation with the Political Agent, ICalat, 
the Governor-General of ICerman agreed to issue a 
notification forbidding the furthey impoi-tation of 
arms along the coast of Persian Mekran, and to 
hold the Baluch Sardars responsible for any in- 
fringement of tlis regulation. 
Thus far it might be thought that everything 
liacl been done to put an end to the traffic. But 
the authority of the Governor-General of ICerman, 
and even of the Deputy-Governor of Bampur, is, 
and always has been, of such a' legendary character 
that little or no attention was paid to the notifi- 
cation by the Baluch Sardars, who are the real 
masters of this portion of the Persian dominions. 
The arms traffic continued to flourish in uninter- 
rupted prosperity, and in spite of the repeated 
warnings of the Political Agent, Icalat, and, as time 
went on, of other frontier officers farther north, the 
gravity of the situation was not realized. 
A t  the same time, in justice to the Government, 
it must be said that an attempt had been inade 
in about 1900 to obtain the consent of France to 
the abrogation of the treaties which permitted the 
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use of Muscat as an entrepbt for the arms traffic, 
and which allowed France to grant her flag to 
certain protdg6s in the port of Sur, under cover 
of which it was feared that nakhudas were enabled 
to evade search while running guns into Mekran. 
With regard to the first point, it may as well 
be said at once that, short of a substantial cession 
of colonial territory to France"--an act against 
which sentiment revolts-or of the possession of 
some powerful diplomatic lever which chance may 
put into our hand, we shall never secure the 
abrogation of the trading treaties. 
With regard to the second point, it was adjudged 
by the Hague tribunal in 1905 that "after 
January 2, 1892, France was not entitled to  
authorize vessels belonging to subjects of H.H. the 
Sultan of Muscat to fly the French flag," except 
on condition that their " owilers or fitters-out had 
established, or should establish, that they had been 
considered and treated by France as her protdgds 
before the year 1863," though "owners of dhows 
wlio before 1802 had been authorized by France 
to fly the French flag retailled this authorization 
as long as France renewed it to tlie grantee." 
It was not till the year 1907 that the undoubted 
truth of the warnings was brought home to the 
Government of India, in a manner which could not 
be ignored. In this year one big load of 30,000 
rifles was successfully run through to Iiandahar. 
It is said that a year or so previous to this, the 
* A W e s t  African colo~ly has been suggested. 
Cd 
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~fir1119i raftit, Governments of New Zealand and New South 
It,,:r fl:at: to Wales had had occasion to dispose of a quantity 
% t 8 dl: P '!Over of old Government rifles which had seen service in 
f/z l:~jblc(l 
the South African War. The purchaser seems to ri%llu 
1r.cll have been a man of no little enterprise. I t  boots PT;  :$y ;3N not to inquire into the Homeric wanderings of 
$+9e;.ii I l j l  tg,:+%~(i~~ 
these rifles between the date of their departure 
.:cl.t ; e g i l I l h t  
from the Antipodes and the date when the first 
e 3s*r:.h-.it.)11 O! of them reached the hands of one of the political 
$."fi;$rtc,s: 11I:ly 
officers on the North-West Frontier. Suffice it to ' 1l1c say that the rifle was forwarded to Simla, where 
it seems to have been regarded as a very interest- 
ei, i l t j jrgtI#d ing curiosity-interesting enough, at all. events, to 
; '$i;af -' :%fttr be forwarded again to the India Office. 
*.-olt.!gfcll to Further inquiries showed to what extent the 
.m 11. f l. tlrc danger on the frontier had grown, and Colonel .:,.*" &-,-NL:L.~)~ Malleson was detailed on special duty to report on 
U-- : . . -L i t~ t  11:id the traffic through Afghanistan to the North-West 
.>. B,aaP 1 g t . n  Frontier. The result of his report was to convince 
:*- ~ ~ ~ s ~ $ t ~ $ j  the Government of India that no time should be 
--. 4 k i .  $ I l ~ ~ . @ \ v s  lost in instituting measures of the most repressive 
$15. F*rii~ic~ kind. Military operations, which were undertaken 
& $  litrid;itiu~i at Robat, were found inadequate to the situation 
$ 2  K~:..~ in view of the nature of the country over which 
a * ~ 1 1 I t  s&&btt'tl watch had to be kept. A Gurkha battaLion was, 
rpg4i ,+ Q* , tile however, stationed there in case of eventualitiw, 
! &  8: t ia~ l c t  ~ i t b t  which succeeded in making several important 
I (B: ;+aa,ritlu captures. Accordingly, in 1909 a rigorous blockade 
Ei.wi:d b;tr, was instituted in the Persian Gulf and in the Gulf 
g.# lijiris, tile of Oman. During the cold-weather season of 
. c c 4 .  1909-10 so numerous were the captures of gun- 
8 
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running dhows that the Arab skippers soon learnt 
to look before they " skipped." 
And now we come to the genesis of the autumn 
crisis of last year on the frontier. Before the 
development of the arms traffic through Afghan- 
istan, what rifles were in the possession of 
the Pathans had either been run in througl~ 
British India or were the products of successful 
rifle-stealing from regimental guard-houses. Of ' 
some 1,500 rifles returned at  the end of tlie Tirali 
campaign, the majority were identified as haviiig 
been stolen in this manner. Coffins had also been 
successfully employed to convey rifles across the 
frontier under the very eyes of unsuspecting militia 
patrols. I n  Calcutta rifles had been strapped 
under goods-waggons destined for Peshawar, wlience 
they were secretly carried off by natives on arrival. 
Ammunition had gone through the IChaibar cleverly 
conceded in bales of merchandise. Bolts had 
disappeared mysteriously from arms-racks. All 
these methods of obtaining arms now suffered a 
severe slump. It was no longer worth while 
stabbing a sentry in the back to get his rifle. The 
cunning which had prompted the rifle-thief in the 
stillness of the night to pitch a pebble to  one side 
of a sentry and to attack liim from the other wliile 
his attention was distracted in tlie direction of 
the souiid was no longer called forth. These ways 
were too difficult and dangerous, and were not 
always rewarded with success. 
Even the Adam IChel Afiidis who owned rifle- 
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factories in the Icohat pass began to appreciate 
the decline in trade consequent on the appearance 
of the " vilayeti " (European) rifle with which the 
border was being inundated. The '( pass-made " 
rifle fell in price to half its value. With one 
accord the Adain Ii11el closed their workshops and 
invested in the new avenue of trade. A few went 
theinselves to the Gulf, but the majority elitrusted 
their savings to the l'owindal~ merchants who now 
visited Mekran in large numbers. These Powin- 
dalis, it is said, were financed in some cases by the 
Amir, on condition the rifles were sold in districts 
designated by him. 
For a time everything went well. Rifles poured 
into the frontier. But suddenly the crash came. 
The Pathans who, returning from Mekran, reached 
their homes about the beginning of June, 1910, 
reported that they had been unable to obtain rifles. 
The ships of the "Sirkar," they said, had put an 
end to the trade. Their money was in the hands 
of the dealers in Muscat. 
Whole clans were ruined-nay, whole tribes. 
All through the sninmer indignation grew. Raid- 
ing recommenced with unexampled persistence. 
Demands from tribes-people for colnpensation began 
to be heard. The Adam Ilhel reopened their 
worksl~ops, on the principle that " 'tis an ill wind 
that blows nobody any good." It was of no avail ; 
nobody had any money wherewith to buy even 
a c6 pass-made " rifle. 
But though ,the suppression of gun-running in 
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the Persian Gulf had undoubtedly had its full pro- 
vocative effect on the tribes of the North-West 
Frontier, yet there had not been wantirig causes of 
unrest, which, independently of gun-running and, 
to all appearances, of each other, had been gradually 
leading up to a frontier crisis. Gun-running in its 
succeeding phases, first of toleration and then of 
suppression by Government, had provided first the 
means and then the pretext for a rising. I n  a 
sense, then, it should be regarded more as the latest 
development in the situation than as the fons et 
origo of all the trouble. 
That an outburst was, at  least for the time 
being, warded off reflects the highest credit on the 
tact and judgment of the frontier political ofhers. 
For not since 1897 had such a favourable oppor- 
tunity for combined action occurred sim. ul-tnneously 
all along the frontier. In  nearly every quarter 
disaffection had been rife. ATot only in the south 
had the Mulla Powindah, since 1904 the evil 
genius of the Waziri border, been exerting himself 
in the cause of Islam, but in the north, in Swat and 
Bajaur, the Gud Mulla, upon who~n fell the 
mantle of the late IIadda Mulla, had also, in s 
tentative manner, taken up his parable. At the 
same time, there was evidence that influences of 
Afghan origin had been st work to seduce the 
tribes-people from their allegiance-influences which 
seemed to point to the fact that a rising of the 
independent tribes would not have been looked 
upon with disfavour in certain quarters in Kabul. 
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Yet further signs of the times were to be found 
in  the revived activity of the Hindustani fanatics, 
a politico-religious sect which for twenty years had 
been practically regarded its a cipher in Indian 
politics. What passed between Nasrullah and 
Abdul Icerim, the nephew of their present leader, 
during the latter's visit to Kabul in the autumn of 
last year has not yet transpired, but it is safe to 
say that it bodes no good to us, and we sl~all 
probably hear of them again before very long. 
But by far the most dangerous exhibition of 
ill-feeling came from the IChaibar Afridis, and 
especially among the Zakka Ichel section, who saw 
in  the disaffection of the IZohat Pass Afridis an 
opportunity not to  be lost of fbrwarding their own 
quarrel with the Goverilment of India. 
As in 1897 and in 1908, so to-day the tribes on 
the Peshawar border take their cue from this 
powerful division of the Afridis ; and it is as much 
due to the fact that the Iihaibar Afridis hesitated 
t o  take the lead as to anything else that the 
TCohat Pass Afridis, who of all the tribes had 
suffered most in connection with the suppression 
of the gun-running, acquiesced in the refusal of 
Government to compensate them for their losses. 
A word as to the divisions of the Afridis. The 
Afridis themselves are divided into three great 
divisions distinct from one another. 'I'hese are- 
(1) the Khaibar Afridis ; (2) the Adam IChel or 
ICohat Pass Afridis ; (3) the Aka Rhel Afridis. 
Though participants in the Afridi rising of 1897, 
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taking a prominent part in the burning of Landi 
Ilotal and Ali Masjicl, the Aka Ilhel have given us 
little trouble in comparison with the other sections 
of the Afridis. Owing to their geographical 
position midway between the IChaibar and Icohat 
Passes, when in 1881 allowances were apportioiled 
to the Afridi clans for the policing of these passes, 
the Aka IChel found themselves excluded. They 
remained, therefore, for many years the only tribe 
among the Afridis not in receipt of Goverilment 
grants. This has constituted their chief grievance, 
venting itself in numerous petty raids into British 
territory. To remedy this very natural feeling of 
jealousy, a pretext was found for granting thein an 
allowance, and in 1902 they were e~t rus ted  with 
the protection of their section of the frontier. 
Since that year they have not shown any active 
hostility. They are, however, in the habit of 
harbouring outlaws, as it is contrary to  their code 
of l~onour to give up anyone taking refuge anlong 
them, and for this they have been fined more than 
once. Notable among these refugees was the 
Hazari~ao gai~g, wl~ich in recent years, from the 
safe retreat of the hills between the Bara ltiver a i d  
tlie ICohat Pass, cormnitted many raids on the 
Pes11,zw;tr district. 
Tke Adam Ichel, who live in the rnountaiiious 
district between Peshawar and ICohtlt, through 
which for fifteen miles runs the Icohat Pass, are, 
as has been mentioned before, the only section of 
the Afridis who show any ct~pacity .for trade. 
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They are engaged in carrying salt, and also in 
the manufacture of rifles, for the production of 
which there are half a dozen workshops in the 
pass owned by the Galai section of the Afridis. 
They have no connection with either the Aka 
Illiel or tlie Bhaibar Afiidis, and are politically 
under the Deputy-Commissioner, Icohat. 
The IZhaibar Afridis are further divided into 
six clans, which I here, for the sake of convenience, 
tabulate under their respective political factions of 
Sainil and Gar, tlie origin and meaning of which 
are lost in the mists of antiquity, but whose 
ramifications extend to all tlie tribes between the 
Ichaibar and Icurram. Like Whig and Toly, the 
Afridi accepts, as a matter of course, the traditions 
of the faction to which lie is born. As Salnil or 
Gar, nascitur, non fit. 
Samil. Gar. 
MnIikdin Khel. Kambar Khel, 
Zaltka Kliel. Kuki Khel. 
Sipahs. Kamrai. 
There is a dynastic alliance between the Malik- 
din Khel and the Icambar Ichel, while tlie Zaldra 
Bhel and the Ilulri Ichel are mortal enemies. The 
Sipal~s and Ibrnrai are of minor importance. These 
clans live in Tirah in the summer, coming down in 
winter to the country along the south of the 
IZliaibar Pass, and are therefore known as "do- 
kora," or " two-homes." To these clans, from whom 
are recruited the Ichaibl~r Rifles, is entrusted the 
guarding of the pass, for which services they 
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receive allowances amounting to the value of the 
tolls levied by them before the Britisll occupation 
of the pass. There is no more mistaken idea than 
to regard these allowances as a kind of danegeld, 
by which it is hoped to buy off raiders from making 
inroads into the Peshawar district. Such a policy 
would only serve to aggravate the evil. 
The tranquillity of the passes and the consequent 
rapid growth of trade has tended to enrich the 
tribes-people, who calk now come and go with 
greater security and regularity in pursuit of their 
own humble trade, which for the most part consists 
in carrying firewood into Peshawar. This enhanced 
prosperity, far from having had any marked civil- 
izing effect, seems rather to have rendered increas- 
ingly difficult the task of the malilts in keeping 
order among the more unruly element. Moreover, 
one or two successful raids, for which reparation 
was not immediately exacted, had still further 
increased the arrogance of the tribes-people. 
After the Zakka Ichel Expedition of 1908, each 
of the Afridi clans, by the terms of the agreement 
then come to, undertook responsibility for the good 
behaviour of one section of the Zaklca Icllel. This 
was never meant to be a perrnanent measure by 
those who made it, nor did the Zakka Khel, who 
consider themselves a match for any two of the 
other clans, contemplate an indefinite submission 
to the yoke of their neigl~bours, even had these 
latter felt thcmselves capable of enforcing it. 
For ten years there has been a bitter blood-feud 
I d u e  of the 
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between the Zalcka Khel and the IEuki IChel, which 
from time to time breaks out with more than usual 
ferocity. A t  such times it is the obvious duty of 
the other clans, under the agreement of 1908, to 
intervene and put a stop to this internecine strife. 
But here the eternal question of Samil and Gar 
crops up to divide the Afridi jirga among itself, 
and to destroy the balance of power in this tu- 
multuous commonwealth. The Malikdin IEhel, 
being in politics Samil, refuse to take sides against 
the Zalcka IChel, and the Kainbar Khel, though of 
the Gar faction, hold to the Malilrdin IChel on I 
account of their common ancestry. The two re- 
inaining clans, conscious of their numerical in- 
feriority, are too frightened to exhibit any active 
sympathies. 
When roused, there is no saying to what lengths 
the Afridi will go, and these internal feuds con- 
stitute a direct menace to the security of the pass, 
and thus violate the agreements of 1881 and 1908, 
by which the trade through the passes is snfe- 
guarded and the tranquillity of the Zalclca Khel 
guaranteed. Any infringement of these under- 
talrings renders punitive intervention not only 
legitimate but allnost obligatory. 
I11 the midst of these internal dissensions, the 
news of their losses as the result of the suppression 
of the gun-running raised the indignation of the 
Zalrlra lChel to fever-heat, and the Afiidi clans, all 
of whom had been affected in a greater or less 
degree, were found either unwilling or powerless 
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to restrain them. A t  the same time, the demand 
made to Government by the Kohat Pass Afridis 
for compensation, which received a , firm refusal, 
led to the perpetration of numerous raids into 
the Peshawar district, and the mail-tonga was held 
up and looted in the Kohat Pass, which was in 
consequence closed for about a fortnight in 
September. 
At one time in September it looked as if 
hostilities could hardly be avoided. The situation 
had resolved itself into the problem of how long 
the Icambar and Mdilidin Khel would remain con- 
tent with merely evincing a passive sympathy 
towards the turbulent Zakkas. There were even 
budmashes among the Kulu Khel prepared to 
sink their feud in order to foment a general Zaklia 
I<hel rising against the British. Excited by the 
success of several raids at this time, the warlike 
spirit of the Zaklca Khel threatened to  obliterate 
the memory of the expedition of 1908. As a 
precaution a guard was placed on the bridges over 
the Indus at Attock and I<ushalgurh, both of 
which are threatened from the low hills of the 
Jowaki Afridi country. But chiefly owing to the 
tactful treatment of the situation by Mr. Merli, 
acting as Chief Commissioner in the absence of 
Sir George Roos-Reppel, the storm was happily 
averted, though it was some time before it could be 
said that the frontier had returned to its normal 
degree of tranquillity. However, it may be hoped 
that a final and satisfactory termination has resulted 
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e titne, the demand from the deliberations of a united Afridi jirga 
Rohat Pass Afridis held by Sir George Roos-Keppel in Peshawar on 
,red a firm refusal, December 3, at which all parties were fully repre- 
Imerous raids into sented, and in which it was tacitly agreed to drop 
nail-tonga was held the question of losses sustained, since it was obvious 
'ass, which was in that there was no intention on the part of the 
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TRIBAL RESPONSIUILITY VERSUS FANA'I'ICISM 
ONCE again, therefore, the priming of the Pathail 
pistol has been followed by a flash in the pan. 
The whole history of tlie frontier has been made up 
of such abortive attempts at revolt, with here and 
there an interval of short-lived success. But 
though the Pathan is capable of causing the de- 
spatch of a considerable quantity of cipher tele- 
grams, these sporadic outbursts are inere side-shows, 
and in reality there is an unmarked struggle going 
on all the time for the sovereignty over this no- 
man's-land which we call the independent territory. 
Western diplomacy is being pitted against Oriental 
finesse, and the commercial instinct is being em- 
ployed to  exorcise the militant spirit of Islam. The 
wire-pullers in this little comedy are the Amir 
on the one hand and tlie Government of India 
011 the other, and the rnawionettes a t  the end of 
the wires are respectively the inullas and the 
inalilcs or tribal headmen. 
The problem with which the Govern~nent of 
India is now confronted is that of convincing the 
maliks, and through them the bulk of the tribes- 
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people, that it is useless any longer to  kick against 
the pricks, and that in lending an ear to  the fantastic 
schemes of the mullas for driving the infidel beyond 
the Indus they are only laying up for tllemselves 
retribution in the near future, instead of the 
treasure in heaven which they so fondly irn a g' me. 
By no other means will the Pathans be induced 
to combine ill any definite action with a view to 
putting down raiding or expelliilg firebrands from 
their borders. As a race they are too intensely 
democratic, and concerted action between the 
members of even a small subsection of a tribe 
only arises from two motives-one of which is 
religious fanaticism, the other self-interest. The 
former being a monopoly of the Moslem inhabi- 
tants, there remains but the latter to Government 
for the accomplishment of its object. Once, then, 
that this idea of self-interest, of material benefit, 
of something to be gained and of something to be 
lost, is aroused in the minds of the tribal elders, 
a powerful counter-agent begins to operate against 
and gradually to undermine the nefarious influence 
of the mullas. 
The system that has been adopted for inculcating 
these ideas is known as that of "tribal responsi- 
bility," by which the lawlessness of this people is 
gradually giving way before the better instincts of 
more civilized communities-industry, discipline, 
and respect for property and authority. Thus, the 
inaliks are responsible for the repair and policing 
of the roads through their territories, protection 
9 
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of the border, keeping open the passes, prevention 
of raiding, expulsion of outlaws from their borders, 
restitution of stolen property, etc., for all of which 
services they receive allowances in proportion to  
their value to the State. These alIowances can 
always be, and frequently are, stopped when the 
tribe proves incapable of fulfilling its obligations ; 
and this system has been found to worlc well, 
especially among the Afridis, who, besides not 
being so susceptible to the wiles of the mullas, I 
have a certain $ail- for the buttered side of 1 I 
the bread. This was well illustrated in the Zalclca j 
IChel Expedition of 1908, when the Afridi maliks 
evinced no desire to  risk the loss of their allow- 
1 
I 
I ailces by allowing the clans under their charge I 
to join in the fray. 
I n  spite of their constitutional hostility towards 
us, the Pathans show a decided readiness to  enlist 
in the frontier militias, which, since the reincor- 
poration of the Punjab Frontier Force with the 
regular army, have been raised in most of the 
agencies. These are the Chitral Scouts, Khaibar 
Rifles, Rurram Militia, Northern and Southern 
Waziristan Militias, forming a force of some 14,000 
troops directly under the command of the Chief 
Coinmissioner of the North- West Frontier Prov- 
ince. These native militias render invaluable 
service in intercepting raiding-parties, but, in spite 
of their extreme mobility in this respect, i t  is 
obviously impossible for them to be on the actual 
spot selected by the raiders as their objective, 
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unless previous information has been received, and 
in  the case of villages near the border it is easy for 
the raiders to  make a sudden descent and to carry 
off their booty to the hills long before the militia- 
inen can arrive to intercept them. 
T o  remedy this evil the somewhat risky experi- 
ment was made last year of rearming% the bead- 
men of those border villages on whose loyalty it 
was felt we could depend. There is, of course, 
always the chance of these rifles being used against 
us in the future ; but it is not unnatural that 
tribes within our border, and entitled to our pro- 
tection, should consider as rather illogical a situa- 
tion in which, while debarred from seeking satis- 
faction in the way most congenial to them-i.e., 
by making counter-raids-they were conlpelled 
to  submit to systerntltic plundering without the 
means even of offering an effective resistance. 
One of the greatest oljstacles that has stood in 
the way of the extension of this system among 
the tribes is the fact that in some cases the maliks 
have contracted responsibilities which, owing to 
the democratic spirit of the Pathans, they have 
since found themselves unable to discharge. This 
is especially the case among the Mahsuds of 
Southern Wazhistan, who, besides being inveterate 
raiders and more than usually susceptible to 
fanatical influences, are democratic to such a 
degree that the term " rnalik," as applied to a 
* Lord Curzon had caused the disarmament of the border 
villages. 
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Mahsud, is a ridiculous misnomer. The asseinbly 
known as the Mahsud jirga practically includes 
the whole tribe. The agreement come to at the 
tennination of the Mahsud blockade was signed 
by no fewer than 1,565 so-called maliks, each of 
whom considered his personal pal-ticipation in the 
proceedings indispensable. 
From this democratic condition it follows that 
the richer, and, on this account, presumably more 
influential, rnaliks are not necessarily those best 
able to preserve order. Those malilzs, in fact, 
who annually received the tribal allowances were, 
in many cases, found quite incapable of controlling 
the ruclr. of the tribe. Their influence over the 
younger' members was nil, and it was found 
repeatedly necessary to fine them and to stop their 
itllowances. 
As age~zts provocateurs of the Kabul Anglo- 
phobe party, the mullas naturally head the 
anti-malilr faction, and in a country where the 
inhabitants we steeped in the grossest superstition, 
even the mullas themselves being in most cases 
ignorant of the true doctrines of the religion they 
profess to teach, it is not to be expected that their 
hold over the population will be easily loosened. 
In spite of the fact that in the Maholnmedan 
religion these are, properly speaking, no priests, 
the whole country is overrun by an hereditary 
hierarchy of mendicant fanatics-hereditary as 
being composed of Saiyids, or descendants of 
the Prophet, and Sahibs, or descendants of the 
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c c  associatcs " of the Z'rophet, with their innumer- 
able following of " rnurids," or disciples. For all 
of these the tribes-people have the profoundest 
reverence, and tlieir paves are, after death, places 
of pilgri~nnge and the scenes of reputed miracles, 
whicli often take thc form of' the grave growiiig 
loilgcr us the s:~intly reputation of its occupant 
increases. One of these, situated in l'eshawar 
Ca~itorlmcrlt itsclf', i ~ n d  known as the 4 4  11,zu-gajar," 
or nine - yil~~cler, :~ttninecl to such :L leilgth that 
it thrcatcncd to grow right across the road. One 
night, I~o~vcvcr, tlie c:~ntonment 1n:~gistrate or- . 
dai~led that a will1 sEioulcl be built round it, since 
when it llt~s bccu kept more or less within reason- 
able bourlcls. 'I'licse " zisr:~ts," or sliri~les, are held 
in such respect tllnt the natives, on leaving their 
l ~ o n ~ e s  for any lengtli of time, do riot hesitate to 
deposit their houscllold v~1u:~bles near one of them, 
in the full certainty of fincling tliem there on their 
return. Shriries are frequently erected over the 
bodies of Rlusi~lrnans wlio have died fighting 
i~guirist the unbeliever," uild it is not uncommon 
to see several of these within s sliort distance of, and 
solnetimcs right under, the w:~lls of s British fort. 
A t  ,Jiuicl.oli~, in Southern FVnziristnn, there is one 
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being on tliis ucoo~lt~t r111 ot~jeet of contempt among 
tllc other Afridi clans, they oric day induced sn 
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exceptionally holy man to visit them, whom they 
promptly murdered, thus wiping away the stain 
on their honour, and at the same time acquiring 
a shrine which soon became the envy of the 
surrounding countryside. 
Independent territory is divided by a belt of 
comparatively non-fanatical tribes-a circumstal~ce 
which explains to a great extent the difficulty the 
mullns experience in mganizing a simultaneous 
I rising all over the frontier. Southern Waziristan 
1 is fanatical, and the whole of the Peshawar border 
north of the IChaibar (Swat, Bajaur, Buner, Agror, I and the Mohmands) intensely so. Tirah and the 
I 
I ICurram, however, are little influenced by the fiery 
i exhortations of the mullas, and though Tirah is potentially our most formidable enemy on the frontier, it chooses its own time for a hostile demonstration, and refuses to  dance to the piping 
11 of every wandering faqir. The following will 
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was to be expected, the lnulla did not care to risk 
his skin in this manner, and was hooted out of 
Tirali. 
It is this non-conducting area that  has for so 
long frustrated the efforts of the rnullas to bring 
about a combined revolt against British rule, and 
a point on which it is impossible to  lay too much 
stress is that 'I'irnh is the KEYSTONE of the whole 
situation. As in 1897, so to-day, the revolt of 
Tirah would be the signal for a general rising of all 
the Pathan tribes. But as long as Tirah remains 
passive, so long will the efforts of the mullas in the 
more fanatical districts resemble the explosions of 
damp gunpowder. 
Before the conclusion of the Durand Agreement 
the Pathans feared the Amir's designs on their 
independence no less than our own, and even 
accused hiin of being the friend of the " infidel "; 
but now that their freedom has been guaranteed 
from attack on that side, they loolr on the Amir as 
their natural ally. Even now the frontier from 
Mount Sikaram, the western extremity of the 
Sofaid ICoh, to the Nawa ICotal in Bajaur remains 
undemarcated, chiefly owing to tlze dilatory and 
obstructive policy of the Amir, who was astute 
enough to recognize the value of such an open 
door into our back-yard, which might be utilized 
by his emissaries without incurring any responsi- 
bility for interfering in affairs on our side of the 
line. Little troubles are constantly cropping up 
on the frontier below Landi ICotal, and the un- 
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demarcated portion of the Mohlnand boundary 
is a continual source of danger, as the territory 
to which i t  gives access is a veritable hotbed of 
fanaticism and intrigue. For half a century i t  has 
harboured the political riffraff of North-West 
India-the Sitana or Hindustani fanatics, the 
mutinous 55th Native Infantry Regiment in 1857, 
the Iladda Mulla and his successors, the Gud (Lame) 
Mulla and the Sufi Sahib, the Nazrat Sahib and 
the Mad Faqir (known also as the Mulla Mastan or 
the Sartor Faqir)-and the Mohmand tribe, half of 
wllich is Afghan and half independent, surges back- 
ward and forward at will, and Afghan lashkars 
infiinge the Durand Agreement with impunity. 
Whatever measure of success may be said to 
have attended Abdurral~man's treatment of the 
ccjehad" (holy war) question, he certainly never 
succeeded in organizing the fiontier priesthood as 
the Amir's brother, Nasrullah, has done. Not only 
has the latter been successful in reco~~ciling to each 
other many who formerly were enemies through 
jealousy of each other's influence or sect, but he 
has created a regular network by which communi- 
cation is kept up between the northern and southern 
parts of the province, and these in turn are in 
communication with ICabul. 
Formerly the activities of the mullas had been 
centred on their own narrow and selfish little 
interests. The preservation of their own saintly 
reputations and the undermining, by fair means or 
foul, of the reputation of any rival divine, varied 
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by an occasional jehad, seemed in their eyes a 
praiseworthy aim and object. Many a plot directed 
against tlie British failed tlirougl~ the petty jealousies 
of its authors. Few of them were capable of such 
patriotism as the late Akhund of Swat, who, in 
spite of religious differences of opinion, used his 
influence on behalf of his rival, Saiyid Akbar Shall, 
the leader of the Sitana fanatics, to procure his 
election as Icing of Swat, a t  a time wlle~i tlie 
proximity of the British demanded, and the rivalry 
between the Swatis deferred, the choice of a recog- 
nized leader. Few, lilce him, had the good sense to 
perceive that the independence of Swat was inore 
easily preserved by adopting a frieildly attitude 
towards us than by continual raiding into British 
territory. 
The reasons that have led Nasrullah to stir up 
the mullas to  a sense of their comlnon interests 
are to  be found in the general belief, entertained all 
over the Mahommedan world, that tlie European 
nations contemplate a partition of the entire Islamic 
asea that yet retains a semblance of freedom in 
Western Asia. Events in Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, 
Arabia, and Persia, are followed with anxious 
interest. Close touch is maintained with the Pan- 
Islamic League. These fears receive daily confinna- 
tion in the rumours of proposed railway construction 
across Persia, and the discussions about respective 
spheres of influence that are carried on in a cool 
pkoprietary tone in the newspapers. Moreover, the 
advent of civilization and education in these coun- 
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tries spells loss of influence to the mullas, whose 
power varies in direct proportioil to the credulity 
of the masses. Thus the mullas are fighting not 
only for tlieir religion, but for their daily bread. 
Appearances being decidedly against the Euro- 
pean nations, Nasrullali has not hesitated to  enlist the 
active co-operation of every sect, not even despising 
the exiguous remnant of the once formidable body 
of fanatical warriors known as the Hindustani or 
Sitana fanatics. These at one time had made 
themselves inasters of the whole of Yusufzai and 
Peshawar, but on the arrival of the British west of 
the Indus were hunted from pillar l;o post, until 
they finally found refuge among the Amazais of the 
Blaclr Mountain, where they have remained since 
1888, in spite of a treaty by which the Arnazais 
undertook to expel them from their borders. The 
elaboration of this scheme was materially assisted 
by a " ghaza," or Church Congress, which Nasrullah 
caused to be summoned for the discussion of these 
and lcindred matters, and secret agents have been 
appointed for the maintenance of close relations 
with such outlying districts as Southern Waziristan. 
For this purpose Ilhost is found to be a very con- 
venient halfway house, since it is within easy reach 
of the Mulla Powindah and the Hamzullah 
Mulla, and the Khostwals can always be counted 
upon to assist in attacks on the Sllias of the Icurram 
Valley.* The mullas of Ningrahar, who are both 
" Lala Pir and the Malang Paqir collected a Iashkar here in 
1908, t o  be used against the Shias. 
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influential and numerous, devote themselves to 
intrigue in Tirah and the country to the north of 
the Ichaibar. 
Of the more reinote tribes inhabiting the valleys 
on either side of the Chitral Road, in Upper Swat 
and the vast tract known as Rohistan, little is 
known, and the Government of India rarely comes 
into contact with them, except indirectly through 
the Nawab of Dir. The strategic value of Chitral 
vanished with the cessation of the Russian advance 
in the Pamirs and the conclusio~~ of the labours of 
the Pamir Boundary Commission, which interposed 
the narrow strip of Afghan territory, known as 
Wakhan, between the rival empires. But, in spite 
of its dangerous isolation, it is thought advisable to 
retain a hold on this distant outpost, owing to  the 
difficulty of getting into the country again should 
the necessity arise. The yearly reliefs go up in 
October, and from that time onwards the little 
garrison is cut off from British territory by 100 odd 
miles of treacl~erous country and two difficult passes. 
A railway runs from Naushera to Dargai, at the 
mouth of the Malalcand Pass, and the Malakand 
movable column is ever ready to secure the line of 
communications. The security of the road is, how- 
ever, continually menaced by the constant intertribal 
fighting that goes on between the Nawab of Dir 
and his son, Mian Gul Jan. The signal services and 
thorough loyalty of the Nawab for many years 
past have always been gratefully recognized, and, 
indeed, it is very fortunate that such a large portion 
76 TRIBAL RESPONSIBILITY 
of the independent territory should be in the hands 
of a ruler who is known to discourage the presence 
of hot-gospellers in his tei~itories. Quite recently 
(December, 1910) the subject-tribes in the Upper 
Swat Valley, wrho pay him a yearly tribute, threw 
off their allegiance, drove the Nawab's tax-gatherers 
hoin the country, and prepued to offer a spirited 
resistance to tlle collection of the revenue. The 
Nawab immediately collected a lashlrar, and, ua- 
aided by any outside help, soon regained control 
over his unruly subjects. 
Meanwhile, in other parts of the province, in 
spite of occasional set-backs, the tribes-people are 
gradually being brought to realize the wisdom of 
following the line of least resistance. Every year 
fresh evidence is forthcoming to show that the 
policy of iinposii~g responsibility on the rnaliks for 
the behaviour of the tiibes under their charge is 
one that has been justified by results, and perhaps 
the greatest proof of this is t o  be found in the 
peaceful termination of the crisis through which we 
have just passed. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FROM PESHAWAR TO PARACHINAR 
TEIE enormous mountain massif of Tirah, forming 
the lreystone of the frontier arch, runs down be- 
tween the Peshawar and Kohat borders to witliia 
fifteen miles of the Indus, neatly 11:~lving the 
province. I ts  eastern extremity is lrnown as the 
country of the Jowaki Afridis, and as such is cut 
ofl from Tirah proper by the Icohat Pass, which 
connects Peshawar and Kohat. The Jowalci 
Afridis, like the Galai Afridis, who inhabit the 
pass, are a section of the large tribe of the Adam 
Khel Afridis. 
It was through this pass that I found myself 
careering along one December morning at  full 
gallop in a dak-tonga on my way to Icohat, e?z 
~ o u t e  for the Kurrarn Valley and Parachinar. W e  
had left Peshawar at half-past ten, and, skirting the 
southern wall of the city, past where the " l~ingi "- 
weavers prepare and dye the long woof of cotton 
which eveiltually becomes a turban, through the 
long avenues of bul-bul trees and the slow-moving 
throng of bullock-carts, buffaloes, donkeys, camels, 
and other beasts of burden, with their attendant 
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drivers, had at last reached the open plain. ICohat 
is forty miles off, and we hoped to do the journey 
in four hours. The first stage of about seven miles 
took us fully an hour, and the fresh pair of horses 
jibbed at starting. This happened also at  the 
second change, and at the third the sluggish " near " 
horse lay down in the dust, breaking his harness, 
or rather its string fastenings. When the tonga- 
wallah had induced it to resume a perpendicular 
position once more by stamping with an iron-shod 
boot on its nose (I made feeble expostulations in 
English), more string was produced, and we started 
off at a wild gallop. A t  Matanni post we changed 
horses again, and the shaft-horse jibbed anew. It 
is always the shaft-horse that jibs. The " off" horse, 
" tied " to the ,tongs with some string and a leather 
trace, seldom gives trouble, unless by backing out 
into the road at right angles to the shaft-horse, and 
outside his trace. Sometimes both horses are 
harnessed to a pole, with a kind of iron yoke, which 
clanks and clatters when they g d o p  in step. But 
when galloping out of step, the natural oscillation 
of their bodies keeps the yoke always fast against 
the pole, and the noiseless seesaw, seesaw of the 
yoke goes on like the pistons of a double-suction 
pump. Many of the tonga-11orses seem to lcnow 
this, and avoid the discordant clank, clatter, clank 
of the yoke. A t  Matanni we picked up a Subadar- 
Major of the Frontier Militia, on his way to ICohsLi;, 
and with the aid of an interpreter he explained to 
me the topography of the pass. 
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THE KOHLIT PASS '79 
W e  were then just entering the foot-llills of the 
Galai country, and from time to time we passed 
groups of tall and wild-looking Afridis, all armed 
with modern rifles, for we were now in independent 
territory. These looked askance at the white man, 
for they were under the displeasure of the Sirkar, 
having held up and looted several tongas during 
the disturbances that had occasioned the recall of 
the Chief Comrnissiol~er from England. A little 
farther oil the narrow valley began to assume the 
appearance of a Scottish glen, with green fields of 
barley on either liaad, and presently we drew up 
at  a village of the Zarghun I<llel, with its mud- 
walled, fort-like dwellings, its whitened " hujrah " 
or guest-house, and its " kar1chanav or workshop 
(i.e., rifle-factory). There are six or seven of these 
rifle-factories in different villages in the Adam I<hel 
country, and thougli the rifles produced in them 
cannot compare with those run in from the Persian 
Gulf, yet a fairly brisk business is done, especially 
when the efforts of the bloclcading squadron in the 
Gulf have reduced competition. The chief difficulty 
that the Afridi workmen experience is in the rifling 
of the barrel and in the construction of the bolt, 
which accounts for the frequency with which in 
former years rifle-bolts disappeared in a mys- 
terious manner fiom regimental arms-racks. It 
was with great regret that, owing to the strained 
relations which subsisted at the time between 
the Adam Khel and t l ~ e  Government, I was 
obliged to continue my journey witliout having 
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paid a visit to the interior of one of these kar- 
khanas. 
For several miles more the road continued to  
wind through this narrow valley of low foot-hills, 
till of a sudden a sheer blank wall of rock blocked 
the end of the valley. Up the side of this wall we 
zigzagged, and presently reached Fort Mackeson 
at the summit, looking out both ways over the 
Icohat Plain and the valley through which we had 
just come. Far away through the haze we could 
malte out the silver thread of the Icohat River as it 
wound its way eastward over the level plain. Be- 
low, on the sight, and followhlg the curve of the 
hillside, the white ribbon of road floated downwards 
like the " paying-off " pennon of a man-of-war. 
Away to the left a faint brown scar across the 
mountain-side showed where the ancient track of 
the Buddhist pilgrims of bygone centuries led 
nortliwards to the Himalaya. 
A t  ICohat I put up for one night at the house of 
the Deputy-Commissioner, who was away on tour 
at the time. This bungalow was designed and 
built by the ill-fated Cavagnari, who was massacred 
in Kabul wit11 all his followers during the second 
Afghan War. It possesses a central rotundo with a 
domed roof, round which the rooms are built, this 
design being adopted for the sake of cooliless 
during the hot weather. The Revenue Comrnis- 
sioner's bungalow in Peshawar is built on the same 
plan, and as far as I know is the only other like it, 
being an exact replica. During my brief stay in 
Kohat 1 was i 
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KOHAT 
ICohat I was indebted for much Iundness to Colorlel 
and Mrs. Kennedy, and have grateful ~emembrance 
of the hospitality extended to me, and of a pleasant 
evening spent with them. Rohat is a deligl~tfully 
cool and shady-looking place for a frontier canton- 
ment, and its green foliage is in stsilting contrast 
to the barren semicircle of hills which close it in on 
the north and west. From rising ground on the 
outskirts of the cantonment may be seen the 
V-shaped notch in the hills tl~rougl~ whicb the 
Ublam Pass leads up to the Miranzai border, 
rendered historic during the Afridi revolt of 1897. 
It was through here that the main southei-n ad- 
vance into Tirah under General Loclchart took 'I 
place. 
Kohat lies on the narrow-gauge railway horn 
ICushalgurh on the Indus, and it was along this 
railway that I continued my journey westward the 
next day to  Thall, its terminus. The line follows 
the Miranzai border along the southern face of' 
the Sarnma Ridge, on whose crest the two forts, 
Gavagnari and Lockhart, look down into Orakzai 
Tiral~. These two forts are held by the Samana 
Rifles, a fi-ontier militia raised the surround- 
ing tribes. A t  Hangu, the " jumping-off place" 
for the Samana Xidge, the little train was boarded 
by an army of locusts, in the shape of some fifty or 
sixty sepoys of the Kurram Militia, just returning 
froin furlough to their regiment at Parachinar. 
As the train was already fairly full up, and there 
seemed no possibility of obtaining any more 
11 
82 PROM PESlIAWAlC T O  PARACI-IINAR 
carriages, every available footboa~cl and platfonn 
was so011 covered with a yelling and writhing mass 
of beturbaned strap-hangers, shouting and gesticu- 
lating to their friends on distant portions of the 
train, and waving good-byes to their relations on 
the platform, tvllich seemed as crowded as before. 
The  journey from Kohat to  T h d  covers about 
sixty miles, and lasts nearly the wl~ole day. To- 
wards evening it was curious to see some devout 
Mal~omnmedan spread his prayer-carpet on the 
platforln and perform his evening devotions in 
the midst of the seething mob, wholly oblivious 
for the time to the discordancies of the  world 
about him. Among this crowd may often be 
seen the Powindnh or Icabuli merchants, on their 
way down into India. Their tattered clotl~es 
and dirty red-bearded hces give no indication of 
their means, and for all one can tell the most 
ruffianly among them may be on his way to 
Calcutta or Bombay, Sometimes they go even 
farther afield, to Australia and even British 
Columbia, where I have seen them employed in 
sa~nnills. The story goes that one day a British 
officer, whose motor-bicycle had broken down on 
the way up to  Parachinu, was electrified on being 
accosted by a huge bearded Powindah with a 
l c  Why, hullo, son ! what's wrong with the ' bike'?" 
Though the throng also move black-robed Turi 
woinen with covered faces, sturdy Afghan women 
with a jingling necklace and breaqtplate of Kabuli 
rupees ; buxom, laughing Afridi wenches with their 
short kilts, and eve 
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THE ICURRAM VALTZY 
ed and platfoRi 
"dathing short kilts, and ever and anon the slrirl of the 
"'Q a d  gtsticu. 
" serenai "--the Pathan equivalent of the bagpipes 
' I  portions of the -is heard above the incessant din. 
~ l a t i o ~  n The Kurrain Valley lies immediately to the 
mwded as before, south of Tiral~ and the Orakzai country. Itemark- 
hall mven about able alike for the beauty of its scenely and for 
the friendly character of its inhnbitai~ts, it presents 
5 ahole day, T ~ .  
in this respect a marked contrast to the rest of " a Nme devout 
the North-West Frontier Province. The entrance 
!@f@pt on the to the I<ul.ram leads through a narrow and b:lrren 
devotions ill 
defile, commanded by the fort of Thall, which is 
5 vbullg o b l i ~ i ~ , ~ ~  situated on an eminence of great natural strength. 
ha of the world Here I passed the night in the dalr-bungalow, 
@d Euj' often be setting out early on the following morning through 
"".wht$, on their the narrow entrance to the valley, to the tune of 
r bitered clothes the long-drawn, melancholy howl that the tongn- 
a.r DO indication of wallah extracts fioin his battered bugle as a 
ku the most warniilg to the natives of the approach of the 
:n m lii way to mail-tonga. 
w they go even A curious sight we must present to the sleepy- 
@d ertu British eyed Turi as he watches our approach through the 
~nlmployed in cold dawn, with a letter or a parcel in his hand for 
t me dq a British the post. Strapped on either side over the wheels 
id h k e n  down on are two Peshauri mule-trunlrs, or yalrhdans," and 
1 e9ecSr;nfid on bcing two bundles of bedding. On the roof of the con- 
Pt~sidd~ with a veyance is a ragged and unkempt urchin, used 
for stmting the ponies when they jib, tying the 
harness again when i t  breaks, and perfoiming odd 
jobs of varying utility. Our Jehu is attired in a 
khaki militia great-coat, and wears a blue turban, 
the end of which is wound round his mouth to 
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keep tlie dust out of his lungs. A pair of motor- 
goggles for the front passenger is not so much 
a luxury as a necessity. I n  this fashion we proceed 
till the mounting sun compels me to change my 
cap for a topee, to avoid sunstroke. Presently 
we stop at the village of Manduri, and I incake the 
acquaiidance of a hospitable custorn of the Pathans. 
The lieadinan of the village, ISalnid IChan, pre- 
sents himself, and, after the usual salutation, offers 
me a cup of tea. TlCs is an invitation which 
cannot be refused without giving ofrence. The 
best ten-service is brougl~t out-a very fine affair-- 
and n charpoy to sit on, and for once the tea is 
excellent. I t  is not always so, but one cannot 
refuse, even tllougli the sugar has been upset and 
piclreil out of the dust by grimy Iiands, as happened 
t o  ine on one occasion. 
After leaving Manduri the valley broadens out 
ancl the road sweeps up a gradual ascent to Sadda 
Post, some thirty-five miles from Thall, where 
the valley takes a sharp bend to the left. On 
eitlier liaiid are diminutive fields sur1.ounded by 
'' bunds," or balilrs, for irrigation purposes. The 
fertile soil here produces two crops annually-wheat 
in winter and rice or lndian corn in summer. 
The fields descend in terraces to the Kumarn 
River, which is perennially fed by the snowfields 
of the Sofaid Koh. Chennb-trees of great size 
and age afford a pleasant shade to the fortified 
villages, which everywhere present an appearance 
of prosperity not to be met with in the more arid 
pvts of the pmvirrc-e. ' 
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parts of the province. These trees, as convenient 
reildezvous for raiders, have each a name by which 
they are known to the natives. 
A t  Sadda Post I met the Political Agent for the 
Icurram, Mr. S. E. Pears, t o  whom I had a letter 
of introduction, and as he had come down from 
Parachinar on urgent matters of State, I decided 
to stay there with him a couple of days, and return 
with him to Parachinar. Sadda Post lies just to 
the south of the Charnkanni country, and has 
stood a siege more than once, notably in the rising 
of 1896. At the timewhen I was there the village 
was full of Massuhzai and Alisherzai clansmen of 
the Orakzai tribe, who, with numbers of Turis, had 
been summoned to appear in jirga before the 
Political Officer. 
A s  most of the differences between the Govern- 
ment and the independent tribes are settled in this 
way, i t  may not be out of place to present to the 
reader a mental picture of one of the more orderly 
varieties of jirga. 
Wi th  a view to creating as much trouble as 
possible, the rnaliks, or headmen, of the clan Gave 
turned up two days late, only to find that the 
Political officer has gone off in his turn in another 
direction, apparently oblivious to this manoeuvre on 
their part. In reality he had been expecting it. 
They are now, perforce, compelled to await his 
pleasure, or forfeit the small grant that Govem- 
ment generally makes towards their travelling 
expenses, which in the case of the more distant 
1 R 
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tribes is, to them, ;l matter of some importance. 
When the Political Officer returns, he finds that 
the tribe has come in in great force, scenting a 
day's feed at Government expense. All the '' grey- 
beards" of the tribe are here, as well as inany of 
the younger members, some armed, in number 
about 400. The scene presents a picture almost 
Biblical in its solemnity, the analogy being 
heightened by the Jewish type so prevalent among 
the Pathans. 
Assisted by the Extra-Assistant-Colnmissioner, 
generally s Khan of good local family, the Political 
Officer takes his seat, the jirga disposes itself 
round him on the ground in a semicircle, and 
I the discussion begins, graduating in violence v according to the " jungliness " of the tribe. The case 
for settlement is as follows: The tribe in question 
has gone bail in Rs. 5,000 for the good behaviour 
of a notorious outlaw among their number. This 
outlaw has since raided a tribe under British pro- 
tection, carried off much loot and several pi is one^:^, 
and escaped through his own country into the 
back of beyond. The tribe is now faced with the 
knotty problem of rescuing the prisoners and re- 
capturing the outlaw, or of suffering the loss of 
Rs. 5,000. What, then, are they to do ? I n  spite 
of having been badly let in by a "pal," their 
sympathies are all with the miscreant, whom they 
consider to have performed a very commendable 
feat. Had he not succeeded in escaping, their 
verdict would have been otherwise, and he would 
. ,, .- 
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have been handed over to justice as a disturber 
of the peace. On the other hand, a large sum 
of money is at  stake, and the Pathan does not 
"part." These little sidelights on the Pathan 
character are transparently visible in his choice 
of arguments. (I must admit that I was unable 
to  follow the arguments, conducted as they were 
in the Pushto- tongue, but the dumb-show was 
eloquent to a degree.) 
See that aged patriarch in the centre, with the 
flowing snow-white beard and the dignity of an 
Abraham. H e  has not said much yet, but sits in 
silence, shielding his eyes from the glare of the sun. 
The two old men on either side of him are doing 
all the talking, and from the tones of their voices it 
is easy to see with what cunning deftness they are 
putting their case before the Justice of the Peace. 
Resignation, aggrieved and pathetic ; indignation, 
scornful and well simulated ; wrathful outbursts 
and spasms of mock-humility, each in turn fail to 
move the Political Agent from his impartial sum- 
ming-up of the case, in which character-study aids 
largely in sifting the trutll from the untruth. 
Still the ancient patriarch opens not his mouth, 
and holds one with his quiet dignity. No doubt, 
as head malik of the tribe, he is too proud to sue 
for a slight reduction in the matter of the fine, and 
while his subordinates, fioin time to time casting a 
pebble on the ground in front of them by way of 
emphasizing a point, weave a voluble and circum- 
stantial romance, if haply the fine may be eluded, 
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he sits with studied indifference, making a little 
pattern with the pebbles at his feet. 
But for all his air of dignity, he is not the noble 
patriarch you thought him. In  a long life he has 
iun the gamut of crime, from petty larceny to 
murder, and has seen the inside of Icol~at Gaol more 
than once. Furthermore, his dignified silence is 
not the expression of a wounded pride, but an 
indication that, like a spoilt child, he is at this 
moment merely very sulky. 
From Sadda Post to Parachinar the road runs 
parallel to the beetling range of the Sofaid Koh. 
None of the passes over this range into Afgl~anistan, 
whicli lies beyond, is under 12,000 feet high. The 
crest of the range is some 2,000 feet higher, rising 
at its western extremity to  a height of 16,620 
feet in the snowy peak of Sikaram. To the west 
of Sikaram lie the low hills of the Peiwar Icotal, 
the point of British territory nearest to ICabul, and 
beyond this, again, can be made out the elephant- 
shaped mountain in Afghanistan, over the brow of 
which runs the Shutargardan, or Camel's Neclr 
Pass, and the road to Kabul. It was through here 
that Lord Roberts led his column into Afghanistan 
Parachinar is an open cantonment, and, owing to 
its altitude of 5,750 feet, would make an ideal hill- 
station, Here are the headquarters of the Kurram 
Militia and the political agency. The whole 
British staff, however, only amounts to eight 
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THE TURIS 
men-viz., five officers of the militia, the Political 
Agent, a sapper, and a doctor. By these the whole 
of this valley, sixty miles in length and in area 
about the same size as Cambridgeshire, is adminis- 
tered. 
The inl~abitants of tlie ICurram are Turis. By 
religion they are Shias, and have, in consequence, 
always been at  enmity with the surrounding tribes, 
who are Sunrii Mahommedans, by whom they 
might well in time have bee11 exterminated. But 
in 1893, a t  their request, the valley was occupied 
by the British, since when the Turis have been left 
more or less in peace by their neiglibours. A 
small portion of the Bangash tribes in South-East 
Tirah profess the Shiah creed, and, like all other 
sects, are divided up into factions. These factions 
are led by different Saiyids (descendants of the 
Prophet), and are at  consta~nt enmity with one 
another. The Turi Saiyids are divided into two 
great factions, of which tlie Mian Murid, whose 
present leader, Mir Akbar Mir, resides in T i d ,  
though numerically inferior to the Drewandi, 
possesses by far the greater power of the two, 
owing to the lack of combination among the latter, 
and the jealousy which prevents the selection of a 
supreme head. 
The Turis enjoy a reputation for bravery equal, 
if not superior, to that of any other Pathan tribe, 
else had they assuredly been exterminated long 
since. The raising of the ICurram Militia put 
them in a position to defend themselves against 
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the Shinwari and Orakzai tribes to the north and 
the IChostwals to the south, As in the IChaibar, 
so here there are numerous posts along the road, 
and communication is kept up between these by 
means of heliograph, at which the native jemadars 
are adepts. Having learnt the Morse code and its 
equivalents in the English alphabet, they are 
enabled to speak to each other in their native 
language, Pushto, through this medium, even 
though in solhe cases they are unable to write 
their own language. 
Khost is a small district of Afghanistan abutting 
directly on the southern boundary of the IC~~rram 
Valley, and jutting out wedgelilre into the Bannu 
district. It commands the Bannu road to Miram 
Shah in the Tochi Valley, or Northern Waziristan. 
When we took over the ICulqram and occupied the 
Tochi Valley in 1893-1895, the Amir Abdurrnhman 
is said to have exclaimed : " Tl~ese are two knives 
in my side 1" With greater justice we might weU 
reply that Ichost has been a thorn in ours. Separ- 
ated from its natural markets, ICohat and Bannu, 
the hostility of its inhabitants towards us has 
gradually increased, alternating, curiously, from 
time to time with intimations that they were ready 
to throw over the A m i ~  if we would consent to 
take over their country. It has for long been a 
ready place of refuge for all the blaclclegs of the 
border, offering as it does a secure retreat from 
which they might harry the Bannu border. Many 
a Hindu has been kidnapped and carried off into 
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!' to the north and 
""Q the Kh&ar, IChost to be held to ransom by the outlaws. 
Sts along the mad, Efforts were from time to time made to procure 
the dispersal of these bands, but it would appear ' 'etl~een t~lese by 
"lc llative jemadars that the Halcim of Khost was in league with the 
.\lorse c a b  and its outlaws, for the raiding never stopped for any 
length of time. Emboldened by the distractiolls 
"pllabet, they fin 
that were occupyirig the attention of the autllorities "' in their native 
in other parts of the province all through last yeay, 
Ilis medium, eve11 
the raiding became more fiequent than before. 
unable to wwite 
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Jeinadar Adjutant of the Northern Waziristan 
Militia, named Muzaffer Shah, together with 
several sepoys, was carried off from Datts Ismail 
Ichel by a notorious outlaw named Arangi and his 
gang. Hitherto the Rhostwals had been content 
to direct these personal attentions to  Hindus, but 
the capture of a Government servant in the shape 
of a native officer of a frontier militia was a direct 
challenge to the Government of India. No ransom 
was forthcoming, but on November 7 news was 
received that the Jemadar had been released, after 
a captivity lasting two montl~s. A declaration 
issued some days later by the Amir, to the effect 
that all outlaws were to be banished fifty miles 
from the Durand line, let drop a hint as to the 
means by which his liberation had been effected. 
Between Thall and Bannu there is a wedge of 
independent territory jutting out into administered 
territory, and commanding the Rohat-Thall and 
ICohat-Bannu roads, through which the raiders 
from Khost were obliged to pass. While the 
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recent kidnapping of Hindus from the roads was 
at its height, a cordon of troops was placed along 
a line indicated by Spinwam and Edalr, for the 
purpose of intercepting the outlaws. Should the 
proclamation of the Amir fail t o  produce any 
effect, it will probably be found necessary to make 
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SOUTHERN WAZIRISTAN 
THE development of the railway system in the 
North- West Frontier Province, considering its 
vital iinportance fsom strategical considerations, 
leaves a great deal to be desired. The value of 
such schemes as the Icurram Valley and ICabul 
River Railways lies chiefly in their more or less 
probleinatical utility at  some future date, and their 
construction can only be justified by the supposi- 
tion that a t  some future date that chain of circuin- 
stances will arise which will lead to the necessity 
of lauilching a large force into Afghanistan. But 
with regard to the administered districts of the 
province i t  is quite different. Many arguments, 
not least of which is tl-ie civilizing effect of rail- 
ways, can be brought forward in support of their 
construction. A t  the present time there is no 
railway connecting l'eshawar with the sout%ern 
portions of the province. To reach Dera Ismail 
Khan, for instance, from Peshawar, it is necessary 
to  undertake either a long and uncomfortable 
journey of some 200 miles by tonga via Icohat and 
Bannu, or an equally unpleasant railway journey 
by way of the Attock Bridge and the left bank of 
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the Tndus. Various schemes have from time to 
time been sub ,jzjzsdice for linking up, not only the 
northern and southern parts of the province, but 
the whole province, with the Baluchistan Agency. 
Expense, however, has stood continually in the 
way of their redizatio11. But the difficulty of 
rapidly transferring troops from Peshawar to the 
Derajat constitutes such a weakness in our system 
of frontier defence that the question of further 
railway construction is recognized in many quarters 
as being one of primary importance. Had the 
money that was spent on the abortive Ribul River 
Railway been expended on a line through the 
Kohat Pass to Kohat and Bannu, with a branch 
line from Bahadur Khel to Thall, a valuable and 
lasting work would have been effected, with, per- 
haps, less likelihood of stirring up the ill-feeling 
of the tribes than there was i11 the former case. 
From Bannu the line co~lld then, in the course 
of time, have been continued via Lalci and through 
the Pezu Pass, in the IChuttak country, to  Dera 
Tsmail Khan. From Pezu also, which is in the 
neighbourhood of Sheikh Budin, the hill-station 
of Scuthern Waziristan, a further extension could 
be made south-westward tl~rougll Tarilr to  the 
mouth of the Gumal. I ts  ultimate continnation 
through the Pass would depend on the state of the 
tribes in the Sherani country. A glance at  the 
map will convince anyone of the undoubted 
strengthening in our military position that would 
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sundry whom it might concern that the mail was 
approaching, and that on no account should the 
slow-footed caravans venture on the bridge until 
it was safely past. The passage of a kafiln 
several hundred yards long is an affair of at least a 
quarter of an hour. 
The change in the scenery of Dera Ismail Iihan 
from that of Peshawar is very striking. A new 
climatic belt has been entered. Here the date and 
other palms flourish in profusion, and brilliantly 
coloured parroquets flash in and out of' their shade, 
uttering harsh and discordant cries. 'J.'he bright 
sunshine, the whitewashed bungalows, and the 
luxuriant green of the vegetation, give the lie to  
its nickname of Dreary Dismal. But to  Live there 
is perhaps to understand. Dera Ismail is in con- 
stant danger of being engulfed by a sudden change 
in the course of the river, and the present site 
of the town dates only fivom about half a century 
ago. The new Paharpur Canal, whicli takes off 
from the Indus some 100 miles farther noith at  
Balakot, passes close by here, and falls again into 
the Indus a little below. It was intended to 
irrigate the country round Psharpur lying to the 
north of Dera Ismail Iihan, and to supersede the 
ancient and little scientific practice of damming 
up the torrent-beds till the water sllould back up 
above tlle level of the bi~nks, slid be led off at  
right angles oveib the fields. The advantage of 
the new canal lies in the fact that it renders 
perennial irrigation possible. The old method 
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depended entirely on the rainfall, which might 
prove insufficient, or, on the other hand, if very 
heavy, was more than likely to rush down with 
such force from the hills as to sweep away in one 
night the huge dam which it had taken the com- 
munal labour of several villages six months to 
build. Utter famine would in such cases result, 
necessitating a remission of the revenue - tax. 
When it is remembered that the "rains" are all 
over and done with in i~bo~i t  a fortnight, it will 
be seen how precarious is this method of irrig a t' ion. 
The new canal is not yet in thorough working 
order, and no decision hi~s yet been arrived at 
as to  what tribe allall be allotted the land which, 
through it, will eventually be brought under cul- 
tivation. The scheme is known as the Paharpur 
Canal Colony, but it is to be hoped that such land 
will only be panted to tribes dwelling in the 
administered poi-tion of the province, since it 
would be as u~ljust as impolitic to grant it to ally 
independent tribe when tliere are so many of our 
own subjects with better claims. While on the 
subject of irrigation I sliould like to inention here 
that the general character of the soil a id  the 
aspect of the couiitry through which the Paharpur 
Canul flows bear a striking resernblarlce to large 
portions of Persian Mekran,  lota ably the coast21 
belt, tllroug1-i which the route of the &Ielu.nll Field 
Force lay. Rekrcace to this will be made in u 
subsequent chaptcr. 
The town of Tank, situutecl forty miles to the 
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north-west of Dera Ismail Khan and nine from the 
independent border, is a t  once the terminus of the 
tonga service and the jumping-off place for the 
Mahsud country. It is also the hereditary posses- 
sion of the ancient Nawabs of Tank, whose ashes 
lie rnouldering in the ruined cemetery in the pic- 
turesque palm-garden of the Nawabs. The present 
Nawab is something of an eccentric, devoting his 
time and his money to the breeding of greyhounds, 
hawking and coursing being still n favourite pastime 
of the local chieftains in this part of the world. 
The Nawabs of Tank have always been bitter 
enemies with the tribes of tlie Cl'azil? border, 
though they do not appear t o  have beer1 very suc- 
cessful in "keeping their end up " against their 
aeighbours, but rather to  have been utterly at their 
mercy until the arrival of the British flag. 
To the south of Tank, some forty miles distant, 
rises the famous " Throne of Soloznon," the Takht- 
i-Suliman, wit11 its twin peak, the Kaisitr Ghar. 
West and north is a level plain, inhabited by 
Bhitannis, beyond which a dreary and barren country 
rises up gradually to the snowclad peak of Pir 
Gal, at least forty miles o f ,  ill the Derwesh Ichel 
country. Twenty-two miles west of 'l1aiik lies the 
British outpost of Jandola, arid between this and 
Pir Gal is the country of tlic Md~suds ,  coirlprising 
in all some forty or fifty square milcs. 
Tlle occasion which led me to undertake niy first 
camel-ride, from T:mk to ,J:~ndoln, was the anriunl 
meeting of tlic hlul~sud jirga, for receiving their 
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allowances or paying up the balance of their 
fines, as the case might be. The Mahsud jirga is 
a byword ainong the tribes from Chitral to the 
Gumal for turbulence and L C  shaitani '' (devilry). 
Our party consisted of the Resident in Waziristan, 
Mr. J. Donald, C.I.E. ; Major Jacob, who had come 
from Quetta for the purpose of enlisting Mahsud 
recruits in the Indian army; and Major Dodd, 
Commandant of the Wano Militia and Political 
Agent in Southern Waziristan. The cavalcade was 
further augmented by our respective bearers and a 
couple of sowars (troopers). Thus escorted, we 
rode out across the plain towards the wall of moun- 
tains. As we approached these the stately head of 
Pir Gal sank gradually out of sight, and we were 
not to see i t  again until we stood on the ramparts 
of Jandola. The route led up the valley of the 
Zam River, and the stream had to be forded many 
times. As usual, the way was crowded with herds 
of small brown cattle and flocks of goats, being 
driven along by wild and unkempt-looking savages, 
whose loose cotton pantaloons were girded up 
about their loins because of the continual fording 
that had to be done. Southern Waziristan is noted 
on the frontier for its mutton, and grazing disputes 
are not uncommon between the Mahsuds and their 
neigl~bours. The Bhitannis especially are always 
looking for trouble of this kind by grazing their 
flocks on the land that by long usage has become 
the recognized ground of the Mahsuds, and though 
the former always come off' worst, generally having 
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their flocks driven off, yet they never seem to learn 
by experience that the M:thsud is best left alone, 
Another source of illcome to the inhabitants of 
Waziristan is derived fiom the magnificent forests 
of edible" pine which clothe the slopes of Pir  
Gal and the surrourlding mountains in the Derwesh 
Hhel country. These forests are :~t  present under- 
going, for lack of inore efficient methods, a systen~ 
of "robber exploitation," by wllich at  least a. third 
of every tree is wasted. I~T~cH cut down they are 
then roughly squared wit11 nrl ndze, until about half 
the tree is lying in chips on tlie ground. The balks 
of wood that rernain are then laboriously floated 
down the Zam River in loiig boorns of pairs of logs 
tied end to  end, being dragged over the shrtllows 
until the plain is reached, wllen they are corlveyed 
two at a time on camels into Ti&, :md there sold. 
IS  n British occupittion of the bTallsud country ever 
becomes a fkil cicco71plz', a forest officer would be as 
desirable ari addition to the administrative s t a r  as 
he would be in the forests of Ilir d the present 
moment. 
The last approach to  .Jr~ndola, wlle11 once the 
open arn~~hitl~eatse of liills 1l:ld heen reached, in the 
n~iddle of wllich the fort is situated, led past :r little 
oasis of fields, lccpt etenlally gllecn by nn irrigation 
ditch which led alo~lg thc face of the hillside. 
Fonncrly the Sort was tinder the charge of' n single 
Bril;isll officer, brrt tlie strain of this solitary life 
provcd too great, :111(l. now two aflicers go up from 
Dera Ismnil Klinn fur two montlis a t  EL time. 
JANDOLA 
Certainly it would be difficult to find a more 
depressing and dismal place for a two months' 
sojour11 than Jandola. The fort itself is small, the 
rooms dark and ill-lit by narrow windows placed 
high above the floor, a very necessary precaution 
agzinst being shot through the window by some 
fanatical "sniper." Officers are not allowed to go 
farther than three-quarters of a mile from the fort, 
I and even then must have an escort. The walls of 
tlle mess-room were covered with the artistic efforts 
of tlie various people who from time to tiine had 
undergone a two months' incarceration within the 
fort. Itegimental crests predominated, those of the 
19th Punjsbis, 47th Sikhs, and 40th Pathans, being 1 
conspicuous ex:trnples. The homely gramophone 
grinding out "The Merry Widow" served in a 
measure to  distract the mind from thoughts of the 
lnarkhor " on the neighbouring mountains-so 
near and yet so far. To relieve the daily 
monotony of this existence, Major &IcPherson, 
40th Patlmns, in charge of the fort at  the time of 
my visit, had introduced the game of rounders to 
the notice of his sepoys, who entered into the spirit 
of the gtme as much as we did on the afternoon 
of our tirriv:ll. hImy of the PIahsuds who had 
itssem1)led iri the " hujra," some 200 yards from the 
fort, cairic over to watch tlie game. Among them 
wils nn ngerl ihqir wit11 a scarred and wrinkled 
face, to wliicli a 1)lixld eye gave a peculiarly mulig- 
11a1it a11d I I I ~ C ~ I I I ~ Y  espression, He wtts dressed in 
the foulest rugs and carried n heavy bludgeon, 
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following us about with the most unpleasant per- 
sistence, and muttering hoarse maledictions against 
us. Hoping to  be rid of him, we presei1ted him 
with a couple of annas, which he cast back in OLW 
faces with every sign of contempt. H e  tvas then 
c C  moved on " by the sepoys. 
It is hard to realize the change that comes over 
sucl~ a barren and hideous country as this as 
evening draws in. The ochre-coloured circle of 
hills, that all day has quivered in the heated atmos- 
phere, at  twilight takes on a softer hue, and the play 
of colour as the s u i ~  sinks behind the violet hills 
would have caused Turiier, could he have seen it, 
to  despise his best masterpieces. As the desert 
breeze springs up the opalescent light dies away, 
Pir Gal flashes a last pale signal fi-om above Wano 
Post, and everything is swallowed up in umber. 
A bugle sounds the 6cRel;rea;t" and tlzen the 
c c  Alarm," and immediately the whole of the troops 
in the fort are at their quarters, as if an attack 
were impending. This is frequently done for 
practice, as the fort is in reality always in a state 
of half siege. Every night the barbed wire .that 
surrounds the fort is religiously linked up in fi-ont 
of the large gateway, and the flares of straw, which 
are ignited by a. torch slung down a wire from the 
ramparts, are seen to be in ordcr. 
TheMalisudsl~ave always been, without exception, 
the most turbulent tribe on the frontier, and com- 
mit outrages from a sheer irresponsible " Schaden- 
freude," which no amourlt of fining has availed to 
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mitigate. But for rnany years past they have been 
under the evil influence of the Rlulla I'owindali, a 
fi~rlaticul t~nd u~~scrupulous mountebank, who has 
aspired to recognition by tlle Governrneut of India 
;LS the leading rnalik of tlie Mahsuds. 
This znan is of the Shubi Khel section of the 
hlahsuds, and started life as a vagrant " talib-ul- 
ilm" (seeker after knowledge) irl Landidah, an 
isolated village in the Bannu district. I l e  was the 
instig:~tor of the night attack on 5Van0 Cainp in 
1894, wllen he relnairled un1ieroic:~lly in the rear, 
besting a drum, while his yelling accomplices 
rushed 1ie:~cilong in among the lines of tile Waziris- 
tan Deliinitation Escort. Froin this time dates 
liis influence in Soutllern TiiTi~zii~istaii. Ilis position 
was still f~lrtller sherigtllened in 1000, when in a 
weak moment he was accorded an interview wit11 
the Political Officer, by which action Goverillnent 
virtu;~lly recog~lized llinl as u chief of the Mahsuds. 
This was one of the greatest inistakes that could 
have been inade, and it h:~s taken years to under- 
mine the position he gained ill consequence of this 
~neetirlg. Alllong other things, it precipitated the 
crisis whidl led to tlic estr~blishment of the Blallsud 
1)lockncXe in 1!)00-01, :~nd liad its indirect efTects ill 
tIlc rrlurders of Captairl Bowring in 1904 nncl of 
Coloxlcl I-Iarnlail ztnd Captain I>o~i:tldson in 1'305, 
in which tllere is little cioubt that tlre ~nulla lrud a 
ha~ld. 
'I'llis winter tlw RIulla Z'owi~ldah nnnouncerl his 
intcotiori to bc present at  tllc delibcri~tiorrs of the 
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jirga in a manner which suggested that he 
expected the Political Officer to  come out a mile 
on the road to meet him. I-Ie was coldly informed 
that he might come as an ordinary Blahsud if he 
liked, but that he would be accorded no status as a 
malik. Incensed at this slight to his dignity and 
blow to his prestige, he promptly sought to incite 
the Mahsuds to some act of violence, in the hope of 
breaking up the jirga. I n  this, however, he was 
unsuccessful, which may be taken as a good omen 
for the future, and as an indication of the gradual 
decline of his influence. 
The usual delays had postponed the assembly of 
the whole of the jirga for several days, with the result 
that I was reluctantly compelled to return to Pesha- 
( war in the middle of the most interesting part, so as 
to be there for Christmas. However, on the f i s t  
day, which was chiefly taken up with settling the 
afore-mentioned grazing disputes, the opportunity 
occurred of taking several good photographs. 
While on the way back to Tank by a different 
route from that by which we had come, in the pass 
not a mile away, had we known it, was a party of 
Mahsuds just returning from a raid on certain 
Uhitanni flocks pasturing in the plain. Two days 
later, at  the final sitting of the jirga, n free fight 
nearly occurred between the Derwcsll I111el Wmirs 
and the Mahsuds, owing to some trivial debt. The 
majority of the tribes-people could not have known 
the cause of the dispute, yet tliey showed thein- 
selves perfectly ready to join in the frt~y, ancl it was 
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by the merest chance that bloodshed was avoided, 
. \ through the presence of mind of Major Dodd, the Political Officer, who threw up the rifle of a man 
1 who was about to fire. This man admitted that 
he had not the faintest notion what the quarrel 
was about, and was grateful for having escaped the 
sword of Damocles in the shape of a blood-feud 
for the rest of his life. 
I 
CHAPTER VIII 
TIiE POLICY OF NON-INTERVEN'TION 
WITH the formation of the N ortll-West Frontier 
Province was also definitely adopted the policy 
of non-intervention, or " co11cili:~tory policy," 
which had beer1 laid down for the guidance of the 
Government of India two or three years before by 
I 
I the Secretary of State in a coillprehensive despstcli 
of January 28, 1898. The kernel of this despatch 
was admitted by Lord George Hi~rnilton in a later 
com~liunicatiorl to be a cclimitatio~l of your intcr- 
I ference with the tribes so as to " (quoting the 
despatch) '& avoid the extensioil of administrative 
i l  control over independent tribal territory." This 
policy, of which the advantages had been previously 
1 fully recognized even by Sir Ztobert Sandeman, 
the " moving spirit " and very embodirnent of tlie 
I, pri~iciple of the c c  forwc~rd policy," was ill reality 
no new cleparture fiom tlie plmactice of' fbrrner 
lndian statesmen, si~icc it lltld heal, wit11 the 
exception of the taking over of t l ~ c  Kurrani Valley 
in 1892-98, consistc~ltly followe(1 in respect of the 
whole frontier to the north of the Gumul. The 
reasons for wllich tllc forward policy carnc to be 
l O t j  
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adopted, with such admirable results, on that part 
of the frontier known as British Baluchistan were 
almost entirely unconnected with any immediate 
and pressing need of controlling the tribes on that 
border. It was the anxiety felt at the rapid 
advance of Russia in Central Asia towards the 
Oxus, and the strategical advantages which the 
possession of Quetta would confer on us in the 
event of a Russian war, that rendered imperative 
the subordination of mere expediency in local 
affairs to those larger questions which might turn 
the scale against us in a Russo-British world- 
struggle for the Asiatic continent. Had it not 
been for these insistent military reasons, Sir Robert 
Sandeman, as he admits in his memorandum of 
September 27, 1890, would have remained an 
advocate of the policy of non-intervention. 
" As regards the extension of British control 
over the frontier tribes not subject to the Arnir, 
I would urge that the poIicy of conciliatory in- 
teryention has been forced upon us. It is an 
absolute necessity that we should defend the 
Kabul, G hazni, and Ilandahar line in Afghanistan 
in case of war with Russia. Were this not the 
case I would be an advocate of masterly inactivity 
instead of conciliatory intervention, and I sl~ould 
consider it a mistake to  make any attempt to 
include within our control the fringe of independent 
tribes which lie between ourselves and Afghanistan 
proper. " 
With the disappearance of the Russian peril the 
forward policy &Us to the ground. 
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That the forward policy has never seriously 
been put into practice in the North- West Frontier 
Proviilce shows how early i t  had been recognized 
by the military advisers of the Government of 
India that, wit11 the advent of the Russians on 
the middle Oxus, the point d)~zppz~i of :t foreign 
invasion had shifted froin Peshawar t o  Quettn, 
from the Rhaibw to the Bolan Pass, and from the 
plain of ICabul to  the desert wastes to the north- 
west of Ibndahar. With regard to n liussian 
advance, it is now almost universally recognized 
that the Hernt-ICandaliar route is the only thinkable 
line. I n  British Baluchistan we hold the key to 
the situation, with Icarachi as a, base, Peshawar as 
a right, and Gwadur or Pasni on the Mekran 
littoral as a coi~venient left. The railliead of the 
Sibi-Quetta line is now at New Charnari, that  of 
the Russians at Icushkinsky Post or Icushk, sliglltly 
nearer to I-Ierat than New Chaman is to Randnhar. 
As  all the world knows, materials are held in 
readiness at both places for building a railway to 
Herat and to  Kandahar. The Russia~ls coulcl 
probably accomplish this it1 a shorter time than 
o~zrselves. That is all. Armageddon would then 
be fought in the nortllerrl part of the I-Ielmand 
Desert, wliicll, lies in between. 
Althougll the pertinacious aclvocncy of the 
extension of the principles of the forwarcl policy 
to the frontier 1iort11 of the Guznt~l is an Iiereditury 
trait amounting almost to rnonometrlil~ nlnong the 
frontier military, yet i t  will be seen thttt iri the 
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absence of any special reason, sucIl as that which 
led to the permanent occupation of British Balu- 
chistan, the arguments adduced in its favour were 
not held to be sufficiently cogent to  warrant its 
application on the Pathan frontier. Here the 
danger of arousing the active aniinosity of the 
tribes-people, possibly precipitating a general frontier 
rising, is thought to outweigh any strategical ad- 
vantages that inight accrue from such extension 
vis-b-vis the Russian question. The tranquillity 
of the fi'ontier, in short, dominates all other 
considerations. 
As evidence of this rnay be instanced the re- 
fusd of the Government in 1904 to comply with 
the request of certain Orakzai tribes of the Shiah 
faith, like the Turis of the Rurram Valley, on 
the southern confines of Tirah, to be taken under 
British protection, their land to be administered 
as British territory. This refusal was given 
face of the recommendation of the military ad- 
visers of the Viceroy, who professed themselves 
ready, on its adoption, t o  withdraw the regular 
troops fiom the Sarnana Ridge, and to  replace 
them with tribal militia. At the same time this 
recommendation w3s accompanied by another, in 
which it was urged that the time had come when 
we should gradually extend our 6'close control" 
up to the Durand line (Parliamentary Papers, 
N.TV.F,, Cd. 4201). The refusal of the Govern- 
ment was actuated by their disinclination to risk 
kindling the spark of disaffection among the Afisidi 
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tribes to the north, wliose country would have 
been made-for them-unpleasantly accessible to 
British troops. Evidence of the feeling in Tirall 
again& such a move was forthcoming ill an un- 
mistalcable manner while the subject was still 
under discussion. 
Instances where tribes have requested to  be 
taken altogether under British control, in spite of 
their well-lmown love of independence, are by no 
means uncommon, and among these may be cited 
the Mallsuds, on all sides admitted to be the most 
independent and intractable tribe on the frontier. 
A t  no time since the demarcation of the frontier 
by the Duraiid Mission in 1893 was so mucli care 
I lavished on this poition of our Indian Empire as - 
during the years of Lord Curzon's and Lord 
Minto's administl.atio~is. Not only were the 
frontier defences entirely reolganized, arid the 
administratio~l improved by the formation of the 
North-West Frontier Province, but this new 
policy, to which I have already alluded, was 
adopted towards the tribes. As an experiment 
this innovt~tion was well worth tlie trit~l ; as a 
ntocZ7t~ vivcndi it is as good us any that have been 
tried. And thougk i t  would he useless to cl:~i~n 
for i t  that i t  has in any way provided the solution 
of tllc fi*ontier prol)lem, yet it would not be fair 
to attribute to i t  clircctly those rcgrcttable iiici- 
dents that have occurrecl sirlc!c its inception. Rfr~ny 
Icssons tnnd much vt~lunl>le cxperiencc hnve been 
gained from it, which would not have been learnt 
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in the school of the forward policy. It has 
served more than anything else to throw light 
on Afghan intrigue, and to show which way the 
wind is blowing in our buffer State. 
During the whole of the period mentioned not a 
single square mile of territory was acquired, and 
in the only expedition of importance this principle 
was set forth in the most emphatic terms by the 
British Government, that " neither immediately 
or ultimately, directly or indirectly," should there 
be any idea of annexation ; and though attempts 
were made to  improve communications by the 
construction of here a metalled road, there a rail- 
way, these have been either necessary for the 
p-otection or convenience of our troops or com- 
plementary to our defensive alliance with the 
Ainir, and their construction has in every case 
been subject t o  the consent of the tribes through 
whose territories they pass. Furthermore, owing 
to some inexplicable change of policy a t  the India 
Office, in two cases where strategical railways were 
in course of construction these have been aban- 
doned. These were the Iiurram Railway, in which 
work never proceeded farther than the acquisition 
of the right of way and the construction of the 
station bullgalow a t  Parachinar, which is now its 
only memorial ; and, secondly, the Loe Shilman 
or Kabul River Railway, on which work ceased 
some three years ago. 
By these conciliatory methods it was designed, 
in the words of Mr. Chirol, to "win over the tribes 
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by consent." The demarcation of the Durand line 
had left a bad taste in the inoutl~s of the tribes 
on our side of the line. I t  was natui:al that they 
should fear that this was but the pre1imin:try step 
to the occupation of their country-a feeling which 
the mullas were careful to stimulate with dark 
references to the fate of Egypt and the probable 
fate of Persia. It was thouglit tlmt by calming 
these fears and by showing thenl that we had no 
designs on their territory beyond the exclusion of 
Afghan iniluences and tlie security of the persoils 
and property of British sul;jects, we sllould gain 
the coilfidence of the tribes-people, and the raiding 
would eventually cease. 
But the Pathan has always been an inveterate 
raider, and consisteiltly hated and iriistrusted us. 
Had we been able to exclude Afghaii firebrands 
from Tirah, TVsziristan, and the Mohn~and 
country, success might have follo~ved. For, in 
spite of the treachery, the cruelty, tlie avarice, 
and tlie cunning with which most writers have 
hitherto credited him, one carlrlot help feeling a 
parig of admiration for liis high courage, oiterl 
lieroism, liis powers of endurance, aiid l is  manli- 
ness--q~lualities which 11eed but to be developed 
to make lii~n into the sple~ldiii 1nateri:~l of wliicli 
tlie frontier militias can show sucli conspicuo~is 
exaxnples. Ilere, one feels, is bettcr stuir? tlit~n tlie 
flabby clown-countryniarl, with his tiiriid cireminac!y, 
arid one urho, could wc but overcome this secm- 
ingly insuperable barrier of mistrust illid ~nisuncler- 
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standing, would not be insensible to the benefits 
of ordered government, nor turn and rend the hand 
that gave it. For in their dealings with us tlley 
have shown themselves not always oblivious to the 
higher dictates of honour; but in many things 
the Pxthan is a spoilt child, and must be treated as 
such. It would be foolish to judge him by our 
ow11 standards of right and wrong. Murder to 
him is not a crime, but a creed; robbery a social 
duty. H e  fails to  grasp the theory of punishment, 
though admitting its pmctice with sulky resent- 
ment. Childish in his mental attitude towards our 
parental corrections, he is apt to be suspicious of 
our kindnesses, and to attribute wrong motives 
to any leniency shown him. Philantl~ropy is lost 
upon him. It does not enter into his conception 
of the social virtues. To him might is right, and 
any clemency is put down to the score of weakness. 
A policy of " masterly inactivity " leads him to the 
conclusion that we are incapable of taking his 
country from him, and one of concession that we 
dare not. As this opinion gains ground among 
the tribes-people, so the danger of a rising increases. 
And so the raiding continues, and the cry goes 
up that the " conciliatory policy " is a leaky vessel. 
Whenever the disturbances show signs of abating, 
a judicious prod with the Afghan stick is sufficient 
to stir the smouldering fires of fanaticism, and to 
cause little fires among the mountains, which, if 
neglected, threaten to spread and to cause a vast 
conflagration. And this is, in fact, what has been 
15 
114 TI-IE POLICY O F  NON-INTERVENTION 
pendent border,' 





on either side 
demanding n fa 
municstions altc 
actunl figlzting 1 
a border rising tl 
weakness, as thc 
bc relieved. TE 
burning of Lane 
It is evident 
ii~security of thc 
the questiorl oi 
Southern TVazi 
of Chitral hns ; 
military opinio; 
~1~11ich tve retail 
hold is in itsel 
run in this dire( 
Opportunitie! 
h ~ d  we intend1 
happening. Tlzere can hardly be any doubt that 
the activities of the fanatical Mulla Powindah 
among the Mahsuds, as well as the martial ardour 
of the Zalrltu Khel, and the ruinours of conspiracy 
between the tribes north and south of the Kabul 
River, derive their motive force from Kabul. A t  
the Mdlsud jirga held at  Jaizdola at the end 
of December, 1910, it was known that the Afghan 
I Government had taken measures to keep them- 
1 selves fully informed of its proceedings. 
! Disgusted by an apparen1;ly week-kneed policy 
of' indecision, which forbids any firm grappling with 
the situation, and all unaware of the higher policy 
to which the local questions of the frontier must 
always be subordinated, it is hardly a matter for 
surprise that some voices are raised more and more 
as tirne goes on in favour of a reinitiation of 
I the forward policy as the only solution of a very difficult problem. * 
Looking at the question of moving up to the 
Durand line merely as a question of theoretical 
policy, and without regard to the situation at the 
I present moment, both on the frontier and in India 
-in other words, to the fitness of the opportunity 
-there is much to be said on either side. 
Viewed from the purely military standpoint, is even reason 
~vould secretly . 
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I 
I there can be no doubt as to the desirability of an 
advance. The only alternative involves a pusil- 
I 
lanimous retreat, and tlze formation of a strong 
line of defences on what is known as the "inde- 
* See note at  end of chapter. 
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pendent border." Being at right angles to the 
Durand line, our present position violates one of 
the elementary rules of strategy. Should the 
internal condition of Afghanistan ever necessitate 
our intervention-a by no means hypothetical 
contingency-our only lines of advance are flanked 
on either side by presumably hostile tribes, 
demanding a force for the protection of com- 
munications altogether out of proportion to the 
actual fighting force employed. I n  the event of 
a border rising these isolated posts form a positive 
weakness, as they are easily cut off and have to 
be relieved. The siege of Chitral in 1896 and the 
burning of Landi Kotal in 1897 are cases in point. 
It is evident that the Government realize the 
insecurity of these posts, since from time to time 
the question of evacuating the Wana Plain in 
Southern Waziristan is raised, and the retention 
of Chitral has already been condemned by expert 
military opinion. The cumbrous machinery by 
which we retain our hold on this remote stroiig- 
hold is in itself a demonstration of the risks we 
run in this direction. 
Opportunities, to be sure, have not been lacking 
had we intended to occupy the country. There 
is even reason to believe that a few of the tribes 
would secretly welcome our coming as a means to 
putting a stop to their blood-feuds, which in some 
cases have assumed such proportions as to threaten 
the extinction of whole clans, and that they would 
only make a small show of resistance, in order to 
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cc save their face " and to satisfy their own honour. 
As far back as 1880, when the Mahsuds sacked 
and burned Tank, at the supposed instigation of 
Shere Ali, the punitive expedition which followed 
in 1881 found the Mahsuds not inimical to a 
British occupation of their country. 
But militmy opinion differs from political, and 
political opinion differs according as to whether its 
source is north or south of Tirah, which, running 
eastward as the country of the Jowaki Afridis to 
within fifteen miles of the Indus, cuts the North- 
West Frontier Province neatly into two. The 
nearer one approaches to the Baluchistan Agency 
in the south the more the methods of Sandeinan 
find favour ; but at the same time it is impossible to 
conceal the fnct that the Khaibar is the pivot on 
which turns tlie frontier question, and that on its 
needs policy will be moulded and the event decided. 
One of the most plausible arguments of the 
Baluch school is that the occupation of British 
Baluchistan has resulted in the complete pacifica- 
tion of that district. Deprecating the suggestion 
that the Baluch character is not so fiercely warlike 
as the Pathan, its votaries point out that north of 
the Sibi-Quetta line the Zhob Valley is, in point of 
fact, inhabited by l<alrar Pathans. T o  clinch this 
argument the occupation of the ICurram Valley is 
cited. Where else in the province can one point 
to  an open cantonment, as in Parachinar, only 
fifteen miles from the Afghan border, and fifty- 
seven from the nearest British fort-that of ThaI1, 
where even the da 
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where even the dak-bungalow is situated for safety's 
sake within the walls 1 
It cannot be denied that, as a result of taking 
over the ICurram, the valley now presents, in the 
material prosperity and friendly character of its 
inhabitants, a marked contrast to its independent 
neighbours. But i t  must not be forgotten that 
the 'I'uris owe us a debt of gratitude for having 
saved them as Shia Mahoininedails, from extermina- 
tion by their surrouading enemies of the Suilrii 
persuasion-Shinwaris and Orakzais to the north, 
and Khostwals to  the south-and that it was at 
tlieir express invitation that we marched up the 
valley. Moreover, by so doing there was no 
chance of raising disaffection in Tirah through a 
mistrust of our ulterior motives on the part of 
the Afridis. As for any comparison that Balu- 
chistan may be thought to afford wit11 the Nol-tll- 
Frontier I'rovince, the differences between 
the two in respect of distance from the Afghan 
capital and of populatiorl per square mile con- 
tribute to render unreliable any conclusions based 
on inference from one to the other. 
On the score of expense, too, serious objections 
can be brought, not so much on account of actual 
inilitary expenditure n t  the time, but because the 
revenue to be derived fro~n EL tract of country 
which, when not desert, is poor grazing land, would 
never support the army of revenue officials neces- 
sary for its collection. True, there are forests in 
Southern TYaziristun which might produce con- 
16 
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siderable revenue, but these are chiefly owned by 
the Derwesh IChel Wazirs, a tribe to  whom it 
appears we have virtually passed our word never to 
attempt to make them pay revenue. Thus the funds 
for running the administration would have to coine 
out of the pocket of the already overburdened Indian 
taxpayer. Nor does irrigation hold out any pros- 
pect of converting independent territory into a 
paying proposition," because, owing to the liinited 
quantity of water available, for every new area put 
under irrigation, a similar area goes out of cultiva- 
tion. It was calculated that if a scheme for 
irrigating 7,000 acres in ICurram-where taxes are 
nominal-were put into operation, a corresponding 
area in Bannu, which yields a considerable revenue, 
would be turned into a desert. 
But there are even inore pertinent objections 
to a forward movement being made, with which 
the perils of the moment are intiinately connected. 
Were we to absorb independent territory, our 
administrative boundary would be conterminous 
with that of Afghanistan, and continual friction 
would ensue. Outrages committed by indepen- 
dent tribes can be punished according to British 
law or tribal custom without loss of prestige to 
Government ; but such offences, when committed 
by Afghan subjects in British territory, constitute 
an act of aggression, and international issues are 
immediately thereby raised. The Amir would 
then no longer be able to shelter himself under the 
specious plea that he is no longer responsible for 
i 
i 
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I outrages perpetrated in independent territory. Any untowi~rd incident in that case would spell 
Habibullah's downfall, for he would stand between 
the devil and the deep sea. On the one hand he 
must live up to the agreeinents which his father 
made with the British Government, and which is 
1 the price he pays for our support ; on the other he 
i must face his brother, with the whole weight of 
n fanatical l~ierarchy at his back. 
I I n  short, were we to occupy independent terri- 
I 
tory we should inevitably be drawn into a war 
with Afghanistan-a war of far - reaching con- 
sequences, and a responsibility against the as- I 
sumption of which all the canons of common 1 I 
sense combine to militate. 
For  in the present condition of India sufficient 
troops could not be spared for such an enterprise, 
and it is doubtful whether reinforcements from 
home could be counted on. Furthermore, a war 
with Afghanistan would alienate the 70,000,000 
Mahommedans in India, on whose support we can ~ 
rely, at  any rate for the present, owing to their 
rivalry with the Hindu population. Then there 
would be the question of holding Afghanistan, 
which would constitute n severe drain on the 
Indian exchequer and inlrnobilize some 80,000 
troops. For this service F r~ t l~an  troops could obvi- 
ously not be selected, and it would probnbly be 
found necessary to  incret~se their pay considerably 
befbre Sikhs or D o p s  could be got to serve there. 
It is now barely three years ago that we were 
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saved, by the conclusion of peace with the Zaklca 
Ichel, froin being involved in a cornbilled rising 
of the tribes to  the iininediate 1101%11 and south of 
the Khaibar, which, for reasons which need not 
be entered into here, would almost certainly have 
precipitated a war with Afghanistan. Practically 
the same thing occurred again in the autumn of last 
year, and this tiine the whole border from Chitral 
to the Taltllt-i-Sulimsn was looking to the Zakka 
IChel for a sign that was never given. 
Whatever inistalres have been made in the past, 
it will be seen, with this knowledge to  guide us, 
that our duty lies, not in " rattling the sabre," but 
in backing up the " man on the spot," whose efforts 
are at this moment directed towards staving off 
the explosion which all are agreed must come 
sooner or later, and, in the meanwhile as far as 
possible minimizing the effects of an evil, which i t  
is impossible to root out, well lmowing that in 
the hold we have over the trade-routes into India 
we wield a weapon less dangerous than c c  cold 
steel," but of proved efficiency. 
No~~ . - r ide  article in the Globe of October 15, 1910 : 
". . . The situation has now become intolerable, and the con- 
dition of the frontier to-day is a disgrace to any civilized nation 
which pretends t o  rule and give security in an alien country. 
What we have now to ask ourselves is whether i t  is not time for 
us to  yeconsider our frontier policy, and t o  advance our adminis- 
tration gradually up to the Durand Line. . . ." 
The reader may judge for himself what reliance may be 
placed in this exponent of frontier policy, who, a few lines 
farther down, refers to Dir and Upper Swat as among those dis- 
tricts that have al.ready been taken over by the  Administration. 

A CRUISE I N  THE PERSIAN GULF 
IT had been my intention to return to England via 
the Persian Gulf and the Baghdad-Aleppo route, 
and with this object in view I sailed Karachi 
on February 9 in the British India S.S. Dzvarka, 
fast mail for Muscat, Bushire, and the head of the 
Gulf. Fate, however, decreed otherwise, and a 
month later I found myself once more in Karachi. 
Early on the morning of the second day out the 
high Arabian tableland which backs the Sultanate 
of Oman inland came faintly into view in the 
offing, and an hour or two later we steamed slowly 
into Muscat Harbour, past I-I.M.S. Fox, one of the 
cruisers engaged in the gun-running blockade. 
With the customary salute of three guns in honour 
of the Sultan, we came to anchor opposite the 
solitary gunboat which constitutes the Sultan's 
navy. A n  hour later, from the veranda of the 
British Consulate, I watched the Dwarka steam 
away for Busliire, while far away to the north a 
tiny panache of smoke on the sky-line, showed 
where the "slow mail" was labouring on her way 
to Jask, on the opposite Persian coast. 
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The little cove of Muscat, with its tiny town 
huddled together at  the base of the cliff's, is a 
picturesque and compact little place. On either 
hand, overlooking the town, rise the twin castles- 
last remnant of Albuquerque and the Portuguese 
dominion-with their serried tiers of cannon point- 
ing in every direction. Some oP these, on a visit to 
Y 
the more easterly castle, called Fort Jellali, proved 
to have the five bezants of Portugal emblazoned 
on the barrel, while others had the monogram G.R., 
and are the remains of the armament of a British 
6 5  74" presented to a former Sultan by the East 
India Company. The western castle is fast falling 
into ruins, and quite recently a large mass fell away 
from the wall of the central keep, which now 
presents a similar appearance to  the cc gesprengte 
Turm" of Heidelberg. The Constable of Fort 
Jelldi is a Subadar in the Sultan's bodyguard. H e  
was an aged man, and excused himself from accom- 
panying me over the castle on the plea of astlma. 
I asked him if he would allow me to take his 
photograph, but this he also declined, on the ground 
that he was not in uniform. On the eastern face 
of the castle-that is to say, on the seaward side- 
the ground slopes away to a sally-port a t  the foot of 
the hill. From above a long line of whitish cliffs 
can be seen stretching away to the south-east, with 
never an inlet or bay, t o  the heights of Jabal 
Al~htar, in the dim distance. Far below, a dhow is 
beating up the coast in the teeth of a strong breeze, 
and in imagination it is easy to conjure up the 
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scenes of bygone times, when Muscat was the home 
of piratical slave-traders and corsairs, sweeping the 
seas from Cape Mussendarn to Ras-el-Hadd. For 
all that, the Portuguese castles give a' curiously 
Europeail air to  the scene, as of the Western 
Mediterranean. One could imagine almost that 
the castle were inhabited by ICniglits Templar, and 
that the pirates were the Moorish corsairs of the 
African main. 
At the back of the town rise barren and pointed 
peaks of no great height, quivering in the heat, and 
each surmounted by a watch-tower. These watcli- 
towers are found to be needful in case of any sudden 
attacli: by the nomad Bedouins of the interior, an 
occurrence by no means infrequent in former years. 
At night-time the watchmen in these towers keep 
up an incessant chant in a minor key, calling from 
one to the other a mournful refiain, which produces 
a curiously melancholy effect when heard for the 
first time. It is this mournful chant and the still 
tropic night of Muscat that constitutes the indi- 
vidual charm of the place, and it is that which 
comes into my mind as I look back to the week I 
spent there. 
The streets and bazaars of hhscat are narrow 
and dirty to a degree, and peopled with the most 
hideous speciinerls of huinanity that I have ever 
seen. Ordinarily the men are wiry and of an un- 
mistakable Arab strain, but the women-at least, 
those that are to be seen in the streets-are of negro 
or Suaheli origin, with flat noses, thick lips, and an 
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oily and repulsive appearance. Whether from 
personal vanity or from sheer coinpassion towards 
the unwilling spectator, they wear a black mask 
or visor, which still furthcr contributes to  tlieir 
terrifying ugliness. The inhabitants live chiefly on 
fish and dates, a large quantity of which is imported 
from the opposite coast of Mekran. Tunny are 
caught and offered for sale on the beach, where by 
midday may be seen a festering heap of ichthyo- 
logical remains, sweltering under a swarm of flies. 
The town itself is surrounded by walls, there 
being two gates on the landward side : the Little 
Gate, which leads nowhere in particular, and the 
Great Gate, which leads through a pass to the 
I neighbouring village of Mattarah, about tliree miles 
up the coast. Mattarah is the commercial quarter 
i----- of Muscat, and from thence all the caravans start for the interior of Arabia. Muscat is unapproach- 
4 able from inland except by this route. To gain 
the town from the side on which the British Con- 
sulate is situated, it is necessary to pass through a 
gate over which is still a banner with the word 
" WELCOME " in large letters, which was put up on 
the occasion of Lord Curzon's visit t o  the Gulf in 
1903. These three gates of the city are always 
locked at night, for fear of a Bedouin raid. 
As the centre of the arms traffic in the Gulf, 
Muscat naturally bristles with rifle depots and 
stores. The Custom House quay is seldom un- 
encumbered with cases of rifles and ammunition, 
-while every other shop in the bazaar is a rifle-shop 

THE ARMS DEALERS 1 RS 
a Ion There is a certain ainouiit of humour in a situ t' 
in which a British cruiser is actually tit anchor in 
the harbour, with a dhow loaded to the water-line 
with rifles and ammunition almost within a cable's 
length of her, a Custom House quay fairly crowded 
with large wooden crates coiitainiiig the same, and 
a baza:~ simply bursting with arms and ammunition. 
But the laugh is on our side, and P am credibly in- 
formed tliat, owing to the tho~oughness displayed 
by the blockading squadron, there are now in 
Muscat itself a t  least 200,000 rifles and probably 
3,000,000 rounds of ammunition for which a market 
cannot be found. Prowling through ,the town one 
day, I entered a house, and was shown upstairs by 
an obsequious chuprassi to an upper room, where an 
Arab was sitting at a roll-top writing-desk, directing 
the operations of two servants, who were packing 
up box after box of Indian rupees, ready for being 
despatched to Karachi. I appeared to have chosen 
a busy time for my visit, but made myself known 
as an English traveller wishing to see as much of 
Muscat as I could. I learnt that my interlocutor 
was Ali Musa, the agent for Messieurs Goguyes 
Frbres, tlie principal arms-traders in Muscat. Ali 
Musa is an Algerian, and we conversed in French. 
He told me that les afaires were not progressing 
as satisfactorily as dnns le iemps, owing to the 
watchfulness of the blockading squadron. He  
hinted, however, that the trade was not yet at  an 
entire standstill by any means, and that secret 
channels of egress existed, which were being devel- 
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oped, and which would prove troublesome to  us in 
the future. After this he became more reticent, 
and I took my leave. On the whole there is little 
hostility to Englishmen in Muscat, whose inhabi- 
tants take a sportsmanlike zest in outwitting us if 
they can, taking defeat with good grace and a 
smile, which tells that they do not consider them- 
selves t o  have had altogether the worst of the 
game. A friend of mine told me that  one day he 
went illto the bazaar to buy a rifle, but that the 
vendor refused to sell him one, saying, "If  you 
want rifle, you go and get him out of sea." This, 
of course, had reference to our practice of " dump- 
ing " captured rifles overboard. 
To the courtesy of Major Trevor, the British 
Char@ d'Affaires in Muscat, to whom I also owe 
a debt of gratitude for his kind hospitality to me, 
I owe i t  that I was received by the Sultan, and, 
though it was impossible to  touch on any subject 
however remotely approaching political questions, 
or those connected with gun-running, yet suffi- 
cient was said to convince me that a very real value 
is placed on the continuance of friendly relations 
between Muscat and the Government of India. 
The Sultan received us at  the door of his palace, 
and led us upstairs to a room on the first floor, 
overlooking the harbour. On a black-and-white 
marble floor, in the middle of the room, was ail 
oak table, on which stood a globe of the world, to 
which he frequently referred in tlle course of our 
conversation. Round the table were a few chairs, 
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and a divan ran the length of one wall, which 
was decorated with steamship notices of the North 
German Lloyd and other lines. On a shelf stood 
two enorinous " beaked " coff'ee-pots, of the kind 
usual in the Gulf. Presently the Sultan rose and 
conducted us into an adjoining room, and proceeded 
to put oil an embroidered robe of State, which I 
gatliered he had worn at the time of Lord Curzon's 
visit a few years before. This apartment was fur- 
nished in a more Oriental style than the first, the 
walls being decorated with mirrors and coloured 
glass. On the table was an emu's or ostrich's egg, 
several shells, and numerous European novelties 
and knick-knacks, and in one corner was a tele- 
phone, connecting the palace with two I'ortuguese 
forts. The Sultan is a middle-aged man, inclining 
to stoutness, wit11 a manner in which dignity and 
bonhomie contend for the mastery. The following 
day I happened to meet him again in the bazaar, 
taking a morning stroll with his Court. H e  was 
dressed in a Norfolk jacket and wide, baggy 
trousers, and wore a turban. H e  had just been 
inspecting his stable, which consisted of a number 
of well-bred Persian horses picketed in an open 
space in the town. As there is no possibility of 
riding, or even exercising, them in Muscat, it is 
difficult to see for what reason they are kept, 
unless it be that in every Arab there is implanted 
the love of horse-flesh. 
The little European community that is con- 
demned to pass a few years in Muscat consists of 
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a French, an Italian, an American, and a British 
Consul-there is not yet a German Consulate- 
a British telegraph-master, a British doctor, and the 
agents of one or two trading firms. Lawn-tennis is 
the only form of recreation which i t  is possible to 
obtain, and the little colony meets in the evening 
for a set or two, to which the cruisers in the 
harbour contribute sometimes a welcome addition 
in players. Lunching one day on board the Fox, 
Captain Hunt showed me afterwards an ingenious 
invention which he had contrived for fishing at 
see while under steam. It was an automatic 
device for taking up the strain on the line when 
tt fish was caught, and obviated the necessity of 
keeping a constant watch on the line. By a system 
of weights attached to the line, which had been 
rove through a block at the masthead, a fish of, 
say, twenty-five pounds would raise a shot of ap- 
proxitnately the same weight, with a ivsh halfway 
to the truclr, and would be brought up gradually by 
the second weight attached farther down the line 
coming into play. Should a fish of 100 or 
even 150 pounds weight be hooked, the weight 
would be thus automatically increased, as the 
successive shot were raised from the ground, 
until a sufficient drag had been produced. The 
strain caused by hooking a large fish while steaming 
at ten knots would otherwise probably snap the 
line. With a large spinning-bait tunny of 50 
or 60 pounds had been caught, but the possibility 
of catching a shark had necessitated the employ- 
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ment of shot of an aggregate weight of 250 
pounds. 
The phosphorescent effect produced a t  night 
by the presence of the red Sargasso weed" in the 
harbour of Muscat was sometimes very beautiful, 
and the light was occasionally so strong as t o  throw 
a glow over Fort Jellali up to the very battle- 
ments. The weed appeared to drift in from the 
open sea when the wind set from the Indian 
Ocean. 
Having spent just a week in Muscat, I sailed on 
a Monday in the slow-mail for Jask, where we 
stayed long enough to permit of my lunching 
on shore with Colonel Whyte and the officers 
of the detachment of the 117th Malirattas, who 
are stationed there for the protection of the Indo- 
European telegraph-line and the new c c  wireless " 
installation, by which the cruiser squadron are kept 
informed of the movements of suspicious dhows. 
Landing a t  Jask, as a t  all other points along this 
narrow and shelving shore, is rendered difficult by 
the dangerous surf, which beats constantly on the 
beach even in the calmest weather. It is necessary 
to anchor some distance offshore, and then back: 
down the boat astern till near enough in to  jump 
ashore. The steamer, of course, cannot come 
within two miles of the shore, but anchors in Jasl: 
* I am not awme of the proper scientific name of this plant, 
though the readel; if he wish, could decide for himself approxi- 
mately by consulting the list of seaweeds found on the island 
of Henjam, given at the end of Floyer's "U~iexplored Balu- 
chistan." 
17 
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East or West Bay according to the direction of the 
wind. 
The importance of Jask lies in the fact that it is 
the point where the threads of three cables, one 
overland telegraph, a local telephone system for the 
'2 L -  ... 
telegraph-huts, and the invisible threads of the 
c G  wireless," are gathered together in the hand of a 
superintendent, who is also the Political Officer. 
, At the time of my visit Jstslr presented the 
I appeasance of a miniature Ladysmith. On every 
hand sand-bag forts, surrounded with an inex- 
tricable network of wire entanglements, met the 
eye. Sand-bag forts aIso bloclced the entrance 
I 
to the main building, and more barbed wire. The 
whole cantonment was surrounded by a veritable 
zareba of barbed wire, from the middle of which 
two flagstaffs rose to the height of 150 feet from 
the ground. On the top of these more wire. 
11: From the neighbouriag building an intermittent - - - 
tearing noise indicated that the 66  wireless " was 
working. I t  was as if some gigantic bumble-bee 




and was making efforts to escape. And this all 
I 
! because some 900 Afghans were on their way 
i down from the north to bend the Baluch Sardars 
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I From the top of the telegraph building Old 
? Jask is visible, the residence of the hereditary Mirs 
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Hoti, have gone down a bit in the world, and their 
more powerful neighbour, Mir Haji of Salrui (of 
whom more anon), wiped out Old Jask some years 
since. I n  summer the col~tinually drifting sand 
raises a curtain in front of the coast range, so that 
nothing can be seen farther than a mile fkoin Jask, 
and for all one can see, Jask might be situated 
in the middle of a vast plain as flat as a billiard- 
table. 
We  weighed anchor towards evening, with an 
addition to  the cargo of several drums of barbed 
wire, so as to enable the Consulate at Bandar 
Abbas to put itself into a better position for 
defence against the expected onslaught of the 
Afghans. 
While still on the subject of radio-telegrapl~y, it 
is an interesting fact that with a daylight radius 
of 300 miles i t  is impossible to communicate 
between Lingah and Muscat, though at night 
Bombay may sometimes be called up from Lingah, 
a distance about three times as great. It is said 
that one night Bombay refused to speak with 
Lingah, because they were "talking with the 
West Coast of Ireland," Whether there is some 
formation in the rocky promontory of Cape 
Massendam which interrupts the current is not 
known, but the wireless operator on the P. and 0. 
Xnlsette told me lie "could generally" speak to 
ships a t  the head of the Persian Gulf fiom the 
entrance to the Gulf of Aden-that is to say, 
across the whole extent of the Arabian plateau, a 
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distance of over a thousand miles. This is, of 
course, oilly possible at night-time. 
It was impossible to land either at Bandar Abbas 
or Dibai, the two next ports of call, and all the 
impression of them I retain is of a faint ribbon of 
palm-trees some four miles away, and an invisible 
line of sandy beach. Close to Randar Abbas are 
the islands of Qishin, Henjam, Larak, and Hormuz, 
the last of which gives its name to tlie straits in 
which i t  is situated. On the eastern end of Larak 
are the remains of yet another Portuguese castle. 
A t  the western extremity of Qishm is the shallow ' 
l~arbour. of Basidu, which has been used as a coal- 
ing statioil for tlie sloops and pinnaces of the 
blockading squadron. It is, however, too shallow 
to admit of the larger cruisers coaling there in 
comfort, and since the rest of the island belongs to 
Persia, there seems to be a general coilsensus of 
opinion that it would benefit all parties concerned 
were we to give up the harbour of Basidu in 
exchange for the small island of Henjam. 
Dibai is situated on what is known as the ccpirate 
coast," and is ruled over by one of the seven 
" tlucial" chiefs, so called from the fact that 
after the suppression of the slave-trade they entered 
into treaty engagements with the British Govern- 
ment. The remaining trucial chiefs are those of 
Abu Thabee, Shargah, Ajman, Umm-al-Gawain 
and Ras-al-ZCheyma. It was at Dibai that a 
landing-party from the Hyacinth was fired on on 
Christmas Day, while searching for concealed arms. 
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trouble begnn t 
of the natires, 
their .~vomen-fc 




had been to  c 
next port beir 
were looking 
the decks oncc 
justified in f 
departure, sin 
thein who ow 




were told th: 
the A~sbian 
considerntion. 
expense of E 
be thankful 1 
steamer on h 
Iater, wl~en el 
a deck wouIc 
and Arab 1101 
The value 
Islands apper 
!ow I I 











n of  
Ihle 





This led to the bombardment of the town, and the 
punishment of its chief. It is thougl~t that the 
trouble began through the employment of a strategy 
of the natives, by which, under plea of removing 
their women-folk before the search, the arms were 
also removed at the same time, a trick which had 
succeeded more than once before. 
The majority of the passengers on board were 
pearl-merchants returning froin India, where they 
had been to dispose of their yearly output. The 
next port being Bahrein, and their destination, we 
were looking forward to being able to walk about 
the decks once more in comfort. I think we were 
justified in feeling a certain pleasure at their 
departure, since there were only about three of 
them who owned first-class tickets, the rest being 
slaves and acquaintances, who battened on the 
hospitality of the pear1 magnates, and spread their 
carpets under our very feet as we walked the decks. 
Remonstrance with the captain was in vain. W e  
were told that it was the company's orders that 
the Arabian passengers should be shown every 
consideration. And this they were, even at the 
expense of European travellers. W e  could only 




steamer on her way down the GuU a few weeks 
later, when every flat surface that could be termed 
tt deck would be crowded out with Arab horses 
and Arab horse-dealers. 
The value of the pearl-trade of the Bahrein 
Islands appears to be steadily on the increase, and 
18 
tie. 
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there seems to  be an opening for some enterprising 
British firm to send an agent there aanually. The 
figures, which me to be found in the Consular 
Report for 1010, are as follows : 
The drop noticeable in the figures for 1908-09 
is no doubt due to the financial crisis of that year 
in America, which reacted on both the American 
and British markets. 
About seven miles inland fiom Bahrein are the 
ruins of an ancierlt civilization, thought at one 
time to be of Phenician origin. It was even 
suggested by some that this place might be the 
cradle of the Phenician race. Having the whole - 
day in front of us, we determined to land and ride 
out on donkeys to this burial-ground. Our donkey- 
ride began sooner than we had expected, for the 
beach shelves down so gradually that it is im- 
possible to get a boat within 50 yards of the 
shore, and after bumping over hard sand for a little 
way, we rode ashore on donkeys. With good 
trotting donkeys we did not take long to reach 
our destination. The track led through mile after 
mile of shady date-groves, till at last we came to 
the open salt-plain. Continuing some time over 
this, we came to another village, over wlich we 
could see the rounded tops of innumerable tumuli 
or barrows. Those nearest the village appeared to 
be larger than the rest ; but there must have been 
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several thousand of them, for they stretched away 
to the horizon, and, going back by another way, we 
came upon ailother field of them. A few of them 
were excavated some years ago by Professor Theo- 
dore Bent, but so little was found in them that it 
was not thought worth while continuing the excava- 
tions. Inside the mounds are large burial-chambers, 
some of thein extending to a considerable depth 
underground, and constructed of enormous blocks 
of white limestone, roughly hewn and fitted 
together, forming what I believe is termed " cyclo- 
pean architecture." Dr. Budge is of opinion that 
they belong to a civilization vastly anterior to that 
of the Yhcenicians, or, indeed, even to the Sum- 
merian or Accadian Empires of the Euphrates 
Valley. "And God planted a garden eastward in 
Eden. . . . " " Es lasst tief blicken." 
From Bahrein we made for Bushire, and had 
again to undergo the discomfort of landing from 
the steamer a t  a distance of four miles from the 
shore. It is iinpossible for the British-India boats 
to enter the harbour of Bushire without touching 
ground, and since this is imperative to enter the 
Shatt-al-Arab, i t  is thought advisable to do so as 
little as need be at other places of call. A snapped 
propeller is not an easy thing to replace in the 
Persian Gulf, not to inelltion the cost of a bronze 
blade, which runs into hundreds of pounds. It is 
generally agreed that the situation of Bushire is 
such as to  destroy any hope of i t  ever growing 
much beyond its present importance. The Karun 
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on the one hand and Bandar Abbas on t l ~ e  other 
are two coinpetitors wllose rapid expansion will in , 
the long run stifle the trade through Bushire. Its 
situation on an island, and the exte~isive dredging 
that would be necessary to convert its harbour 
into a safe ancl~orage for large steamers, are the 
two largest disadvantages agaiilst which it has to 
contend. The eventual trnilquillity of the Southern 
Persian trade-routes is only a matter of time, but 
the trade of Ispshan will find a better outlet 
through the Valley of the I<ai.un, that of Yezd 
through Bandar Abbas. 'I'here remains, therefore, 
but the trade of Shiraz. 
A t  the time of my visit to Bushire, the Shiraz 
road was considered to be so uilsafe that pernlissiori 
was refused to travellers wishing to proceed into 
I 
I 
Persia by that route. I remembered having read 
of the British "note" to Persia on this sub,ject in 
the Reuter's telegrams a t  Port Said oil my way out 
in October, and the incredulous surprise with wllich 
the news was received. The " note " still ibrined a 
chief topic of conversation, and it was laughingly 
said that an enterprising traveller, wllose life was to 
him of no particular impoltance, might cxsily earn 
the lasting gratitude of his country by becoming 
the sacrificial calf, over whose dead body British 
troops might justifial~ly march to Sliirm to restore 
the tranrluillity of the road. i 
The European Consulates a t  13usliirc are for the 
most part situated at sue11 a distance from the 
town that i t  is hardly a matter of surprise tliat 
l~iri~d 












in times of disturbance i t  becomes necessary to 
land troops from war-ships for their protection. I11 
the centre of the town is the palace of the Darya 
Begi, or Governor of the Gulf ports, and in the 
harbour lies the Pel..~epolis, the one battle-ship of the 
Persian navy. About three miles along the coast 
to the eastward are the Russian and German Con- 
sulates. Behind these, a little way inland, at 
Sabsabad, is the bungalow of the British Resident 
irl the Persian Gulf, Colonel Cox. Yet farther 
inland, and equally isolated, are the bui1gdows of 
the Medical Inspecting Officer for the Gulf, and of 
Mr. Consul Chick and Mr. Birdwood, whose hospi- 
tality I had the honour of enjoying for two days. 
Had I continued my journey in the " slow mail," 
1 should have had an opportunity of visiting the 
harbour of Iioweyt, about wl~ich, until recently, as 
the " only possible " terminus to the Baghdad Rail- 
way, there has been so much discussion. This 
theory has, however, beer1 recently exploded, since 
it is now generally recognized that the dredging of 
the bar at  the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab is within 
the bounds of practical engineering. It is said that 
were ICoweyt to be made the terminus of the 
Baghdad Railway, it would still pay the steamship 
companies to load up half bulk in Basra and the 
rest in lighters outside the bar, as is done at present. 
Proceeding again from Bushire in the ('fast 
mail," we passed the Turkish fort of Fao, a t  the 
mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, at the same time 
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al-Arab, between wide banks covered with date- 
groves. These groves are among the richest in 
South-Western Asia, and extend for a mile or two 
on either bank. Behind them the land becomes 
low and marshy, and behind this, again, is the 
illimitable desert. On the right bank as we steamed 
up to Mohammerah floated a mirage, as of mist 
rising from off a lake. As far as Mohainmerah and 
the mouth of the IZarun, which here debouches at 
right angles into the Shatt-al-Arab, the eastern 
bank is Persian territory. From Moham~nerah we 
went forward in Messrs. Lynch's launch to  Basra, 
preceding the steamer by a day. It is not an 
uncommon thing for the launch to be fired on on 
its way up to  Baghdad, and, though we saw the 
dents in her funnel ancl sides, we were fortunate in 
escaping the attentions of any riparian marksman. 
Frorn the Shatt-al-Arab branch off many canals 
at right angles, and on one of these, a t  about a mile 
from the liver, is situated the native town, with its 
tortuous bazaars. Along its banks are the dwellings 
of the inhabitants and the few Europeans 
whose business necessitates their presence in Basra. 
On the river itself are the docks, wharfs, and quays 
of the shipping and trading firms. The appearance 
of this canal is picturesque in the extreme, and 
might be termed an Oriental Venice without preju- 
dice to the latter. Up and down this waterway 
with amazing swiftness ply the long narrow native 
craft, propelled at each end by a picturesque savage, 
hardly less willowy in form than the punt-pole 
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which lie so deftly wields. Halfway towards the 
native town is a wooden bridge, constructed of 
bdlrs of timber lashed togetller. When I first 
beheld it, a small cavalcade of Bedouin cavalry was 
slowly making its way across it, their dirty garments 
contrasting ill with the Saracenic grace of their 
horsemanship. The yellow house behind, with its 
brilliant cobalt blinds, cast warm zigzaggy shadows 
in the water below. 
l3,zsr:~ now boasts all hotel owned by a Greek, 
and at this we put up. With its untidy and scru- 
pulously dirty " patio," it was not unlike a Spanish 
" posada " of the meaner sort. It was in no sense 
n pleasure to  stay there, and we were glad.we had 
some tinned Bologna sausage to fall back upon. 
Our spirits were, however, lrept up by a party of 
three French engineers on their way to Aleppo. 
The doyen of this trio was accompanied by his 
wife, a charming lady. She, on hearing of the 
horrors of existence in Baghdad, declared with 
simulated horror that nothing would induce her to 
go a step farther. Her husband had surely inis- 
taken his vocation, for in a deep base voice, evidently 
trained, he sung snatches from the opera with a 
wonde~ful patl~os of expression. When he switched 
off into a less serious vein, his companions joined in 
wit11 inelodious tenor and alto. 
The baztu~rs of I3asra, though more extensive 
than those of any Gulf port I had yet seen, did not 
present any particularly new feature. The town is 
occupied by a Turkish garrison, and it would be 
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difficult to imagine a tougher or more truculent- 
looking set of soldiers than these. It was with 
some little surprise that, on passii~g a group of three 
or four soldiers, I heard the familiar greeting " May 
you never be tired I" uttered in the Pushto tongue. 
A rather laboured conversation elicited the fact 
that these were Afghan and Pathan sepoys who 
had enlisted in the Turkish army. I cannot now 
remember from which part of the frontier the latter 
hailed, but I rather think it was from the Yusufzai 
side. The Afghans were Kabulis, and, since the 
Afghan army is trained by Turkish instructors, 
there is nothing so very remarkable in the presence 
of these Afghans in the Turkish army. 
Instead, now, of continuing my journey to Bagll- 
dad, the possibility of au expedition being de- 
spatched to Mekran led me to retrace my steps to 
Karachi, Nothing of importance occurred on the 
return run, and the voyage, which had taken three 
weeks up the Gulf, was now accomplished in five 
days. However, on arrival in Karachi it appeared 
that there was no likelihood of such an expedition 
being sanctioned in the immediate future, and, since 
I was not due in Bombay till March 24, I set off 
to visit Lahore, Delhi, and Agra, with an account 
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CHAPTER X 
GUN-RUNNING I N  THE PERSIAN GULF 
HITHERTO I had only had an opportunity of 
observing the effect of the gun-running on the 
Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. But 
during my cruise in the Persian Gulf, of which in 
$ 
the last chapter I gave a short narrative, I was 
I enabled t o  learn considerably more of this interest- 
&I 
ing subject. 
About the middle of February i t  began to be 
rumoured in various quarters that a large body 
of Afghans, numbering, it was said, 3,500, had 
been concentrating for some time past in the 
neighbourhood of Bampur, a town in Persian 
Baluchistan. The presence of Afghans in Persian 
Baluchistan was not in itself remarlcable, since it 
is in spring that the GhiIzai traders visit the Gulf, 
on their way back from India through Afghanistan 
to Central Asia. But the gravity of the situation 
was to be found in the temper of the invaders, and, 
according to rumours that were current, their 
intentions were of the most warlike nature. They 
were reported to  be contemplating a repetition 
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of the outrage on the Central Persian Telegraph- 
Line of September, 1910, when four miles of wire 
had been cut up. An attack, under the leadership 
of Mir Barlcat IChail, late Governor of Biyaban, on 
one or other of the small posts that have been 
established for the protection of the Indo-European 
Company's line at such places as Chalibar, Jask or 
Bandar Abbas, was also feared. Mulla Ichair 
Mohammed of Icarlcindar in ICarwan, coinmonly 
known as the c b  IChalifa Sahib," was also stated 
to be advancing at the head of a following of 
upwards of 200, accompaiiied by a wandering 
derwesh of mystic powers." 
Among the Afghan tribes none have benefited 
more by the arms trade, nor enjoyed greater facili- 
ties for embarking in this traffic, than the Ghilzais. 
These, besides being themselves the purchasers of 
I 
large quantities of rifles, have gradually acquired 
almost a monopoly of the carrying trade in arms. 
Owing to the hostility of the Persians of ICerman, 
to the vigilance of H.B.M. Consul-General in 
Meshed, and, more recently, to the presence of a 
Gurkha regiment in Robat, the routes followed 
by the arms-caravan have of necessity been gradu- 
ally narrowed down to an area indicated by an 
isosceles triangle, of which the apex is roughly at  
the Helmand Lake, and its base between Lingah 
on the west and Chahbar on the east. From 
the apex of this triangle the caravans cross the 
Afghan frontier to Bandar -i- Kamal Khan, on 
the Helinand River, thence along its banks to 
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Girishk, whence they branch off to Icandahar and 
Ghazni, the country of the G.hilzais. 
This powerful and warlike tribe, the backbone 
of the Afghan nation., and our old enemies at 
Maiwand, is divided into two sections, of which the 
nomadic 'I Powindahs," or warrior-merchants, con- 
stitute the wealthier of the two. As traders between 
Hindustan and Ichorasan (Herat, Bokhara, etc.), 
they are accustomed to fight their way through 
their hereditary enemies of the Mahsud and Waziri 
borders. They visit India during the cold weather 
to  barter the merchandise that they have brought 
from Central Asia, leaving their families and their 
herds of camels in vast encampments on the banks 
of the Indus. It is estimated that 50,000 of them 
pass yearly through Dera Ismail IChan. They 
command a considerable credit among the Hindu 
bannias of Peshawar, Lahore, Delhi, and even 
Calcutta and Bombay. When the rapid develop- 
ment of the arms trade opened up an additional 
and more profitable field for trading, the Ghilzai - 
merchants were not slow to seize tlie opportunity, 
and for some years now have had commercial re- 
lations with the principal arms-dealers of Muscat. 
But it is to the second and more stay-at-home 
section of the Ghilzais, known as 'c  Jais," or 
settlers, that the Afghans who had invaded Per- 
sian tei~itory belonged. Though by no means so 
wealthy as the Powindahs, they, too, had invested 
large sums of money in the arms trade. The 
Sultan of Muscat, however, discouraged these 
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Ghilzai traders from coming in person to Muscat, 
fearing that itwould prove prejudicial to  his relations 
with the British Government, through whose in- 
strumentality alone the Beduin tribes of the Olnani 
1 hintelbland are kept at bay. But in spite of this 
f 
I restriction, such was the confidence of the Ghilzais 
I in the A/Iuscat dealers that they continued to pay 
; their inoney down, in the full certainty that the 
rifles would be duly delivered on the Mekran 
1 coast. The Muscat dealers undertook, in fact, 
1 to  engage the dlzows and make all arrangements 
j for running the guns over t o  the Persian side, 
I 
I 
I where, in their turn, the Baluch Sirdars found 
camels and acted as intelligence agents in the 
interests of the Ghilzais. The arrival of cargoes 
of rifles, watched for and marked by the Baluch 
I Sirdars, was duly notified to  the Afghans, who, 
1 owing to the lack of forage for tlieir beasts near 
! the coast, as well as to tlze need for secrecy, were 
i 
I 
expectantly waiting some ten or fifteen miles 
i inland. When the coast was clear, they came 
I down, loaded up the rifles, and the long march 
i inland commenced, each successive chief through 
whose territory the caravan passed taking his toll. 
Among the Baluch Sirdars of Persian Mekran 
the most indefatigable in the interests of the gun- 
runners has been Mir Barkat Khan, Governor 
of Biyaban up till the time of his capture in 
March, 1910-a man of more spirit than the 
majority of his race, and one who has presumably 
reaped a subst, 
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reaped a substantial harvest from his enterprise. 
So great, indeed, at  one time was his activity as 
to cause the Persian Government anxiety as to 
the preservatioi~ of their authority in this district. 
We was in consequence one day spirited away on 
board the Persian cruiser Persepolis by the Derya 
Begi, or Governor of the Province of the Gulf 
Ports, who had been sent by the Persian Govern- 
inent for this express purpose. 
Last August, however, he managed to effect his 
escape, and returned to Biyaba~i at an oppoi-tune 
moment for those engaged in the traffic, for the 
disorganization caused in the plans of tlie gun- 
runners by the vigilance of British cruisers in the 
Gulf of Oman had brought the tmde to a stand- 
still. Not only had dhows which had left Muscat 
been compelled, after a severe chasing, to put back 
to their port of departure to evade capture, but the 
" nakhudas," or Arab skippers, owing to the in- 
creased risk, refused any longer to  run guns across 
on tlie same terms as before. The arrangement 
hitherto 'adopted had been the payment of a third of 
the value of the dhow to her owner by the Afghan 
trader, with an undertalung to pay up the re- 
mainder in the event of the ship being captured or 
otl~erwise lost. The nakhudas now demanded 
payment in full, as dhows were becoming scarcer 
and scarcer every day. In this condition the 
Afghans were unwilling to acquiesce, having no 
guarantee of the good faith of the nakhuda. Even 
Barkat Khan, with all his influence, proved unable 
19 
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to iliduce them to resume their occupation, and for running the I 
was also in consequence lii~nself a loser. able that camel 
The naval measures that resulted in this state blind, while the 
of affairs are briefly as follows : The Omani and point. 
pirate coasts of Arabia are watched by cruisers, ITT hetller the 
and the departure of dhows is commurlicated eventually l~nvc 
immediately on receipt of the intelligence by altogether is a p 
wireless telegraphy to Jask, whence the information any opinion. : 
is passed on to " boat-cruisers " that are stationed short of solme clt 
along the coasts of Mekran and Biyaban at the Governmeilt nr 
most likely landing-places. These boats contain which the ah1 
an officer and from six to a dozen bluejacl~ets, and trentics ~ ~ h i c h  
are visited fortnightly by the cruisers to which they Sultan the r i g 1  
belong. Their occupants are frequently sniped French and ot  
from the shore, and when a strong (' shumal" the port c 
(north-west wind) is blowing, the only alter- squadron in the 
native to riding out the gale in very uncomfo'ortable the traffic. F 
quarters is the hazardous venture of landing up enable the Su! 
a creek and accepting the risk of being fired on. that \ire afl'ord 
Cruisers search dhows in Persian waters, in accord- tribes of the i 
ance with an agreement entered into with the knows to be I 
Persia11 Government, but not in Muscat territorial rvllicll he is re] 
waters, since it is suspected that the captured rifles, duties, so long 
when returned to the Sultan, find their way back of being able 
into the possession of the dealers. Precautions Ru~fiours hav 
l-rave also to be taken against any gun-running French Gove 
dhow getting through from Hodeidah or other 
I 
these rights i 
Red Sea port. Information is generally available British posse: 
as to the presence and whereabouts of any large fice, howeve1 
number of camels in the interior, which very often candle," and 
furnishes a clue to the place selected by the nakhuda lever with t h  
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for running the cargo. It is, however, not improb- 
able that camels are collected in one place as a 
blind, while the rifles are being landed at  another 
point. 
Whether the continuance of the bloclrade will 
eventually have the effect of killing the trade 
altogether is a point on which it is difficult to form 
any opinion. Myself I do not think it will, and 
short of some definite arrangement with the French 
Government and with the Sultan of Muscat, by 
which the abrogation inay be effected of the 
treaties which give to certain subjects of the 
Sultan the right to fly the French flag, and to the 
French and other nations the right of free trade 
with the port of Muscat, the presence of a cruiser 
squadron in the Gulf will remain necessary to check 
the traffic. For so long as these treaty rights 
enable the Sultan, without forfeiting the support 
that we afford him in his dealings with the Beduin 
tribes of the interior, to permit a trade which he 
knows to be contrary to our interests, but from 
which he is reported to levy a large sum in import 
duties, so long will he be in the enviable position 
of being able t o  eat his cake and still keep it." 
Rumours have been afoot of proposds from the 
French Government for the relinquishment of 
these rights in return for the cession of a certain 
British possession in West Africa. Such a sacri- 
fice, however, would hardly seem "worth the 
candle," and as things stand at present our only 
lever with the Sultan is his fear of a second sack of 
Muscat by Beduin invaders. 
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The traffic, nevertheless, has been greatly reduced. 
The constant harassing to which dhows have 
recently bee11 subjected lias undoubtedly caused 
many of the dealers in Muscat to transfer their 
business to other quarters, or to shut up shop 
altogether, owing to actual or imminent bankruptcy. 
Muscat is, of course, very closely watched, and 
quite recently in the harbour was to  be seen a 
dhow, with 2,000 rifles on board, that had twice 
essayed without success to run through the tightly 
drawn cordon. This has led to  an attempt to 
form depots farther up the coast. By this the 
additional advantage would be gained of being 
able to put straight across the Gulf of Oman at  its 
nxrrowest part, instead of having to work labori- 
ously up the coast (by night, so as t o  benefit by 
the 0%-shore breeze) before getting a fair wind. 
Depots were also probably formed on the pirate 
coast within the Persian Gulf. No doubt Dibai 
was one of these, though the punishment that 
was meted out to its sheikh will probably deter 
the remaining trucial chiefs frfi.qm emulating his 
example, At present suspicion centres on Sohar, 
a poit about a hundred miles north of Muscat, as 
a possible depot, the rifles being conveyed secretly 
from Muscat. 
011 the refusal .of the nakhudas to continue 
operations as before, the Ghilzais demanded that 
the money they had on deposit in Muscat, as 
security for the guns they had caused to  be ordered, 
should be refunded to them. This the dealers 
refused to dc 
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refused to do, saying that they must take the 
value out in rifles. Indignant at  the loss of their 
money, i t  is not to be wondered at that, taking 
matters into their own hands, they should invade 
I 
I Persian Mekran in force, breathing threats of 
violence to  all and sundry who should oppose their 
progress, intent on bringing the naldludas to 
reason, and with the avowed intention of cutting 
the telegraph-line and of driving the " kafir " into 
1 the sea. Any chance there may a t  one time have 
been of Mir Barlcat-who periodically used to 
apply for an increase in the already liberal allow- 
ance granted him for the protection of the line- 
I coming in, vanished wit11 the news that the Afghans 
were about to place themselves under his leader- 
ship. It looked as if the wave of indignation 
which had swept over the North-West Frontier in 
October, and spent itself in impotent fury along 
1 the Afiidi border, were now about to break again 
i 
I 
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f f  The ubiquitous tendency to  territoriril expansion, wliicli is 
so marked a feature in Ruropean States of the periotl, results it1 
a corresponding coxltractio~i of the ground free cclunllp t o  all ; 
and as this narrows tllcre cannot but 1)e increasing jealousy of 
every movement; which carries with it n tllrerit of exclusive 
control, whether by acquisition or by pretlon~illarlt influence, 
especially if the latter depend, not on fair commcrc!ial struggle 
in open markets, but upon the  alien elements of nlilitary mld 
political ~o~'c~,"--CAPTAIN MAIIAN : Prohbax /!sin. 
IT was not till March 30 that it was known 
that the Government 2.1:ld decided to send an 
expedition against these invaders of I'ersian 
territo~y. News had, indeed, been received that 
a small telephone-hut so~newhere between ,Task 
and Chahbar had been wrecked, arid the tcle- 
phone clerk forced to fly for his life. I3ut beyond 
this nothing further, as h r  as it was known, hncl 
happened, although the Afghans litid by this time 
moved down by easy stages tow:~rds the coast, iuld 
were occupying a line of csuritry just sotit11 of Uint 
(a town midwily between I3arnpur and the r:ot~st) 
stretching away westward ,towards Ihshnkard tlxlcl 
Biyaban. 
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expedition to  Mekran may possibly be attributed 
to the anxious jealousy with which any forward 
movement on our part in Southern P'ersia is looked 
upon by Russia and Germany, the former because 
she has interests there herself, and the latter 
because she has none. This feeling of jealousy 
is admirably appreciated in the quotation from 
Mahan's " Problenls of Asia " which I have placed 
a t  the head of this chapter. The secrecy with 
which preparatioris were made and the operations 
conducted was commented on in the following 
words by Mr. Lovat Fraser in a paper on " Gun- 
running in the Persian Gulf," read by him before 
the Central Asian Society 011 May 17. 
You cannot mobilize a squadron and an expe- 
ditionary force and start out to conduct warlike 
operations, and then ask the rest of the world to be 
kind enough to look the other way." 
The apparent leisureliness of the movements of 
the Afghans, and the fact that, with the single 
exception of the molestation of an isolated line- 
guard, no outrage had been committed, could not 
be taken as an indication that their warlike temper 
had been exaggerated. Their very numbers served 
to negative such an assumption. bloreover, small 
accessions t o  the Ghilzai host continued to  make 
their appearance. The circumstance that the 
departure of the main body from Afghanistan had 
been known as early as ill October, 1910, and the 
fact that they had frequently halted for weeks at a 
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time in places where good pasture was available 
was held by many to be a sign of their deliberate 
intention to  procure rifles a t  all costs, the inore 
so since the month of May is the last in which i t  is 
possible to return over the waterless desert which 
now lay between them and the Afghan frontier. 
Only the year before the returning arms-caravans 
had suffered the most terrible privations and 
unmentionable hardships through having post- 
poned till too late their return journey. 
Realizing at last that the Ghilzais had in fact 
a come to stay," the Government on March 30 
issued orders for the mobilization of a small force 
to proceed to  the coast of Mekran, under the com- 
mand of Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Slade, IC.C.I.E., 
Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Squadron. 
The lariding force was to be under the comrnand of 
Colonel Delamain, D.S. O., 123rd Outram's Rifles, 
~vlio had led a similar expedition up the Gulf the 
previous year, and consisted of the 104th Wellesley 's 
Rifles, with two machine-guns, under the command 
of Major A. P. Stuart ; the 32nd Mountain Battery, 
under Major Williamson Oswald ; the 19th Com- 
pany Sappers and Miners, and two sections of Field 
Ambulance-in all about 1,000 men. 
On April 6 the naval Commander-in-Chief 
transferred his flag from H.M.S. Hyacinth to  
H.M.S. Wig/i$yer, which had arrived two days 
before from England, and oil April 7 the transports 
Nardi?zge and No~~thbrook, escorted by the High- 
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passed the old flagship, flying her paying-off pen- 
non, her gallant crew, who had borne the burden 
and heat of the day, and were now to return to 
England, gave us three cheers, which came faintly 
to  us over the water. 
The heat in Bombay had been pretty bad, but it 
was nothing compared to the stifling air between- 
decks. Both transports were packed to overflowing 
with men, mules, stores, and kit. The mules, of 
which there were about 230 on either ship, were 
stabled along both rails of the main deck, while tlie 
sepoys occupied the forecastle and the lower boat- 
deck. Shortly after staiting we were startled by a 
furious trampling of hoofs on the declr, accoinpanied 
by the curious vocal noise of the mules, which is a 
cross between a neigh and a bray. Investiga- 
tion resulted in the rescue of a sheep which had 
got under the hoofs of a mule, a i d  but for timely 
succour would in a little time have been trampled 
to  death. The removal of the sheep produced a 
monotonous void in the mules' daily round, until 
i t  was discovered that ,the wood of which tile stalls 
were built was saturated with the most excellent 
salt. From that date onward "crib-chewing" 
became a favourite occupation, and by the time 
the expedition reached Bombay once again the 
mules must have been in debt to the Government 
of India for a considerable amount on the score of 
dilapidations. 
On the fourth day after leaving Bombay a narrow 
yellow line bounded the horizon to the iiorth. The 
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coast between Chahbar and Jask affords but an 
open ancl~onlge, and consists of a low, sandy, surf- 
beaten shore, backed a short distance inland by a 
series of difficult parallel mountain ranges running 
in a general direction north-west to south-east. 
Behind these we suspected that the Ghilzais were 
encamped. The villages along this coast are all 
well-known landing-places of the gun-runners- 
Gabrig, Sadaich, Rapch, Galag-the last of which 
was given out as our landing-place. It is situated 
about one mile up the eastern branch of the Rapcli 
River, just inside an inconvenient bar. This river 
is one of the few perennial rivers along this coast. 
At ten o'clock on the morning of Monday, 
April 10, the HigIfiyc?. and the -iVo?~ti~broolc 
dropped anchor off the mouth of the Rapch between 
two and three miles from the shore, and the latter 
began immediately to disembark tlboops. It was 
some time before the Hardi~zge arrived, as she 
had dropped some distance behind owing to the 
fact that she was burning cc country coal "--i.e., 
Indian coal. A pilot la~lnch was sent off to dis- 
cover the best place for landing at that state of the 
tide, and on the way to the shore fell in with a 
patrolling c'  boat-cruiser," whose hirsute occupants, 
Ulyssean in aspect, hailed the boat with offers of 
assistance in finding the channel. The tide being 
at  that hour somewhat low, it was found impossible 
to cross the bar, and so the landing had to be 
effected slightly to the eastward of the mouth. 
Hour after hour the launches came and went, each 
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with its c c  tow" of three ship's lifeboats, until by 
three in the afternoon the N o ~ t h b ~ o o k ' s  complelnent 
formed up on the beach, and marched off to camp 
at the date-grove a t  Galag, one mile inland. The 
Ha~dhzgc had not been so lucky, for a stiff breeze 
springing up in the afternoon interrupted the laiid- 
ing, which was not completed until the following 
morning. The mules were landed i11 lifeb'onts from 
which the thwarts had been removed. On arrival 
in shore a cordon of sepoys was formed round the 
boat, from which the mules leapt into the water. 
The mules, on gaining terra-firma, were allowed 
one long roll in the sand, to take off the stiffness 
of their cramped positions on board-a diversion 
which they appeared thoroughly to enj oy-and 
were then loaded up preparatory to marching. The 
landing costume of the men, as may be seen in the 
photograph, was of the scantiest description; and 
very necessary it was, too, since the boats could 
rarely approach within seventy yards of the shore. 
The Hig?@ye?- also landed a contingent of 
Marines under Major Herriot, R.M.L. I.-handy 
men, every one of tliem, and already well versed in 
" Gulf lore." Blankets and " grub " were scarce 
that night at  Galug, and most of us slept as we 
were on the sand. 
The next day a tiring march in the heat of the 
day through a scrub desert brought the vanguard 
to a well, surrounded by an iron fence, from which 
it11 drank greedily, regardless of filters, and by even- 
ing the whole force was encamped about twelve 
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miles inland at the telephone-hut at Rapch, the 
scene of the murder in 1897 by Baluchis of Mr. E. 
Graves, one of the Indo-European Telegraph 
Company's superintendents. Here the column was 
met by Sirdar Saiyid Khan of Geh, a seini-inde- 
pendent chief whose autllority extends over the 
greater portion of Persian Melcran, a man with 
whom our relations have been on s friendly footing 
for some years past on account of the telegraph- 
line which traverses his territory, for the protection 
of which he receives a small subsidy. 
A t  Gdag the coluinn had been met by Mr. E. 
G. Gregsoi~, who had succeeded Colonel Malleson 
on special intelligence duty in the Persian Gulf in 
1909, and whose intimate knowledge of all fron- 
tier questions, and personal acquaintance with the 
~rincipel characters, notorious and otherwise, in 
1 gun-running circles, fitted him in a peculiar manner 
, to accompany the expeditioil in the capacity of 
Political Officer. In a conversation with the latter 
and with Captain Craufurd, D.S.O., Gordon High- 
landers, Intelligence Officer at Jask, the Sirdar 
readily agreed to lend his good offices oil our behalf 
in inducing Sirdar Islam Khan of Bint to co-operate 
with us in the extinctioil of the arms traffic by 
excluding Afghans from his country. A letter in 
this sense was accordingly despatched to Sirdar 
Islam Khan, notifying him of the landing of the 
force, and requesting him, under the authority of the 
Persian Government, to come in, with the object 
of arriving at some solution of the situation. This 
interview too 
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interview took place in the Sirdar's camp at Rapch, 
where, under the shade of a giant tamarisk, a few 
rugs had been spread, on which the Sirdar reclined 
with his son. Two negro slaves handed cool water 
in a shallow brazen bowl, but out of our saddle- 
bags we produced some chocolate and a sparklet 
siphon, which surprised and delighted both father 
and son. Saiyid Khan in appearance is a man of 
fifty years of age, with the dark complexion of the 
true Baluch, and a melancl~oly expression in his 
dreamy eyes, which is accounted for by the fact 
that he is an opium-smoker. His son, a cheerful 
boy of ten or twelve years of age, rode with us 
several marches. 
The experience of the previous day had con- 
vinced Colonel Delainain that the heat would not 
permit of day-marching, and hencefoiward all 
marching was done either by night or in the early 
morning. Except when night-marching, camp was 
therefore always broken before even the dawn was 
faintly perceptible in the eastern sky. At  Rapclz 
we were fortunate in obtaining about thirty camels 
. after a slight palaver with their owners, who had 
driven them off into the scrub, thinking that they 
were to receive no payment for them. This settled, 
the column marched twelve iniles to Chikai Bund 
on the Rapch River. Troops marched well, giving 
evidence of the exceptional mobility of the force, 
whose transport had been cut down to one blanket 
(4 pounds) for officers and half a blanket (2 pounds) 
for the men, no tents being allowed. The country 
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traversed consisted at first of a tama~isk jungle, 
which later gave way to a gradual ascent over a 
stony plain, until the range of Zaur came into view. 
The route then dropped down once more into the 
bed of the Rapch River to the oasis of Chikai Bund 
on its left bank, about three miles from the entrance 
to the defile between Zaur and Chikai. Here a 
halt was made for three days, while mules were 
sent back to the coast for six days' extra r a t' ions. 
Up till now not a sign of life had been noticed. 
Except for deserted tracts of desert, surrounded by 
ditches, which appeared to have been subjected to 
a half-hearted attempted at cultivation, there was 
nothing that could have been te~med a field. But 
as we entered the rich oasis of Cliikai Bund, a 
herdsmail was perceived driving off his cattle, and 
I on the followiilg day we caught a glimpse of a 
I white-robed form high up on the opposite hillside, 
1 
i apparently scanning our position with interest. 
I I<arkindar lay now almost due west of us, and a 
short reconnaissance was made in this direction, in 
the hope of finding traces of the " dushman " 
(enemy), Icarkindar being the home of Mullah 
Rhair Mahommed, who was known to have 
collected a small following. Nothing came of it, 
however, beyond the establishment of helio com- 
inunication with the coast. 
On April 12 news arrived that Sirdar Islam Khan 
was already on his way down from Bint, in answer 
to the summons that had becn addressed to him. 
On the following day one double company, under 
VIE\\'  OF 'I'll13 IIAIJCII IIIVEIl (11' C'HlKAl DUND. 
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the cominai~d of Ma,jor Williamson Oswald, with 
silppers and miners and one section of the Mountain 
Battery, moved through the Chikai defile and 
encaiulped about eight iniles north of Chiltai Bund, 
a t  Zarnin, from which camp two cases of sniping 
were reporLed on the night of the 13th. Intelli- 
gence was now received from Biyaban that Mir 
Barkat had been active in instigating raids, and 
that many Ghilzais were moving through Bashakard 
into that province. The Iihalifa SnlGb was in 
Bampur, while the Gllilzais in Bint had retired 
througli the gorge of Fa~uc l l  to I-Taimani, on the 
Bsmpur lrrtfileli route. 
The news of these dispositions made it finally 
clear that if any good were to result from this first 
landing, it was absolutely necessary that the column 
should reach Bint. With this intention it was 
gently broken to the Marines that they would be 
expected to furnish a camel corps, and a parade 
was ordered for the afternoon of Good Friday. 
Now, there is a good deal of difference between a 
riding-camel and a paclc-camel, and those n t  the 
disposal of the Marines were chiefly of the latter 
variety, so that after the parade it became evident 
that if there were to be a camel corps at all, the 
Punjabis, who are accustomed to camels, and not 
the Marines, were the Inen to undertake the job. 
T11e Marines therefore magnanimously waived their 
cluiin to the honour, and were provided wit11 mules. 
With regard to camel transport, there can be no 
doubt of its superiority over all other in military 
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operations in Persia. Owing to the rocky and 
impassable nature of the ground, mules are unable 
to undertake long days of successive marching with 
impunity. I n  addition to this, the camel is capable 
of carrying a load of 380 pounds to  the mule's 
160 pounds. Of this a smaller proportion is taken 
up by the animal's fodder, since the camel call 
practically exist on the scanty scrub of the desert, 
while in a waterless country its limit of endurance 
is greater than that of the mule. 
As a means of locomotion he is by no means to  
be despised. There is something rhythmic and 
soothing in the ambling motion of this '' grim, un- 
1 gainly, gaunt, and gliastly " ship of the desert, as 
he pads along on silent foot through the " dasht," 
whether ill the stifling glare of midday, in the 
silent watches of the night, or in the cool of the 
evening, with tlie sunset afterglow behind the hills 
and the fresh night breeze blowing up the pass. 
There is something restful when at the end of the 
day's march he sinlts domi in three ponderous 
movements, and begins to chew the cud, his jaws 
working alternately from right to left and from left 
to right. Now and again his long-lashed eye roams 
with a supercilious philosophy over the lines of 
mules, to whom the proximity of a camel, whether 
on account of its unpleasant odour or of its strange 
and terrifying appearance, fi~rnishes a continual 
excuse for stampeding. The camel, indeed, seems 
to appear to the mule much as the Spanish horse- 
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CAMEL TRANSPORT 161 
and undreamt-of monster. And, to be sure, he is. 
The interior of the camel is constructed on the 
latest and most scientific basis, and is the last word 
ill desert economy. In addition to the ordinary 
furniture of the ruminating orders, he possesses 
auxiliary tanks for water and bunkers for fuel, and 
an emergency ration growing on his back. As a 
dog perspires only through his tongue, so the camel 
only perspires at  the back of his neck, thus retain- 
ing the maximum of moisture in his body. Hence 
he will not stop and drink at every stream, as 
will a mule or a horse, if allowed, but will plod 
d o i ~ g  all day, inaking his four to five miles an 
hour if a riding-camel, his two miles if a pack- 
animal. 
Not only is he the symbol of the desert, but of 
the mysterious East. From Pekin to Icasbgar and 
Yarkand the long caravans pass, accomplishing 
their journey in about six months. From Bokhara 
to tlie Indus extends another great camel route, 
and from Iihorasan through Icerman to  Bandar 
Abbas. The large Powindah tribe of the Ghilzais 
possesses a t  least 50,000 camels, beside which the 
10,000 of the Queen of Sheba appears paltry and 
pretentious. The two-humped Bactrian camel of 
Central Asia is not considered such a good marcher 
as the Arabian camel, but is eminently fitted by 
his long hair for crossing snowy passes at great 
altitudes, such as the Bamian Pass over the Hindu 
ICusl.~, due north of Kabul. 
For the rest, the camel is a vain creature, loving 
81 
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to be decked out with gaudy trappings and tassels 
of red and green, yet he can hardly be called a 
good-looking animal, except for his liquid eye and 
glossy " back hair." 
Havirig awaited the return of the convoy froni tlie 
coast, theremainder of the column moved up through 
the Chikai defile on April 15, accompanied by 
Sirdar Saiyid ICllan, to Zamin. That evening 
Sirdar Islam Kllan also arrived in camp. But it 
was not until the next day that the meeting 
between him and the officer commanding the 
force occurred, dusing the march northward from 
Zamin. A t  one point the route led across an 
elevated plateau, or <' dandyn of vast extent, stretch- 
ing away to the distant mountains without a sign 
of vegetation, reminding one of Sven Hedin's 
description of the Chang Tang Desert of Tibet. 
Over this tableland the barbarian cavalcade which 
constituted Islam Khan's bodyguard careered at 
full gallop, the horsemen bending low in the saddle 
as they picked up stones from the ground, or stand- 
ing up in their stirrups as they brandished their 
rifles in the air, their gaily coloured clothing, 
embroidered saddles, and bandoliers crammed with 
cartridges, completing a characteristic spectacle. 
Islam Khan himself is a man of about thirty-five 
years of age. His face, though indicating a certain 
doggedness of character, has a pleasing expression, 
his aquiline nose, black beard, and fiercely bristling 
moustaches, contributing toa decidedly distinguished 
appearance. He  expressed his readiness to meet 
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the wishes of the British Goveniment, and showed 
but a momentary surprise on learning that Bint 
was to remain the objective in spite of his com- 
pliance. It is probable that neither he nor the 
GhiIzais, whom he had been entertaining at Bint, 
had any real belief in our intention or ability to 
reach that point, thinking, no doubt, that we 
should be satisfied with the assurances of friendship 
so cordially given by its ruler. 
If  this had been their hope, they were sadly dis- 
appointed. On  Easter Day, April 16, camp was 
broken a t  3.30 a.m., and a twelve-mile march made 
to the entrance to the Pass of Korandab. The 
going was very bad, deep sand alternating with 
stony gulches, while the river had to be forded 
many times. Arrived in camp, Colonel Delamain 
acquainted the Sirdar of his intention to push oil to 
Bint, a distance of thirty miles, that same evening. 
Thus the final march to Bint was undertaken by 
night. A t  five in the afternoon a picked mounted 
column, made up of a detachment of Marines, a 
detachment of the 104tl-1, and a half-section of the 
Mountain Battery on camels, moved out of camp 
and up the Pass of Korandab.* The remainder of 
the column was to move up through the pass on 
the following day, as a support in case the flying 
column should be attacked, as i t  was impossible to 
know whether all the Ghilzais had retired from Bint. 
The route lay for twelve miles through the pass. 
* Korandab = " The Meeting of the Waters." A large area 
drains through the narrow defile, 
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Several ineffectual attempts to delay us were made 
by the Sirdar and his attendants, who at sundown 
ostentatiously dismounted and spread their prayer- 
carpets for the eveiling prayer. This, however, 
although repeated more than once, had no visible 
effect on the rapid progress of the column, and the 
devout Mahommedtlns were forced to  gallop to  
catch up with us again. A t  eight o'clock a two 
hours' halt was made until the moon rose. The 
end of the pass was now reached, and leaving the 
river-bed, tile force passed over a long and difficult 
kotal and down into the river-bed again. Here 
a five minutes' halt was made, during which most 
of us slept soundly for three or four minutes. 
From thence a long succession of narrow and 
rocky g~zlches wound in and out among the moun- 
tains, till at last the huge rock of Bint, rising some 
700 feet from .the plain in which i t  stands, appeared 
in the distance as a filmy veil of blue in the fresh 
morning sunlight. Bint was reached at 6.30 on 
the morning of the 17th. A t  the foot of the rock, 
under its north-eastern face, is situated the village, 
containing a population estimated by various 
travellers ill the neighbourhood of 2,000 souls. A 
long c c  mach," or belt, of date-palms borders the 
river, partially concealing the village with its mud 
fort, and among these the column encamped at a 
distance of about one mile from the village. The 
country surrounding Bint is dotted with curious 
conical hills of sllale: suggesting an oil formation. 
Traces of oil were also noticed in the Rapch River 
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BINT 165 
at  the southern debouchment of the Korandab Pass, 
and i t  is not improbable that oil exists in consider- 
able quantities in the neighbourhoodt. Far away 
to the north-east could be made out the violet 
crests of the Band-i-Nilag and the Lashar Range, 
the principal watershed of the district. 
After breakfast and a short rest, Islam Khan 
appeared, and invited us to the village, where he 
said he had prepared a small cc  tomasha" in our 
honour. Colonel Delamain, however, considered it 
inadvisable to  avail ourselves of this invitation, in 
view of the fanatical temper of the Baluchis, whose 
revengeful feelings might be awakened by the most 
trivial incident, and lead, perllaps, to a disaster. 
W e  had perforce to content ourselves with the dis- 
tant view of the mud-fort peeping out from among 
the date-palms. Since it was not my fortune to 
enter the village of Bint, I will here quote the 
description of it given by Floyer : 
" Accordingly, the following morning we walked 
across the common, and, entering through a 
breach in a curious natural sandstone wall, 
climbed up some steep, narrow, and filthy streets, 
whose uses for progression were subordinate to 
their value as manure-beds. W e  had noticed every 
day donkeys passing into the town laden with kik- 
grass roots, and now found every nook and corner 
througl~out the town spread deep with kik-grass 
and old rice-straw. 
c c  The houses of Eint, Fanuch, Maskhutan, and 
other Baluch towns, are simply built in what 
4 resembles an English crew-yard, or yard for winter- 
ing cattle in, and the smell at some se?sons must 
I 22 
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be fearful. The quantity of rice-straw lying about, 
the sparrows, and the substantial look of the well- 
thatched houses, give the place at  the back the 
appearance of a very slovenly English home- 
stead." 
Evidently we did not miss much I 
After a halt of eight and a half hours, the 
column set out on the return journey and second 
night march of thirty miles. One mule had to be 
left behind through foundering, and shortly after 
the start a camel fell and broke its leg, and had 
to  be kiled. The object of this rapid advance 
I on Bint was to impress the Baluchis. It was 
I 
I thought that this rapid advance on Bint would 
I 
I have a salutary eff'ect on the Sirdar by dispelling 
the delusion, under which he had been labouring, 
that Bint was invulnerable to a small force, based 
on the sea seventy miles away. It affords, indeed, 
a valuable illustration of the effective radius of a 
small mounted force, entirely dependent on itself 
for supplies, operating in a barren and almost 
waterless district, and with a transport limited to  
one-tenth of what had hitherto been considered the 
irreducible minimum. 
After the rapid march on and retirement from 
Bint, in which, counting the twelve miles already 
accomplished on the morning of the 16th, seventy- 
three miles had been covered in forty-nine hours, 
the force arrived back at Chikai Bund at  dawn 
of the 19th. A portion of the mules left for the 
coast the same evening, where they were embarked 
the next  da 
on April 31. 
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the next day. The rest of the force embarked 
on April 31. 
The fact that Bint was reached without a shot 
being fired, though disappointing to the troops 
composing the expedition, is hardly a matter of 
surprise, even after the reports that were brought 
down as to  the warlike character of the invaders. 
The temper of the Ghilzais is well lmown, but 
Persian Baluchistan is a large district and a barren, 
and large bodies of Afghans could no more have 
remained together living on the country than 
could the British army. The Ghilzais were bound 
to have scattered for the purpose of foraging, and, 
since Islam Khan had no doubt been guilty in 
their eyes of having betrayed their cause, it was 
not improbable that those who had not already 
retired through Fanuch on their way back to 
Kandahar were making their way across Basha- 
kard, attracted by the news of Barkat Khan's 
activities in Biyaban and those of Gl~ulam Husain 
in Ahavand. I t  was against these that the 
efforts of the expeditionary force were now to be 
directed. 
But in spite of the pacific manner in which the 
object of the expedition had been attained, the moral 
effect remained considerable. Though primarily 
directed against the Ghilzai gun-runners and their 
abettors among the Baluch Sirdars, one of the most 
important results that have attended the demon- 
stration must be counted the restoration of Saiyid 
Khan's authority over a district in which lawless- 
THE DASH ON BINT 
ness had been gradually gaining ground. No doubt 
the operations of the small bodies of troops that 
were moved up a short distance into the interior 
fi.oin Chahbar and Jask at  the time of the landing 
of the Mekran Field Force also contributed to the 


















A BRUSH WITH T H E  GUN-RUNNERS 
rr  In the land that lies beyond 
Erzeroum and Trebizond 
Garden-girt his fortress stood ; 
Plundered khan or caravan, 
Journeying north from Koordistan, 
Gave him wealth and wine and food." 
LONGPELLOW. 
THE satisfactory results accruing fiom the first . 
landing of the Melrran Field Force partook more of 
the nature of a political victory than of a military, 
and may be looked upon as a distinct step towards 
a permanent solution of the arms question-at any 
rate, as far as the more easterly routes employed by 
the gun-runners are concerned. For of late, as has 
been mentioned, the gun-runners have shown an 
increasing preference for the coast of Biyaban, as 
affording greater chances of success in running a 
cargo, owing to the lesser distance of open sea that 
has to be crossed. This factor probably aided 
Islam Khan materially in his decision to come to 
terms with the Government of India, as his profits 
must have decreased considerably during the last 
year. And in its turn, too, Islam Khan's decision 
169 
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to C' come in" no doubt accounts for the entire lack 
of resistailce that was offered to the advance ; for, 
with the exception of the two cases of sniping 
reported from Zamin on the night of April 13, the 
column did not come into touch with the enemy at 
But the success of the establishment of friendly 
relations with Islam Khan was also in a great 
measure due to the friendly offices of Sirdar Saiyid 
Khan of Geh, the parainount chief of Persian 
Mekran, ~ 7 1 1 0  has not always been on the best of 
terms with his neighbour. Moreover, he had 
further cause for jealousy of his rival, in that, while 
Islam IChan was reaping a substantial profit from 
the arms traffic, he himself, in loyalty to the 
Government of India, from whom he receives a 
small subsidy for the care and protection of the 
telegraph-line, was unable to engage in the traffic, 
and was forced to sit by and watch the arming of 
the Ealuch tribes on his northern boundaries with 
rifles which he might well fear might be used 
against him in a not very distant future. However, 
the fact that he recently appointed Islam Khan his 
" vakil " for the province of Karwan points to the 
burial of the hatchet, though there can be no doubt 
that in Islam Khan Saiyid Khan has, if not a 
successful rival during his lifetime, a probable 
successor to the overlordship of Persian Mekran. 
It is well known that the Baluchis have no love for 
the Persians, and have for years succeeded in 
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periodical expeditions sent to collect it by the 
Governor-General of ICerman, under whose nominal 
jurisdiction this district lies. To such an extent 
has this authority declined that i t  would be easy 
for a strong man to  make himself master of the 
whole of Persian Mekran. 
A similar situation prevails in Biyaban, where 
Mir Barkat Khan, having used his legitimate posi- 
tion as Governor of that province to consolidate 
and extend his influence, has now seceded from his 
allegiance to the Persian Government, carrying 
with him the syrnpatl~ies of practically the whole of 
the population, with the exception of that portion 
under the immediate control of Mir Haji of Sikui. 
It was to this quarter that the efforts of the 
Mekran Field Force were now to be directed. 
After the return from Bint and the re-embarka- 
tion at Galag, the Mekran Field Force proceeded to 
the coast of Biyaban, where a second landing was 
effected on April 24 at the small coast village of 
Sirik, which lies at the mouth of the Gaz River. 
On the way up from the Rapch River, the trans- 1 
ports had touched at Jask, for the purpose of re- 
newing the supply of camels, which journeyed 
thence overland to Sirik. Jask was found to be 
full of refugees from Biyaban, who had fled there 
to escape from the cruelties that Mir Barkat Ichan, 
gun-runner, outlaw, and erstwhile Governor of 
Biyaban, had, with the assistance of his motley 
following of Tahirzai tribes-people from the coast 
villages, Bashttkardis from the interior, and a 
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spkkling of Afghans, perpetrated on the unfortu- 
nate supporters of Mir Haji, the present Governor. 
The ICalantar of Sarzeh, so it was reported, had 
been burnt to death by the orders of Mir Barkat a 
few weeks before; Mir ICambar of Kuhistak, on 
returning from the Batineh Coast of Arabia, whither 
he had been to transact some business, had found 
his houses burnt to the ground, his property de- 
stroyed, and his cattle Lifted. From all sides came 
the tale of rapine and bloodshed, of murder and 
robbery. Men had been beaten ; women had been 
robbed of their ornaments ; villages lay deserted by 
their terror-stricken inhabitants. Thus did Mir 
Barkat hope to make himseK master of the situa- 
tion, and pave the way to a veritable orgy of 
gun-running. 
At Sirik news was received that Mir Barkat had 
retired from Sarzeh into the mountains, and that 
Saiyid Abdul Rahim, his second in command, had 
left Goshlu and was preparing to  join him. A 
number of Martini rifles were brought into camp 
by the orders of Mir Haji, with the information 
that they had been saved from the wreck of an 
&rab dhow that had run ashore in a westerly 
gale about a week: before. These had, incidentally, 
nearly fallen into the hands of Mir Barkat, who had 
been surprised in the act of carrying them off 
inland. The rifles, though new, were in a very 
rusty condition, but what most attracted the atten- 
tion was the fact that they had 40 stocks. This 
method of packing them has been, recently adopted, 
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both on account of convenience in transport and 
because the different tribes to whoin they are even- 
tually sold in Afghanistan and on the North- West 
Frontier prefer to make the stoclrs themselves- 
some with and some without the metal butt-plate. 
Marching eastward along the course of the Gaz 
River, tllrough the well-tended date-palm groves 
, which here clothe the foot of the coast range, 
evening found the force cncamped on April 26 in 
the neighbourhood of Sarzeh Pi'oit, having safely 
negotiated the narrow Tang- i- Sarzeh, tl~rougl~ 
which the Gaz River finds its way to the sea. 
This coast range is composed of a stiff blue clay, 
known as " shur," capped with limestone. From 
the seaward side it presents a. jagged horizon of 
sharply denticulated peaks ; on the landward it falls 
away in a precipitous drop to the level plain, a 
noticeable feature common to the succeeding ranges 
which back it inland. 
Towards the middle of the plain the ground rises 
gently to the fort of Sarzeh, the scene of a fight 
between Mir Bmkat and a British force, made up 
of a company of the IlYtIl Mahrattas from Jask 
and a landing-party from the cruiser Fom, as 
recently as on Christmas Day last. Arriving early 
in the morning in search of cz consignment of arms 
of which news hacl been received, they surprised 
the occupants of the fort, who incontinently fled. 
A t  the same time another party of Barkat's inen 
fired 011 the landing-party, who promptly took 
refuge in the fort, whence they were enabled to 
I 
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drive off their foes, though during the retirement 
to the coast a spirited rearguard action was fought 
through the Sarzeh Pass. - 
Sarzeh Fort occupies a commanding site, stand- 
ing four-square and facing south, the entrance 
being on that side. It would form an ideal place 
for a frontier military post, commanding as it does 
one of the principal caravan routes f?om Jask into 
Bashakard. It belongs nominally to the Governor 
of Biyaban, but, being in such close proximity to 
the mountains, it is more often occupied by Mir 
Barkat, since i t  forms a convenient refuge for gun- 
runners while awaiting the arrival of a cargo of 
arms, Unlike the majority of Baluch strongholds, 
there is no central ark or citadel, but in each angle 
of the walls is a tower, those on the western side 
being circular, while those on the eastern are 
square. In the north-eastern corner is the 
crumbling mud-tower set apart for the use of the 
chief, the tribesmen, it is presumed, sleeping on 
the ramparts, or, if no enemy is to  be apprehended, 
among the camels in the open space below. Here 
a quarry-like excavation seems to point to an 
attempt having been made to level the ground, 
which slopes away sharply to the eastward. As in 
all Balucll forts, a well, dry at the time of my visit, 
has been sunk right through the mound on which 
the fort is built to a considerable depth. Close by 
the fort is a small mat-hut village, whose solitary 
inhabitant, an aged man, too old for the wars, 
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A LETTER FROM BARRAT KHAN 175 
From Sarzeh a short march brought the column 
to Gwaj, whence, as we arrived, a cloud of dust 
betokened a small party of cavalry moving off 
rapidly to the hills. Here we found Mir Haji and 
his attendants, who had preceded us, seated under 
a spreading thorn-tree, excitedly discussing the 
contents of several letters, which had apparently 
been delivered by the party whose dusty departure 
we had just witnessed. One of those letters was 
from no less a personage than Mir Barkat himself. 
I n  it he begged to be excused for his discourtesy 
in not having met the column in person on its dis- 
embarkation at Sirilr, pleading in extenuation of 
this omission urgent business in the mountains. 
H e  added, however, that he yet hoped for a 
personal meeting in the Marak Gorge, where he 
intended making a stand. From the remaining 
letters it appeared that Mir Barkat, with a large 
following, had come down from Sahri-i-Gurg, in the 
ICuh-i-Biyaban, with the intention of holding the 
narrow gorge by which the Marak, a tributary of 
the Gaz, flows out at Gwaj into the Sarzeli Plain. 
A reconnaissarlce of the pass having accordingly 
been made, the enemy had been found to be 
occupying a line of sangars halfway between the 
Marak defile and the pass of Pashak, where the 
Maralr, leaving the Sahri-i-Gurg, the " plain of the 
wolf," enters the ICuh-i-Biyaban. 
On the morning of April 28, Colonel Delamain, 
D. S.O., commanding the expedition, ordered an 
advance with the intention of forcing the pass. A 
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picket that had been posted on the top of a hill 
commanding a view of the Marak Gorge reported 
that the enemy had vacated their position of the 
previous day, retiring up the pass in the direction 
of Pashak. The column therefore advanced through 
the Maralc Gorge, following the river, which wound 
tortuously in aiid out between high benches of 
gavel and limestone detritus, cemented together 
by the blue clay from the surrounding hills. For 
mile after mile the column forced its way through 
the deep sand which filled the bed of the shrunken 
stream, through which every now and again inen 
and mules splaslied, stoppiilg to drink and to fill 
their wnter-bottles and " chargles " (canvas skins). 
The day was hot, and the heat was accentuated by 
the funnel-like defile, into which the sun shone at 
an almost vertical angle. There was still no sign 
of the enemy, and the sight of an oorial on the 
mountain-side see~ned an evil omen for the day. 
" No oorial would remain there," Inen said, " if the 
pass were held." It was inlpossible to send flanking- 
parties along the crest of the hills on either side, on 
R C C O U ~ I ~  of their inaccessibility and the nunierolzs 
ravines which separated each peak from the next. 
But what could be done was done. The advanced 
guard sent out a line of scouts through the willow- 
scrub, and a convenient hill was picketed now and 
again. Suddenly a muffled shot was heard some- 
where ahead, another, and then another. An  orderly 
galloped back and reported that the enemy had 
been located in sangars round the next bend in the 
pass. The 
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THE PASS OF PASHAK 
pass. The position had indeed been well chosen. 
At a bend in the pass, where the limestone cliffs 
rose sheer and smooth from the river-bed, the 
" dushman " was discovered, skilfully ensangared 
right across the narrow valley. The vanguard, 
under the command of Major Turton, 104th Rifles, 
immediately opened fire on the sangars, and with 
the support of the advanced guard guns, which 
opened fire at  800 yards four minutes after the first 
shot had been fired, held its position until the 
arrival of the main force. Then, under cover of 
the 32nd Mounted Battery, a general advance was 
made, and the enemy could be seen leaving their 
position and retiring in open prder with the greatest 
coolness to  another line of sangars. Each line was 
successively carried, while the intermittent " cougli, 
cough " of the machine-guns followed the retreat- 
ing force across the open spaces. Each shell from 
the ten-pounders as i t  burst on the hillside laid 
bare a conspicuous round bare patch of blue clay. 
Many burst right over the sangars, and though it 
was afterwards ascertained that several of the 
enemy had been killed, the survivors succeeded in 
carrying their dead off the field of battle. At last 
the end of the pass was reached, and the fugitives 
divided into two bodies, some seeking refuge in the 
direction of Sahii-i-Gurg, others in a more easterly 
direction. One prisoner was taken, carrying a 
Werndl rifle, who had been concealed by his 
fiiends in a deserted mat-hut, severely wounded in 
the leg. 
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On the principle of the Persian proverb, c c  A 
jackal of Mazandei-an is not caught but by a 
dog of Rlazanderan,"* the services of the body- 
guards of Mir Haji and Mir Icambar had beell 
enlisted for the purpose of executing a turning 
movement on the left flank of Mir Barlcat's 
position, and. these were instrumental in continuing 
the pursuit of the vanquished gun-runners far over 
the plain. The action lasted from 9.18 till a little 
past noon, the casualties to the force amounti~ig to  
three sepoys wounded, whilst the enemy, whose 
numbers were estimated a t  200, lost eight killed 
and twenty-four wounded, as was afterwards learnt.? 
I t  is probable thttt the enemy encountered a t  
Pashak was little more than the advanced guard of 
Barkat's main body a t  Sahri-i-Gurg, though, had 
the defence been attended with better success, no 
doubt large reinforcements of Bashakardjs would 
have rolled up from all quarters. Neither Mir 
Barkat nor his lieutenant, Saiyid Abdul Rahim, 
were present a t  the fight, though the probable 
effect on the morale of Mil* Barlrat's following may 
be judged &om the losses sustained by the gun- 
runners, among whom were the son of Gliulam 
Husain, Chief of Afon (Ahavand), mortally 
* Shagal i Mazanderan nilgirad juz sagi Mazanderani." 
'1 News has just reacher1 me (October 1, 1911) of the murder 
at Gwaj of one of the  native guides employed by the Expedition 
in the Marak Gorge.' Mir Barkat, who is probably responsible 
for this outrage, is said to be in the neighbourhood of Bandar 
Abbas, awaiting the beginning of the cold-weather gun-running 
season. 
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DEFEAT OF MIR BARKAT 1'79 
wounded, and the son, brother, and nephew of 
Karimdad, headman of the Tahirzai, among the 
slain, besides two of BZir Barkat's confidential 
" gholains," or Suaheli slaves. In the face of these 
casualties it is difficult to foresee whence Alir 
Barkat is to recruit his following in the future. 
Thus it so happened that, with the exceptioil of 
a diminutive following of Bashakardis under Ali 
Abbas, son of Ghula~n Husain, the whole of the 
enemy's force consisted of inembers of the Tahirzai 
tribe, Barlrat's own men. These, it must be 
admitted, fought with the greatest bravery and 
determination, particularly their leader, Ali Abbas, 
who formed a rather conspicuous mark in a red 
puggaree, and retired shot through both thighs. 
But though the Ghilzais, who during February 
were reported to have invadecl Persian Mekr'ul, 
were conspicuously absent fiom the fight, the fact 
that they did actually exist, though not in such 
numbers as was at first reported, has, a t  any rate, 
been substantiated, not only by those whose busi- 
ness it was to collect trustworthy information as 
t o  the whereabouts of gun-running caravans, but 
indirectly through the principal Baluch Sirdar 
implicated in the traffic, as well as by the personal 
experience of a Persian army advancing on Bampur. 
During the first phase of the operations, and while 
the column was still in Bint, intelligence was 
received from a trustworthy source that at  the 
approach of the troops a body of Afghans had 
retired on Fanuch, where it had joined a large 
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kafileh, consisting of 500 men and 1,000 camels. 
On arival at  Gwaj further information had been 
elicited, to the effect that Mir Barkat had received 
a letter from these Ghilzais, promising active 
support and bidding him on no account to make 
peace wit11 the Sirkar, for they were making all 
haste to join him in the highlands of Bashakard. 
There c,m be little doubt that it was this knowledge 
that decided Mir Barkat to oppose the column in 
the pass at Pashak, though the sudden defection 
of the whole of the Bashakardi tribesmen, number- 
ing some 2,000 rifles, consequent on the non-arrival 
of the Afghans, was a severe blow to his fortunes. 
This non-arrival is, however, sufficiently explained 
by the news of the despatch of a Persian army 
fiom Ilerman, which met a hostile force in the 
neighbourhood of Bampur, and is reported to have 
suffered a severe defeat. 
A further advance not coming within the scope 
of the operations, the force encamped on the 
enemy's position, returning the next day to Gwa-j, 
thence to the coast, the main body embarking at 
Sirik on May 3 for Bombay, while a small column 
under Colonel Walton, 104th Rifles, who had 
rejoined his regiment from leave in England in 
time for the fight of April 28, proceeded south- 
wards by way of Goshki, Bris, and Gwan, to 
embark on May 6 at Bunji. This movement was 
undertaken with the object of strengthening Mir 
Haji's hold over the outlying villages from whicl.1 
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During the time that it remained on shore, the 
force was accompanied by Mir Haji, who, as 
Governor of Biyaban, in the absence of the 
Governor of the Gulf Ports, represented the 
Persian Government, and also by Rlir ICambar of 
Icuhistalc, both of whom had recently been the 
victims of Mir Barkat and his raiding Tahirzai. 
This latter chieftain presented a more truculent 
appearance than even the most villainous of his 
retainers. H e  was attired in a "coat of many 
colours " of the kind made in Bint, the embroidery 
of which, covering the whole garment, was of a very 
rich and elaborate nature. EIis modern rifle was 
decorated with silver bands round the barrel, while 
the stock was studded with plates of the same 
metal. Round his waist he wore a bandolier neatly 
ornamented with fine brass wire, into whicli had 
been thrust a curiously shaped silver dagger in the 
form of a cross, the blade being slightly curved and 
the hilt set with a large turquoise. On this belt 
he carried a silver cartridge-box, of Shiraz work- 
manship, in the lid of which had been set a 
cornelian. But what lent him such a ferocious 
aspect were the crafty eyes, twinlding out from 
under bushy eyebrows and an enormous white 
turban ; the bristling moustache and henna-dyed 
beard, and the brown lungi loosely fastened over 
his mouth and under his chin, to hide a throat- 
wound which he had received a short time before 
in an encounter with Mir Barkat's gang. As for 
Mir Haji, not only is Barkat Khan his son-in-law, 
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rival, and predecessor in the governorship of 
Biyaban, but had it not been for the latter's active 
participation in the arms trafic, and his consequent 
outlawry by the Persian Government, there was 
small chance of his ever rising to the position which 
he now occupies. It was illerefore with sorne- 
thing more than inere zed for law and order that 
Mir IXaji suggested, and his and Mir ICambarYs 
followers carried out, the successful turning move- 
ment of the 28th. The impression, however, 
created in his favour by the presence of the troops 
in Biyaban should suffice to establish his un- 
challenged supremacy in the district of which he 
is now c'Zabt," or Governor. Incidentally we 
thereby gain an additional guarantee of a material 
reduction in the arms traffic at tliis point, since it 
would be virtually impossible for the nakhudas 
to run :t cargo of rifles over from the new depot a t  
Sohar without the fact coming to his knowledge. 
It may be of interest to mention the fact that 
ainong the empty cartridge-cases found in the 
Baluch trenches after the action of the 28th, 
besides those of the principal Continental manu- 
facturing States, were many of English make, 
specimens of which I retained as souvenirs. 
The questions that were asked in Parliament by 
Colonel Yate, shortly after the return of the 
Mekran Expedition (May 1911), with regard to 
measures being taken for the protection of the 
Central Persian Telegraph-Line, raised another 
aspect of the point which originated in the British 
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CENTRAL PERSIAN TELEGRAPH 18%) 
note to Persia of October, 1910, to the effect that 
if the Persian Government should prove incapable 
of preserving order on the Southern Persian trade- 
routes, it would devolve on the British Government 
to  put forward more effective measures for the 
purpose of safeguarding the interests of our own 
commerce in particular and that of foreign nations 
in general in the disturbed areas. The telegraph- 
line in question, after leaving Kerman, crosses the 
Dasht-i-Lut by way of Bam to Kuh-i-Malik Siah, 
where i t  enters British territory at Robak. Between 
Bam and the British fronbier it intersects at more 
than one point with the caravan routes from 
Mekran and Biyaban, by which the returning arms 
caravans regain the Valley of the Helmund. What 
more likely than that, having been driven out 
empty-handed from Mekran, the Ghilzais should 
take what revenge lay in their power and destroy 
a few miles of telegraph-line ? Only last year about 
four iniles of wire were cut up by a party returning 
to Afghanistan, and carried away bodily to Ghazni, 
where i t  commanded a ready sale as a substitute 
for string in tying together the component parts of 
the Afghan plough. Fortunately, up to date the 
telegraph-line has remained intact. The point at 
issue, however, was not whether a force should 
have been moved out, presumably from Robat, to 
protect the line, since this was precluded by the 
approach of the hot weather and the consequent 
drying up of the water-supply, which makes i t  
impossible for a column to operate in this district 
184 A BRUSH WITH THE' GUN-RUNNERS 
I 
I after a certain date, The real question, which still 
1 remains to be decided, is to what extent we are 
i justified in interfering in Persia, and in taking our 
1 own precautions to insure that the concessions that 
have been granted to British subjects are not 
rendered nugatory by the inability of the Persian 
Government to provide any guarantees of proper 
protection ; that our telegraphic comlnunications 
with India are not in jeopardy from casual bands 
of disaffected tribes-people from a neighbowing 
State ; and that effect is given to the assurarlces of 
the Persian Government, who profess to be in 
sympathy with our attempts to prevent the a~ming 
of hostile tribes on our North-West Frontier. 
k! I n  this connection it is interesting t o  learn how 
the matter is regarded in the country through 
which the Rfekran Field Force passed. Mir Haji, 
the chief whose authority has just been restored 
over the province of which he is Governor, pro- 
fessed himself anxious to learn when the British 
Goveinment proposed carrying out their expressed 
intention of policing the trade-routes of Southern 
Persia, adding that the three months granted as 
respite to the Persian Government had long since 
run their course, and that the disturbing news from 
Bushire at  that time (April-May) warranted the 
adoption of precautionary measures of the nature 
suggested. He was thinking, no doubt, of his own 
lands and of those of Mir ICambar of Kuhistak, so 
recently harried by Mir Barkat and his freebooters 
from a safe retreat in the fastnesses of Bashakard. 
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That there is no love lost between Persians and 
Baluchis is a. truth on which it is needless to dwell. 
Persia fulfils no duty towards its province of 
Baluchistan, beyond the self-imposed task of ex- 
torting from time to time by force of arms what 
revenue can be squeezed out of the uiducky inhabi- 
tants. I f  we should be justified in policing the 
trade-routes of Southern Persia proper, surely, then, 
it is our duty to preserve the peace in Baluchistan, 
where a country, potentially fertile, as I shall 
attempt to  show in the next chapter, is being kept 
back through the oppressioil of the Persians on the 
one hand, and the lawlessness of the neighbouring 
hill-tribes on the other. 
CHAPTER XI11 
THE FUTURE OF MEKRAN 
f c  Before my dreamy eye 
Stretches the desert with its shifting sands 
And i~nimpeded sky ." 
LONGBELLOW. 
WHILE interest still lingers over a country that 
has just been traversed by a British force, and 
which has hitherto remained t o  all intents and 
purposes a terra incog~ita even to the pioneers 
of British trade, it may not be out of place to offer 
a few remarks on the resources and possibilities 
of Persian Melcran, as far as it is possible to judge 
of them during a short and transitory visit. The 
probability, also, of a railway being constructed 
through Southern ~ e r s i d  in the not very distant 
future affords an additional reason for speculative 
interest in Mekrm. 
Of the early history of Mekran we can obtain 
only occasional glimpses, and for these are mainly 
indebted to the diligent researches of British 
officers who, such as Pottinger, Goldsmid, Holdich, 
and Sykes, have traversed this region in the service 
of their country; or to men such as Bloyer, who, 
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during a long residence in Mekran in the employ- 
ment of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, 
explored the little-known interior of Persian Balu- 
chistan, and gave to the world the results of his 
wanderings in "Unexplored Baluchistan," Such, 
indeed, is the isolation in which this out-of-the-way 
corner of Persia has been sunk for centuries that 
it is only when an Alexander, a Ghenghiz Khan, or 
a Nadir Shah, leads his victorious armies in this 
direction, that we gain more than the distorted and 
legendary accounts of mythical heroes or local 
chieftains handed down from mouth to mouth and 1 
sung by the gipsy bards* of Mekran. Since the 
time when Alexander led his army back from 
founding an empire on the Indus, almost every 
century has brought a fresh invasion, the Baluch 
Sirdars, then as now, yielding a minimum of 
homage to  the conqueror of the moment. Persian 
dynasties and invaders from beyond-Sassanians, 
Hindus, Arabs from Aleppo ; Saffars, Deilamis, 
Seljuks from Central Asia ; Mongols and Afghans 
-each in turn have made themselves masters of 
Mekran, none, however, having been able to 
maintain more than a temporary supremacy over 
the hardy Baluch chieftains, in whom the spirit 
of patriotism, common to all hillmen, is so 
strongly implanted. In the majority of cases they 
were content to  exact an exorbitant tribute at  the 
time, and retire with a nominal title to the lands 
which they had conquered, but had been unable 
* The Loris. 
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t o  retain. This is the position of Persia to-day 
with regard to  Mekran. 
As a result of these numerous irruptions of half- 
civilized tribes, the whole of Persian Baluchistan 
has been overlaid with successive deposits of ethno- 
logical sediment, differing in character according to 
the quarter from which they originated, much as 
the low-lying flats of the Kabul River around 
Peshawar differ in the cha~acter of their sediment 
according as to whether the Swat, the Bara, or the 
Kabul River was last in flood. These different 
tribes have, as a general rule, no very strongly 
marked territorial limitations, as among the 
Pathans, but are scattered broadcast throughout 
the country, their tribal occupation being a surer 
guide to  their origin than the locality in which 
they are found. Much of this inay be accounted 
for by their semi-nomadic habits. It must also 
be remembered that, besides the principal invasions 
to  which allusion has already been made, there .t;11e trough of 
occurred many immigrations of which not the ,tructed of a 
slightest historical records exist. ballasted with 
In most countries the original inhabitants, where same tree, an( 
yet they exist, are generally found in the course 
of ages to have sunk down in the scale, and to have Of t h e  tlibl 
been gradually forced into menial occupations by origin are foul 
the races by whom they have been supplanted. of A r a b  desce 
This is true of Mekran, with one brilliant excep- of the Mirs oj 
tion-namely, the Brahuis, an aboriginal tribe of 1 can find no 
Dravidian origin, according t o  Sykes, who have az~d inhabit thc 
inhabited Mekran since the first dawn of history, With the e: 
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and who yet in its more easterly districts have 
remained the dominant race. Among the remain- 
ing probably aboriginal tribes may be mentioned 
the mat-makers of Geh and Qasrkand, several 
l~omadic tribes of graziers and camel-owners in 
the Jaghin and Sadaich Valleys, and the c c  Maids," 
or fishermen, who are almost certainly the descen- 
dants of the ancient <' Ichthyophagi," or Fish-eaters, 
of whom Arrian spealcs in his account of the 
voyage of Nearchus from the mouths of the Indus. 
While landing at Galag, a good opportunity 
occurred of observipg one of these "Maids" at 
work, fishing with a line some half a mile out 
to  sea. A t  first sight, and from a distance, this 
ragged creature appeared to be standing motion- 
less upon the face of the waters, but on a nearer 
approach he was seen to  be supported on what 
looked like a mass of wreckage, througl~ which 
the sea was breaking as it lay half submerged in 
the trough of the swdl. This crazy craft is con- 
structed of a framework of date-palm branches, 
ballasted with heavy blocks from the trunlc of the 
same tree, and, in spite of its appearance of in- 
stability, is said to possess great buoyancy. 
Of the tribes in Biyaban, the Mirs of Indian 
origin are found also in Mekran; the Shaikh are 
of Arab descent; the Ho t  constitute the family 
of the Mirs of Jask;  and the Tahirzai, of whom 
I 
i 
I can find no previous mention, are agriculturists 
and inhabit the inner valleys of the coast district. 
With the exception of the Brahuis in the east 
- 
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of Melrran and the Gichki, descended from Rajput 
chiefs, the Baluch Sirdars are all descended from 
the large horde of Rinds that migrated from 
Aleppo early in the Mahommedan era. The 
priilcipal of these families are the Nahruis of Geh, 
Bint, and Qasrkand ; the Jadgds of Bir, Dashtiari, 
and Bahu; and the Hots of Jask and Biyaban. 
All the Baluch Sirdnrs are interrelated, and form 
a kind of feudal confederacy under Saiyid Khan 
of Geh, who, as paramount chief of Mekran, is 
liomiiially under the Deputy-Governor of Bampur, 
who, in turn, is respoi~sible to the Governo~-General 
of Icirman. I t  is this family relationship which 
enables the Baluch Sisdars to present such a 
determined front to any undue attempt on the 
part of the Persian Government to interfere in the 
affairs of Bduchistan, though among themselves 
there is a continual undercurrent of animosity 
and intrigue. For many years the Persiau Govern- 
ment has confined itself to making periodical in- 
cursions in force into Baluchistan, for the purpose 
of collecting revenue; but whether the present 
army, which is reported to have been defeated 
in the neigl~bourhood of Bampur, was sent to 
drive out the gun-runners, or whether the oppor- 
tunity of collecting revenue while the British 
troops were still in the country was considered 
too good to be lost, does not appear. At  any rate, 
success does not seem to have attended its efforts. 
Melcran is divided into the five districts of Jask, 
Geh, Qasrkand, Dashtiari, and Bahu, which, with 
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icts of Jask, 
which, with 
the exception of the first, are under the Sirdar of 
Geh, and pay, or are supposed to pay, an annual 
tribute to the Persian Deputy-Governor of Bampur. 
The taxes are collected, but it is very doubtful 
whether the Governor of Barnp~zr ever sees more 
than a portion of them. Jask, though reckoned a 
district of Melrran, is under the Daria Begi, or 
Governor of the Gulf Ports, of whom it is, how- 
ever, almost entirely independent, paying no taxes. 
Biyaban also forms part of the of the Gulf 
Ports, but the mountainous and inaccessible region 
of Bashakard, running down like a wedge between 
Melcran and Biyaban, is a subdistrict of Rudbar, a 
district of ICirman. It would be very much better 
were Bashakard incorporated either with Balu- 
chistan or the Gulf Ports, for, lying at a considey- 
able distance from, it is virtually independent of, 
ICirman, and, being infested with robbers, is a dis- 
tinct menace, not only to the compa~atively unim- 
portant country to the soutll and south-east, but 
to the highly important trade-routes leading from 
Bandar Abbas to Hirman. Caravans are constantly 
being attacked and looted by these robbers from 
Bashakard, and being outside the jurisdiction ofthe 
Daiia Begi, the latter cannot, while the Governor 
of Kirman will not, take any steps to put a stop to 
the nuisance. 
Towns can hardly be said to exist; in Mekran. 
Geh, Bint, and Qasskand, are little more than large 
villages of 2,000 inhabitants, though Chahbar and 
Jask, on account of their European connection, 
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might rank as such. Among the remaining villages 
may be mentioned Old Jaslr, the residence of the 
hereditary chiefs of Jask, wiped out by a rival 
Sirdar some years since ; Grishkin, a port at the 
mouth of the Jaghill River, which carries on a not 
unimportant trade with the opposite coast of 
Arabia ; Bir, a few miles west of Chahbar ; and Tiz, 
a suburb of the latter port, which in early times 
was the centre of a large silk export from the 
Bampur region. 
Our own relations with Persian Mekran have 
been chiefly in connection with the delimitation of 
the boundary between it and British Mekran, which 
was effected by the Goldsmid Mission by a line 
drawn fi-om a point eight miles east of Gwatar to 
Icuhak, some hundred miles inland. It was this 
recognition of Persian interests in Mekran that 
incidentally suggested t o  her the idea of reasserting 
her rather shadowy authority over this turbulent 
district. Since that time two British expeditions 
have penetrated Mekran, one to  avenge the murder 
of Mr. Graves in lcarwan in 1897, and the second 
in 1902, under Major Tighe, as escort to Major 
Showers, Political Agent, Icalat, for the purpose 
of destroying some forts in the Sarhad district of 
Persian Baluchistan which were being used as 
strongholds whence raids might be committed into 
British territory. 
As to commercial relations, these can hardly be 
said ever to have existed. It was at Jask in 1619 
that British trade first sought to tap the markets of 
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Southern Persia. Here the East India Compaily 
had its first factoiy i11 the Gulf, whence in 1622 it 
was trai~sfened to the port of Gombroon or Bandar 
Abbas, and the coi~nectioiz ceased.* I n  1904-05 
the itinerary a t  first selected for the Iudinn Com- 
mercial Missioil to South-Eastern Persia iilcluded 
a return journey from ICirmwn by way of the fertile 
district of Bain-Narmashir, across the Gishu Pass, 
througli the Barnpula Valley and Persian Bnluchistan 
(this would probably have included n visit to tlle 
districts of Geh, Bint and Qasrkand), to Magas; 
thence, via IZuhalc and the I<ej Valley, to the coast 
at Gwadur o~ Pasili. But on al~ivnl in Persia 
"the tour through s sandy and stony land, wllich 
grudgingly supports a sparse population of wild 
and poverty-stricken nomads," where tllcre was 
"no trade worth speaking of, nor ally hope of 
increasing it," was ultimately abandoned.? Tlius 
for the second time British trade passed by on the 
other side. 
Broin the foregoing sketch i t  will be seen that 
the drawbacks that have beset Persian Baluchistan 
in the past-the scanty population, the huge u11- 
cultivated areas-have been due as much to the 
maladministration and extortion of the su~ceeding 
conquerors who froin time to time have imposed 
their will on the wretched populatioa as to the 
vagaries of an unkindly Nature. 
Tt would be premature to attempt to forecast 
* Cu~zon's " Persia." 
-t. Report on the Mission. 
25 
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the actual route that a railway through Southern 
Persia would follow, but this much may possibly 
be hazarded with safety, that such a railway, if 
built, will pass througli Persian 13aluchistar~, and 
connect with the India11 system, not at Quctta, as 
might be expected, but at Icarachi. Tlie difficult 
gradients in the neighbou~hood of Nushki, and the 
desert zone wllicll lies across the pat11 of the more 
northerly route, combine to favour the idea that 
tlle more southerly, across Persian Baluchistan, will 
eventually be adopted. It is possible that to many 
the idea of developing R'Ielcrail will appear in the 
light of making a silk purse out of a sow's ear. I 
do not ~yisli to claim too much for Mekran-qz6i 
trop embrace, 71zal kkreiszt-but in the construction 
of a railway it is necessary to talrc into account the 
material resources of the district through which it 
is to pass, and althougli no glowing future can be 
predicted for Mekran, as has been for other parts 
of the Shall's dominions-at least, for Inally a long 
year to coine-yet, it is capable of sufficient de- 
velopment to  provide valuable feeders for the 
tru~ilr line. 
In  order to make the position clear i t  will be 
necessary to  give a rather detailed account of the 
orographical features of the country, in which, for 
the sake of homogeneity, it is proposed to  include, 
under tlie geographical expression '"ekran," all 
that country lying to the south of the latitude of 
Bandar Abbas as far as the British fi-ontier, and 
including the subdistricts of Biyaban and Bashakard, 
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Geographically speaking, Mekran may be divided 
into three distinct belts, of which the most southerly 
consists of a broad strip of alluvial country extend- 
ing on an average some ten to fifteen miles inland 
to  the foot of the coast range. In Melaan proper 
this coast range is composed of a sandy con- 
glomerate of gravel and shells, while in Biyaban it 
is formed of the stiff' blue clay known as shur," 
capped with sloping strata of white lilnestone 
several feet in thickness. From the seaward side 
i t  presents a jagged horizon of sharply denticulated 
pealrs ; on the landward it falls away in a pre- 
cipitous drop to tlie level plain-a feature common 
to  the succeeding ranges which back it inland. At 
the foot of this range, where i t  approaclles the 
shore, are low-lying rnangrove swamps and long 
stretches of driven sand, while in places are to 
be found groves of date-palms, villages, and scanty 
cultivation. 
While in Biyab,m I had the opportunity of visit- 
ing the Governor of Biyaban in his mud fort at  
Sirik, and of obtaining a nearer view of one of 
these coast villages. Sirik lies about three miles 
from the shore, from which it is concealed to  view 
by a long line of carefully tended palm-trees. The 
village consists of some scores of huts made of 
date-palm brailches, and thatched with the leaves 
of t l ~ e  dwarf "pish" palm, clustering round the 
square mud fort in the centre, while to the left 
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is a large banked-up reservoir. As  we entered the 
village women were passiilg to and fro carrying 
? pitchers of water on their heads, but these soon 
1 disappeared into the huts, modestly drawing the 
i 
corner of their veils across their faces. It is 
i 
h 
impossible to describe the impression of squalor 
and poverty that tlie first sight of these rude 
f dwellings produces on one. Unventilated and 
unlit but by the narrow entrance, the furniture 
of these hovels rarely runs to anything Inore 
luxurious than a threadbare Bnshakardi carpet, 
a long red bolster slip filled with hay, a few 
copper cooking-pots, a cracked lookii~g-glass, a 
bag of beads from the Somali coast, some baskets 
of dates, a saddle-bag or i;wo, and a naked boy, 
while in the corner lnay be seen an old matchlocl~ 
c c  jezail," and hanging on the walls the pendant 
camel's-hair trappings which lend to  the ungainly 
" sliutar " (camel) such an air of superiority. 
Entering the mud fort through a kind of guard- 
house, where a malefactor was undergoing punish- 
ment in the stoclcs, we came upon an open court, 
in the middle of which was an empty mud tai11c 
and a small heap of grain, which some woman had 
no doubt been engaged in winnowii~g when our 
appearance put her to  flight. T o  right and left 
were low and gloomy doorways leading to dark 
recesses, while in fiont, under a high portico, sup- 
ported by cylindrical pillars of uncommon thick- 
ness, sat the Governor, on a rich carpet, sur- 
rounded by his advisers, retainers, and negro 
slaves, pa 
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slaves, passing from hand to hand the gurgling 
" kalyan." 
Behind the coast range is ail intermediate belt 
composed of parallel ranges of hills of no great 
height, and valleys, uninhabited for the ~rlost part, 
but possessing ,z light clay soil, wl~ich supports 
a few oases of date-palms and a luxurious growth 
of tamarisk and acacia, camel-thorn and "akh," 
while hay, dwarf melons, wild indigo, and wild- 
flowers, abound after the rains. The oasis of 
Chikai Bund, at  which the force encamped on the 
~narch up to Bint, and also on the way back, 
for several days, provided a plentiful supply of 
first-class hay, and all along the banks of the 
Rapch at  this point the vegetation was especially 
luxuriant. 
Behind this intermediate belt the countiy rises 
again through a third zone of rugged mountains, 
stark and riven plateaux, ravines choked with 
boulders, to the distant Lashar Range, wllich, 
extending westward as the Band-i-Nushki to its 
right-angled junction with the Band-i-Marz, or 
mountains of Bashalcard, eastward as the Band- 
i-Nilag to the British frontier, forins the water- 
parting between the basins of the Gulf of Oman 
and the Jax Morian Hamun-the last remnant 
of an inland sea probably still existent in early 
histoiical times. 
There is no reason to suppose that Mekran is 
ally less fertile than any other part of Persia. 
Given better govemmeilt and the abolition of the 
26 
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perilicious system of farming the taxes-" pisl~kesh "
(the " graft " of America)-and other methods of 
extortion, a largely increased area might speedily 
be brought into cultivation-an act of enterprise 
which the humble tiller of the soil has hitherto 
refrained from committing through fear of increased 
taxation. To  those who have seen " in the rough " 
the type of country which in TVestern America, 
despised at  first even by the cattle-rancher, has 
become the richest fruit lands in tlie world, or to 
those who are acquainted with the gigantic schemes 
that are in hand for the irrigation of blesopotamia, 
of Upper Egypt, and of the Sind " desert," the 
latter of which reproduces in many striking ways 
the characteristics of Mekran, the problem of 
effecting the metamol.phosis of Melrran would not 
present such apparently insuperable difficulties. 
The water-supply of Mekran, as obtained from 
the perennial rivers-i.e., those that take theii. 
source in the main watershed-is both excellent and 
abundant. Prom the Rudkhaneh-i-Minab, the 
classical Anamis, where Nearchus brought his 
celebrated voyage to a close, t o  the Bay of Gwatar, 
there are no fewer than ten such rivers, all of which 
have quite respectable tributaries. As waterways 
they are, of course, valueless, being seldom more 
than 18 inches deep, and never continually so, 
except perhaps in the flood season. The most 
iinportant of these flow into the Gulf of Oman 
-namely, the Jaghin, the Sadaich, the Rapch, 
the Geh, and the combined course of the Dasht i~r i  
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and Bahu Rivers. Between them are many 
smaller streams, rising mostly in the middle belt, 
which dry up altogether in the hot weather, and 
whose waters are brackish and generally unfit to 
drink, even for beasts. The rivers of Biyaban, tlie 
Mnzavi and the Gaz, also rise in the main range, 
but are shorter, and flow into the Straits of Horinuz, 
carrying with them quantities of gypsum, held in 
suspension and obtained from the limestone farina- 
tion, which, together witli the " shur " or stiff blue 
clay, is everywhere to be seen, the latter rising in 
jagged cliffs, seamed witli myriads of tiny perpen- 
dicular runnels and scoriations. The Marak River, 
a tributary of the Gaz, where it forces its way 
through the gorge bet~veeil the plairis of Sahrn-i- 
Gurg and Sarzeh, has forrned on the inner side of 
tlie bends in itsdcourse high benches of this mixture 
of limestoile and clay soil, which appears to possess 
a greater fertility thail the alluvial soil of Mekran 
proper. At any rate, the cultivation here is in a 
more advanced condition, the general aspect of 
Biyaban being somewhat in the nature of a surprise 
to eyes accustomed to the dreary wastes of unculti- 
vated plain that had been encountered during the 
advance up the Valley of the Rapch. On all sides 
waving fields of wheat and barley stretcl~ed away 
to the distant curtain-wall of limestone, while the 
la~idscape was filled in by a profusion of tamarisk, 
mimosa, and acacia, with the usual date-groves, and 
an occasional field of " jowari " (millet) and lucerne. 
It was by far the most fertile part we had yet 
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traversed in this land, where the evil administration 
R of the Persian Government, the rapacity of the tax-farmer, and the ever-present menace of the 
11 robber hillmen, have combincd to  atrophy the 
I/ 
S ngricultural instinct in the oppressed and down- 1 trodden peasantry. It is only necessary t o  mention I 
that these crops have been produced by the simple 
II 
rainfall of the district to realize what might be 
;I 
II 
achieved were proper steps taken to store the water, 
wl~ich comes down in sucli quantities from the 
I l~ills, for the purposes of irrigation. 
'1 
For inany years it was tl~ougllt that the Bampur 
I 
River drained out into the Gulf of Oman, but this 
mistake has been explained now by the fact that 
the principal rivers of Mekran proper rise on the 
northern slopes of the Lashar Range, and, hemmed 
in by a kind of " trans-Lashar Range," bend south- 
wards, boring their way through wild and fantastic 
I : gorge scenery, that has more than oncc inspired the 
I pen of the traveller. During and just after the 
1 rains, which occur in December and January 
! (Mekran being outside the monsoon area), these 
1 
I gorges are filled with raging torrents, by which 
1 many a caravan has been engulfed while making an 
I! 
/I 
ill-judged attempt to negotiate the passes. Lower 
I down they inundate the whole of the coast district, 
I sometimes rendering impassable for many days at a time the Rah-i-Daria, or coast road, which runs at a distance of ten miles or so inland, coilnecting 
1 the Mekran ports of Gwatar, Challbar, and Jask. 
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graph land-line runs to  Jask, and i t  is also at the 
intersection of this road with the courses of the 
rivers that the more important coast villages are 
situated. But for the vernal floods these villages 
would in all probability not exist, as they are mostly 
uni~lllabitnble and deserted in the hot weather. 
The existence of these rocky gorges tends to 
simplify in a p e a t  degree the problem of water- 
storage, and renders the country in many parts 
peculiarly adapted for successful irrigation. Nature 
has, indeed, herself supplied an object-lesson in this 
direction by the vertical uptilting of the limestone 
strata, which, acting as a natural dam, serve to 
retain in deep and limpid pools far up among the 
mountains the residue of the rains, which at  present, 
neglected by the unthrifty inhabitant of the plain, 
flow to  waste in the sandy nals-beds of the coast 
district. All over the Middle East are to be found 
the remains of irrigation works, some of them on 
a vast scale, and one cannot doubt that the noble 
cities and fertile gardens of ancient Persia were 
entirely dependent on the maintenance of such 
dams as that on the Halil Rud, a little above the 
city of Jiruft, destroyed probably at  the time of the 
downfall of the Seljuk Dynasty, but even to-day 
capable of being sufficiently restored to hold a 
large quantity of water.* 
Immense reservoirs of this kind miglit easily be 
constructed at  comparatively small cost among the 
hills, where the narrow gorges and oval-shaped 
* Sykes. 
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valleys permit, and if these were not needed, 
smaller dams would suffice to  raise the river-levels 
high enougll to admit of the water being led off 
into irrigation channels. A t  present there is no 
systein of irrigation worthy the name beyond 
the " bund " round the date-grove, not even the 
llo~nely and primitive '' lta~iz," '( qanat," or covered 
ditch. 




on by the inhabitants of Mekrnn are camel-breed- 
1 ing, mat-making, fishing, and, in a minor degree, 
agriculture and grazing, and from these practically 
all the trade is formed. Tile principal camel- 
breeding centres are a t  Geh and in the Rapch, 
Sadaich, and Jaghin Valleys. A considerable export 
trade is carried on in dried fish with Maskat, 
forming one of the principal means of livelihood 
for the poverty-stricken coast population. With 
the dried-fisli indristry may be mentioned the 
export of sharks' fins and isinglass, also to 
Maskat, thence to China and the East, where 
they are valued partly as delicacies and partly for 
their medicinal properties. Next to the fishing 
industry that of mat - making ranks perhaps in 
importance, being carried on wherever the dwarf 
palm exists. Other occupations are those of carpet- 
inaking in Jask and Bashakard, a black-and-white 
carpet known as c 6  khirsak " being peculiar to the 
Jask district. I11 Rint a curious kind of em- 
broidered coat, worn by all the notables of Persian 
Baluchistan, is made. The embroidery on these 
coats is of a 
and effect i 
miniature. 
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coats is of a very high order, resetnbling iu pattern 
and effect the richness of a Persian carpet in 
miniature. In  a country where so inucli has re- 
mained unchailged since early Biblical times-the 
legend of Jonah is said to have originated on the 
shores of an inland sea that existed here for- 
merly-it would hardly be surprising were this 
coat the lineal descendant of the original " coat of 
many colours " that excited the envy of Joseph's 
brethren. The more usual crops raised include 
wheat and barley in spring ; dates and jowari in 
autumn ; small quantities of rice and cotton are 
also grown. Live-stoclr is confined to a few herds 
of humped cattle of a breed peculiar to the 
country, and a few flocks of " dumba " (fat-tailed 
sheep) and goats. Camels and dollkeys are the 
beasts of burden. 
Wi th  this meagre stock-in-trade it is not to be 
wondered at that European trade has impatieiltly 
gone elsewhere. As far as inland communications 
are concerned, Mekran is no worse off than other 
parts of Southern Persia. The principal caravan 
routes connecting the coast with the interior 
follow the course of the rivers. The most im- 
portant of these is undoubtedly that which from 
Chahbar strikes inland up the valley of the Dash- 
tiari River past Qasrkand, over a low kotal, and 
down into the valley of the Bampur River. A t  
Bampur it connects with the main caravan route to 
Kirmaii via Barn and Rayill, and also with the 
Sistan-Khoras~n route through Robat and Nasrata- 
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accommodating ships of even such moderate 
draught as those employed in the Gulf. A t  that of Cllalib 
Gwatar, Chahbar, and Jask, the two last of which ]rand, Faaucl~, - .  
1, are regular places of call for the British India Line, 
vessels have to anchor as much as three or four 
I 
miles from the shore, and discharging a cai1go is 
rendered difficult by the surf, and by the ever- 
present possibility of the dangerous " shumal " 
springing up at any moment. In early times, 
Chahbar-or rather Tiz, as it then was-boasted 
a considerable trade in silk, coming down from 
the interior by way of the Bampur-Chahbar caravan 
route. The possibility of ever revivifying this 
route as an alternative artery of trade for the more 
easterly portions of the commercial catclzment- 
basin of Bandar Abbas depends on the develop- 
ment of the country that lies between Bampur 
and Chalzbar. A t  present the trade of Chahbar is 
slightly on the decline, owing possibly to the rapid 
development of Bandar Abbas and amounts to 
about two lakhs and a half of rupees per annum, 
of which one 1ak.h accounts for imports ; while that 
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of Gwatnr amounts to one laklr, of which a third is 
in imported goods. I~nports coilsist of Mmchester 
cotton goods, rice, flour, lead, iron, tobacco, beads, 
oil, matches, tea, thread, silk, spices, and sugar, 
for which latter commodity there is said to be 
an ever-increasing demand in Persia. 
It is improbable that Jask will ever rise above its 
present position, overshs~dowed as it is on one side by 
Bandar Abbas, and on the other by Challbw. It has 
110 coinlnercial hinterland worth mentioning, while 
that of Chahbar already includes Geh, Bint, Qasr- 
lrand, Fanucl~, Barnpnr, and Fehru;j, and there is no 
reason why it  should not be extended so as to 
embrace Sarllad and Saravan, when developed, and 
Sistan and Bam-Narmashir, for which, however, it 
will have to compete with Baildar Abbas. 
I n  his valuable report on the Indian Cominercial 
Mission to South-Eastern Persia, Mr. Newcomen, 
its president, pointed out that the value of our 
trade wit11 Persia lay in the fact that we were able 
to supply her with articles which she was unable 
to produce herself, whilst taking fsom her r,zw 
materials, chiefly of a costly nature, such as gums, 
drugs, spices, and dye-stuffs. He  also drew atten- 
tion to the fact that Persia is not yet sufficiently 
developed to  produce enough raw material to 
pay for the value of her imports. This makes it 
quite clear that before Persian Mekran can be made 
a profitable field for commerce her puschasiilg 
power must be increased by the full developinent of 
her internal resources. Pish " palm mats, dates, 
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and dried fish, will not buy the co~ninodities of the 
West, for which all over Persia there is an ever- 
t increasing demand, and in order to produce this 
I 
I 
r purchasing power i t  will be necessary for the 
husbandmen of Mekran to import and cultivate 
the valuable plants of the gums, spices, and dye- 
stuffs, which already form such a large item in the 
I material resources of the rich province of Kirman. 
Indigo already grows wild in Meluan. Henna, 
saffron, and madder, should follow it, and the valu- 
I able gum-tragacanth, asafetida, and colocynth. 
i For those plants that need moisture the coast 
district can provide up to '70 per cent. and 80 per 
cent. of atmospheric saturation. Long-staple cotton 
should grow well and compete successfully with the 
short-staple cotton of I<llorasan, rice in the flooded 
coast-belt, and coffee where it is not subject to  
inundation, but where the water-laden sea air might 
yield results equal to  those of far-famed Mokha. 
Inland the climate is dly and stimulating, and suit- 
able for the production of cereals, and also for 
sheep-farming, on account of the saline character- 
istics of a great part of the soil. 
The mineral resources of Mekran are probably 
very limited, although the fabled and inysterious 
mountain of " Iluh-i-l'aftan " in the Saravan High- 
lands of Northern Persian Baluchistan is reputed 
to be rich in the precious as well as the useful 
metals. It is, however, not improbable that oil 
and sulphur exist in workable quailtities, especially 
as Mekran lies in the Southern Persian oil-belt, 
which stretc 
t o  the Aj 
certainly ex 
of sulphur . 
of the Gaz 
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which stretches more or less from the Ilarun River 
to the Afghan c c  Garmsir." An oil formation 
certainly exists in the vicinity of Rint, and traces 
of sulphur were distinctly noticeable in the water 
of the Gaz River in Biyabaa. 
Such, indeed, as I have described them, I believe 
to be the resources and possibilities of Persian 
Meluan, but tlie future development of the country 
on economic lines rests with the Persian Govern- 
ment and with her advisers among the European 
nations, and unless the vampire of Persian official 
peculation prove too strong for the reborn spirit 
of Persian nationality-the latest child among the 
nations-it may well come to pass that the land, 
into which the Almighty is reputed by its inhabi- 
tants to have cast all the refuse left over from the 
creation of the world, may at length be reclaimed. 
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"A really valuable work, a book not only to read and to read carefully, but to possess 
and refer to again and again. . . . Chinese rrlight read this book with as much pleasure 
as Europeans, and probably learn almost as much."-Booh~rran. 
S T O R M  A N D  S U N S H I N E  I N  S O U T H  
AFRICA. By Rosan~und Southey. Edited by Frances Slaughter. 
With Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 12s. net. 
"Miss Southey has the observant eye, the quick ear, and the artistic perception, and she 
has used all these gifts with great discrimination andco~isidernble ffect in this volnn~e. We 
know of no story covering the snme ground that has appeared in receut years that has 
imprcsscd us so much by i t s  sincerity and its accuracy."-Coz~rl journal. 
I N D I A  A N D  T I B E ' T .  By Colonel Sir 
Francis You~ighusband, K.C.I.E. With Maps and Illustrations. 
Medium 8v0, 21s. net. 
"The  expedition to Lhasa six years ago has already had threc historians, but Sir 
Frnncis Younghusband's work is invested with a specinl value which none of its predecessors 
can claim. I-Ie was the responsible lcader of the Mission of 1904, and what he h x  to say 
about it, and about the circumstances which led to its dispatch, hears iht! stamp of final and 
indlliputable authority . . . a full and balanced account of  the political aspects of the 
Tibetan problem, the motives which led the unveiling of Lhasn, the results of the Mission, 
and the questions which still await solution. H i s  book, therefore, cor~rtitutes the most 
important contribution yet made to the growing store of literature about l'illet "-7Xr 
Tiltles. 
A MARINER OF ENGLAND. An Account of 
the Career of William Richardson, from Cabin-Boy i n  the Merchant 
Service to Warrant Officer in the Royal  Navy (1780-1817), told in his 
own words. E d i t e d  by  Co lone l  S p e n c e r  Ch i lde r s ,  R ,E . ,  C.B. 
Dcnly avo. 10s. 6d. net. 
"Worth a dozen of the ordinary memoirs with which the market is flooded. For 
it is a enuine 'human docun~ent ' a revelation of the thoughts and doings of a ty ical 
ICngli% sailorman durin the mabt stirring years in our naval history. . . We eave 
found the book delinhtfu? readin=."-S@aclafor. - - - ". . Such excellent stuff, and in such racy, strai~htforwnrd English. . . . Un- f 
commoAl good reading. I t  makes us  think of some of Capt~in  Marryat's pictures 
~ f w h a t  iey  did at sea in the  brave day8 of old."-Strrrrd~rd. 
I 
i 
ROUND ABOUT T H E  NORTH POLE. By ! 
W. J,  G o r d o n .  With many Woodcuts and  other Illustrations by 1 
EDWARD WIIYMPER. M e d i m  avo. 158, net. I 
"The illustrations are excellcnt, nnd a0 nre the maps. We do uot know of any 
book covering so wide a ran e of exploration equally well. Not only is this voluma 
full of attractrve information,%ut also of stirrin adventure, some stories of triumph, 
but more of failure and despair!'-51rcdFtld 1,rAP6pnldctli. 
A WOMAN'S WAY THROUGH UNKNOWN 
LABRADOR. By Mrs.  L e o n i d a s  H u b b a r d ,  Jun io r .  Wi th  Map, 
Portraits, and  other Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d .  net. 
"Graphic narrative and descriptive power and close observation illuminate its 
pag.es. It Is distinguished moreover by the fact that Mrs. Hubbard piirsued and 
ach~eved, with rare tenaeit;, courape,'and singleness of purpose, a definite objec- 
tive."-Eurnirrg Shndard. 
FROM PEKING TO MANDALAY. A Journey 
from North China to  Burma through Tibetan Ssuch'uan and Yunnan. t 
By R. F. J o h n s t o n ,  M.A., F.R.G.S., District Officer and Magistrate, r 
Wei-hni-wei. W i t h  numerous IlIustrntions and Map. Demy 8vo. 
15s. nel. I 
"No raiae is too high. . . . Written with learning, authority, and enthusiasm. I 
, Mr. yohnston's work i s  one in a thouaand and however many othera may be 
dh;egarded this should be read a t  least by thise who care for the  judgments of a 
I 
f 
man who has broupht to bear in rbmote parts of the Chinese Empire a full knowledae 
of Chinese characters and the Chinese language."-Sprctdor: 
- - 
FROM PEKING T O  SIKKIM : Through the I 
Ordos, the Gobi Desert, and Tibet. By Count De L e s d a i n .  With 
M a p  and Illustrations based on the Author's Surveys a n d  Photographs. 
Demy 8vo. 12s. net. 
"He gives us an account of the most extraordinary honeymoon the world h a  
ever known, and the modesty of the hardened traveller combined with the lucid and 
pictures ue style, makes i t  one of the most absorbingty interesting books of travel 
publishel for a long time!--EYdtr$ng Slondard. 
T H E  INNER LIFE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
By M o n s i g n o r  C o u n t  Vay d e  Vaya and L u s k o d ,  Author of 
"Empires and Emperors." Demy 8vo. 12s. net. 
"An exhaustive study of national qualities and characteristics and represents 
' the l~al res t  of a quiet eye' intent on studying motor forces rAther thpn t h d r  
y d u c t s .  . . . Undoubtedly an authofitative contribution to our knowled~e of the 
n111:d htates of to-day."-S,c~daj Tames. 


